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Richard Walker, executive chair of the Iceland supermarket chain and Labour’s appointed cost‑of‑living tsar, told BBC Radio 4’s Today programme that the government should extend the 5‑pence fuel duty cut beyond its September expiry to cushion households from soaring petrol prices. The call comes as the Strait of Hormuz—a vital conduit for roughly one‑fifth of the world’s oil—remains blockaded after the United States and Israel launched attacks on Iran at the end of February. The disruption has triggered a sharp rise in global oil prices, intensifying pressure on the UK economy. Under current policy, UK fuel duty is frozen until September, when a review is scheduled. By contrast, Australia recently announced a 14‑pence‑per‑litre cut to its fuel tax, highlighting the disparity with the UK’s modest 5‑pence reduction. Walker emphasized on air: “Given where we are, we need to be thinking about extending or enlarging the existing cut.” He noted that the original 5‑pence reduction was introduced by the Conservative government in March 2022. Chancellor Rachel Reeves had pledged in her November budget to keep the cut in place until August, followed by a gradual increase over five years. Prime Minister Keir Starmer has signalled that the planned September rise will remain “under review” in light of the ongoing conflict. Data from the RAC shows that, since the war began, the average price of a litre of diesel at UK forecourts has jumped 30 % to 185.2 pence, while petrol has risen 16 % to 154.5 pence per litre. Opposition parties are also weighing in: the Conservatives propose scrapping VAT on energy bills for several years, Reform UK calls for a VAT cut on fuel, and the Liberal Democrats advocate a 10‑pence fuel duty reduction.

At least 43 civilians were killed and 44 houses set ablaze during an assault by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Bafwakoa, located in Mambasa territory of Ituri province, according to the Congolese army.Lieutenant Jules Tshikudi Ngongo, the army’s regional spokesperson, said the attack occurred on Thursday and that the death toll could rise as search operations continue.The ADF, a rebel outfit that pledged allegiance to ISIL, has been increasingly targeting civilians in Ituri and the neighboring North Kivu province, despite joint Congolese‑Ugandan military campaigns launched in 2021.Witnesses reported that victims were killed with machetes, some perished in house fires, and two individuals were abducted, according to local customary official Christian Alimasi.The incident underscores the army’s difficulty in containing the ADF, which operates alongside other insurgent groups such as the Rwandan‑backed M23, responsible for seizing the major eastern city of Goma last year.Data from research firm Insecurity Insight indicates the ADF accounted for roughly 25% of civilian‑targeted violence in eastern DRC between 2020 and 2025, reflecting its significant presence in the region.Last year, the ADF’s attacks resulted in 66 deaths and multiple abductions, signalling a troubling escalation in its campaign against local populations.

Note: The full text of the Al Jazeera piece titled “It’s the beginning of the end of the American security order” was not included in the source material, so detailed analysis cannot be reproduced here.

The U.S. State Department announced on April 2, 2026 that Iran is "continually" pursuing a nuclear weapon. The declaration reflects Washington’s assessment that Tehran’s nuclear program remains a persistent challenge to regional and global security. This assessment underscores the United States’ ongoing scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear activities and may shape future diplomatic initiatives, sanctions considerations, and coordination with international monitoring bodies. By reiterating the claim, the State Department signals that Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to be a focal point of U.S. foreign‑policy strategy in the Middle East.

The United States has reaffirmed that it is still prepared to engage Tehran in diplomatic talks, despite the ongoing US‑Israel war against Iran and President Donald Trump’s renewed threats to target the country’s civilian infrastructure. State Department spokesperson Tommy Pigott told Al Jazeera that President Trump had pursued negotiations with Iran before the conflict erupted, but accused the Iranian regime of persisting in its quest for a nuclear weapon. "The president is always open to diplomacy, but he’s also clear that we will see our objectives fulfilled here," Pigott said, underscoring the administration’s dual track of diplomatic engagement and military pressure. In a primetime address aired on Wednesday, Trump echoed his earlier claims that the United States is winning the war, yet offered no concrete roadmap for ending the hostilities or reopening the Strait of Hormuz – a chokepoint whose closure by Tehran has driven global energy prices higher. The conflict began on February 28, shortly after a round of Geneva talks that Omani mediators and Iranian officials described as “positive.” Last year, Israel struck Iran’s three primary nuclear facilities in an operation the White House dubbed “Midnight Hammer.” Iran continues to deny any intention to develop a nuclear weapon, while Israel is widely believed to possess an undeclared nuclear arsenal. Former intelligence chief Tulsi Gabbard testified to Congress that Iran was not rebuilding enrichment capacity before the June 2025 attacks, and later reiterated that there have been no efforts to restore its nuclear program since the strikes. Nevertheless, Tehran insists on the right to enrich uranium domestically and has ruled out negotiations over its missile program and support for groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Pigott emphasized that the United States is maintaining high‑level diplomatic contacts across the region, stating, "We see diplomatic engagement at the highest levels of this administration, with our partners in the region, to pursue our interests and explore what can happen here." The spokesperson also accused Iran of targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure, describing the threat of a nuclear‑armed Tehran as "intolerable." In response, Iran has launched missile and drone attacks against U.S. and Israeli assets, as well as energy facilities, hotels, and airports throughout the Middle East. Trump later posted footage of a U.S. strike on a major Iranian bridge, warning that similar attacks could follow. He wrote on social media, "IT IS TIME FOR IRAN TO MAKE A DEAL BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE, and there is nothing left of what could become a great country." In the same speech, he threatened to destroy Iran’s power plants and, earlier in the week, suggested the United States could also target water desalination stations – actions that legal experts say would constitute collective punishment under international law. Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, told Al Jazeera that Trump appears to be "scrambling" to intensify the war in hopes of forcing a resolution before the conflict turns into a definitive failure.

In a recent analysis, the author argues that Lebanon’s accession to the International Criminal Court (ICC) would mark a pivotal step toward greater accountability and international legitimacy. By becoming a State Party, Lebanon could align its judicial framework with the global standards set by the Rome Statute, thereby enhancing the credibility of its legal institutions. The piece highlights three core benefits: first, the ICC’s jurisdiction would provide a mechanism to investigate and prosecute serious crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide that have historically plagued the region. Second, joining the Court would signal Lebanon’s commitment to the rule of law, potentially attracting foreign investment and diplomatic support by demonstrating a stable, rights‑respecting environment. Third, participation could facilitate cooperation with other ICC members, fostering regional dialogue on justice and reconciliation. While acknowledging the political complexities surrounding accession, the author stresses that the long‑term gains—greater judicial independence, deterrence of future atrocities, and improved international relations—outweigh short‑term challenges. The article concludes that embracing ICC membership would not only serve victims of past abuses but also position Lebanon as a proactive contributor to the global fight against impunity.

The Paris Appeals Court on Wednesday rejected Tunisia's request to extradite Halima Ben Ali, the daughter of the late former president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who faces accusations of laundering assets acquired during her father's 1987‑2011 rule.The ruling was anchored in Tunisia's failure to provide guarantees of an independent and impartial trial, a prerequisite under French and international extradition standards.Halima Ben Ali was detained in September 2025 at Tunisia's behest as she prepared to board a flight from Paris to Dubai. Authorities allege she participated in the laundering of wealth amassed under her father's regime.Her lawyer, Samia Maktouf, warned that sending her back would be tantamount to “a death sentence.” After the verdict, Maktouf described the decision as “an immense relief” and affirmed that justice had been served in accordance with the law.Tunisian prosecutors say the alleged financial crimes could carry a sentence of up to 20 years in prison, underscoring the broader push to recover misappropriated assets and hold the Ben Ali family accountable more than a decade after the Arab Spring uprisings.The case revives debate over the legacy of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was ousted in 2011, fled to Saudi Arabia, died in exile in 2019, and was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment by a Tunisian court.While the French decision may strain diplomatic ties, it also signals Paris' commitment to uphold procedural safeguards when handling extradition requests linked to politically sensitive cases.

The United Nations‑backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF) announced on Wednesday that its first foreign troops have landed in Haiti, signalling a new phase in the international effort to tame the country’s spiralling gang warfare.An advance team of soldiers from Chad arrived in Port‑au‑Prince, accompanied by Jack Christofides, a South African UN official appointed to lead the mission’s operations on the ground.The deployment is the initial step of a force slated to expand to 5,500 personnel with a 12‑month mandate. The GSF was authorized by the UN Security Council last September as a replacement for the earlier Kenyan‑led multinational security mission, which has struggled with funding shortfalls, insufficient manpower and limited institutional backing.Unlike its predecessor, which was limited to supporting Haitian police, the new force will have the authority to make arrests and conduct direct operations against groups designated as gangs. The concept was first put forward by the United States and Panama to “neutralise, isolate and deter” criminal networks.During the Security Council vote, twelve members voted in favour of the force, while China, Russia and Pakistan abstained. Russia’s representative, Vassily Nebenzia, criticised the plan as “rushed” and warned that its broad language could enable abuses, noting that the mandate permits the use of force against anyone labelled a gang.Haiti’s recent history of foreign intervention adds a layer of sensitivity to the deployment. Past UN peacekeeping missions have been linked to a cholera outbreak that claimed roughly 10,000 lives after the 2010 earthquake, and UN personnel have faced accusations of sexual assault in earlier decades.Gang control has tightened dramatically since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Analysts estimate that up to 90 % of Port‑au‑Prince is now under gang influence, with around 26 criminal groups operating in the capital. The UN estimates that at least 16,000 people have been killed since 2022 and that more than 1.5 million have been displaced, many facing food insecurity. A recent human‑rights report recorded 5,519 gang‑related deaths and 2,608 injuries between March 2025 and mid‑January 2026, alongside reports of extrajudicial killings and sexual violence.The arrival of the GSF coincides with Haiti’s tentative steps toward a national election scheduled for August, where roughly 300 political parties and groups have registered. Acting Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils‑Aime has recently met with UN officials to discuss the new force’s role in stabilising the country ahead of the vote.

Europe’s attention is fixed on Hungary’s parliamentary election scheduled for April 12, a contest many analysts view as a litmus test for the bloc’s cohesion on foreign‑policy, defence, energy and migration. Since coming to power, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has consistently blocked EU initiatives: he has refused to join a common asylum framework, opposed a joint defence scheme, resisted the shift toward renewable‑energy independence while still importing Russian hydrocarbons, and vetoed both Ukraine’s accession talks and a proposed €90 billion low‑interest loan package for Kyiv. These actions have made Hungary the most disruptive member state in the Union, prompting observers to argue that the election’s outcome will reverberate far beyond Budapest’s borders. Greek conservative MP Angelos Syrigos warned that the EU is plagued by “fanatically Trump‑like and pro‑Russian” governments, naming Hungary and Slovakia as examples. He told Al Jazeera that the constant threat of an Orban veto forces other capitals to seek ad‑hoc compromises rather than genuine consensus. Opposition leader Peter Magyar of the Tisza party is campaigning on a pro‑European platform, pledging a binding referendum on Ukraine’s membership, a crackdown on corruption, the release of billions in frozen EU funds, and a reversal of Hungary’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. Current polls give Tisza roughly 50 % of the vote, a ten‑point lead over the ruling Fidesz, though the political landscape remains fluid. Even a Magyar victory would not automatically resolve the EU’s structural challenges. Other illiberal leaders—such as Slovakia’s Robert Fico and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš—could step into a vacuum of obstructionism. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that Orban’s habit of breaking consensus has forced the Union to become more pragmatic. At a December 2023 summit, EU leaders temporarily excluded Orban to secure unanimous approval of Ukraine’s candidate status, later offering Hungary a €10 billion release of blocked funds as an incentive. Professor Katalin Miklossy of the University of Helsinki explained that the EU has shifted from a rigid, rule‑bound approach to a more flexible, problem‑solving mindset, saying, “We were weak when we clung to the book; now we act more practically.” Should Orban remain in power, the bloc is considering a workaround: issuing 26 bilateral loans to Ukraine from member states, bypassing any single‑country veto. Historical precedent exists. In 2010, when Greece’s debt crisis threatened the euro, EU members created the Greek Loan Facility—an ad‑hoc series of bilateral loans that compensated for the lack of a common rescue fund. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that delays in funding could leave the Ukrainian army under‑resourced, underscoring the geopolitical stakes of the Hungarian vote. The EU’s inability to move from unanimity to qualified‑majority voting—an ambition thwarted by failed French and Dutch referenda in 2005—has amplified Orban’s leverage. Yet the Union continues to evolve, having launched a common bond in 2020 to revive the pandemic‑hit economy and, since Russia’s 2022 invasion, channeling resources into a nascent European defence union. Orban’s recent reversal on the €90 billion Ukraine loan—after Kyiv refused to repair the Druzhba pipeline damaged by a Russian bomb—illustrates the volatility of his stance. He initially agreed to the loan in December, on the condition that Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic would not be required to co‑sign, only to withdraw support a month later. Even if Magyar secures a parliamentary majority, the promised loan may not materialise immediately. Cambridge‑based expert Victoria Vdovychenko notes that a decision made in December 2025 to disburse funds from January 2026 has already stalled, with the next realistic window possibly in June. Academics stress that a Tisza victory would deliver a psychological boost to the EU and its trans‑Atlantic partners, injecting confidence into a system battling “stealth creep of illiberalism” and economic disenfranchisement. Professor SM Amadae of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk warned that while a change in Hungary could energise citizens, the entrenched gerrymandering and patronage networks of Fidesz present formidable obstacles to lasting reform. In sum, the April 12 election is more than a domestic contest; it is a pivotal moment that could reshape the EU’s decision‑making architecture, determine the flow of critical aid to Ukraine, and signal the future trajectory of populist politics across Europe.