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Shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz remains effectively halted even after Washington and Tehran announced a two‑week ceasefire on Tuesday, dampening expectations of a swift end to one of the most severe energy disruptions in recent memory. According to ship‑tracking data from market‑intelligence firm Kpler, only five vessels crossed the waterway on Wednesday, down from eleven the day before, and seven managed the passage on Thursday. The figure is a stark contrast to the pre‑conflict norm of 120‑140 daily transits that the strait typically handled before the February 28 attacks by the United States and Israel. More than 600 vessels, including 325 tankers, are still stranded in the Gulf, as reported by Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Ana Subasic, Kpler’s trade‑risk analyst, warned that even if the ceasefire holds, safe‑passage capacity is likely to stay limited to 10–15 ships per day, reflecting shipowners’ caution and the absence of any toll‑free guarantee. The strait channels roughly one‑fifth of the world’s oil and LNG supplies. Its continued blockage therefore sustains pressure on global energy markets. After a brief dip, Brent crude rose to $96.39 a barrel at 02:00 GMT on Friday, having slipped below $95 the previous day. U.S. President Donald Trump accused Iran of violating the ceasefire’s “safe passage” clause, labeling Tehran’s performance “very poor” in a Truth Social post. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, countered that the United States had not honored its commitments, urging Washington to choose between a genuine ceasefire and “continued war” linked to Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Maritime veteran C Uday Bhaskar described the atmosphere in the strait as one of “uncertainty and anxiety,” noting that shipping firms remain fearful, especially after Iranian statements about newly laid mines. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, CEO of the UAE’s state‑run oil giant ADNOC, echoed the sentiment, asserting that Iran’s conditional permissions amount to “coercion, not freedom of navigation.” Asian equity markets responded positively to the tentative easing of oil price pressure. Japan’s Nikkei 225 climbed 1.8 %, South Korea’s KOSPI rose about 2 %, and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index gained roughly 1 % in early Friday trading. While the ceasefire offers a diplomatic window, the reality on the water remains stark: the Strait of Hormuz is far from open, and the global energy system continues to feel the strain of constrained maritime traffic.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that Spain will no longer take part in the Gaza ceasefire coordination centre, labeling Madrid’s actions as a diplomatic assault on Israel.In a video posted on X, Netanyahu warned that Israel will not stay silent when faced with what he described as attacks on its legitimacy.Foreign Minister Gideon Saar echoed the prime minister’s sentiment, condemning Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for allegedly spreading "blood libels" against the Israeli Defence Forces.Saar added on X that Spain’s persistent anti‑Israel stance under Sánchez has rendered it incapable of contributing constructively to the U.S. President’s peace initiative and the operations of the coordination centre.Relations have deteriorated since Israel’s October 2023 offensive in Gaza, after which Spain recognised a Palestinian state and repeatedly criticised Israel’s conduct. Sánchez’s government also opposed the U.S.–Israel campaign against Iran and even closed Spanish airspace to U.S. warplanes involved in that conflict.The Civil‑Military Coordination Centre (CMCC), a U.S.–led facility created under former President Donald Trump’s 20‑point plan, serves to monitor the declared ceasefire and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to the enclave.Despite the formal ceasefire, Israel continues to conduct near‑daily strikes in Gaza, and significant constraints on aid shipments remain in place.

Jonathan Freedland contends that the record of Benjamin Netanyahu’s recent wartime conduct is one of stark failure, despite the spotlight it has received alongside former U.S. President Donald Trump.While Trump has dominated headlines with his rhetoric on Iran and a self‑announced cease‑fire, Netanyahu has quietly overseen a continuation of hostilities across the region. Israel’s air campaign on Lebanon—the most lethal single strike in recent memory—targeted roughly 100 sites in a ten‑minute window, leaving at least 303 dead and more than 1,150 injured, many of them civilians.Israel maintains that the U.S.‑brokered deal with Tehran does not extend to Lebanon, a claim disputed by Iran and Pakistani mediators. Netanyahu, meanwhile, has pledged to sustain “full‑force” attacks on what Israel labels Hezbollah launch positions, even as he publicly agrees to diplomatic talks with Beirut.Internationally, Netanyahu is already wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes in Gaza, and his reputation abroad is that of a war‑time villain. Domestically, his supporters still view him as a security hawk, a perception that matters most as Israel faces elections no later than 27 October.Freedland highlights that the October 7, 2023 Hamas onslaught—Israel’s deadliest terrorist attack—occurred under Netanyahu’s watch, a fact that would have toppled most leaders in comparable democracies. Yet the prime minister promised “total victory” over Hamas, a promise that remains unfulfilled after a two‑year bombardment that has claimed roughly 70,000 lives in Gaza while leaving Hamas in control of the enclave’s unoccupied areas.Claims of having neutralised Hezbollah have also proved hollow. Although Israel announced the death of the group’s leader, Hezbollah continues to rebuild its arsenal and resumed rocket fire, undermining the narrative of a decisive Israeli triumph.Similarly, the 12‑day 2025‑2026 confrontation with Iran—branded by Trump as an obliteration of Tehran’s nuclear programme and by Netanyahu as a historic victory—has not diminished Iran’s strategic capabilities. The nation still possesses enriched uranium, a robust missile stockpile, and the ability to threaten global shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, effectively holding a lever over the world economy.Freedland argues that Netanyahu’s doctrine of perpetual military pressure yields only temporary relief, likening it to repeatedly cutting off a snake’s head only for it to regrow. Former Israeli general‑turned‑politician Yair Golan is quoted as saying that Netanyahu “does not know how to translate battlefield successes into lasting political security.”The human cost of this approach is evident not only in the casualties of Gaza, the Bekaa Valley and Israeli cities, but also in Israel’s deteriorating diplomatic standing. Recent legislation in the Knesset—pushed by far‑right minister Itamar Ben‑Gvir and supported by Netanyahu—introduces a death‑penalty provision for Palestinians convicted of terrorism, a move condemned internationally as discriminatory.As Israelis endure nightly bomb‑shelter drills and semi‑lockdown conditions, the electorate faces a stark choice. Polls suggest that even if Netanyahu is ousted, his successor may continue a similar hard‑line stance, albeit with different execution. Freedland concludes that Israel’s long‑term security cannot rely solely on force; a negotiated accommodation with neighbours, especially the Palestinians, may finally become politically viable after the exposure of Netanyahu’s repeated strategic failures.

The ongoing conflict between the US and Israel and Iran has significantly altered the dynamics of the nuclear programme negotiations. Former US envoys who dealt with Iran have stated that the US-Israeli attack on Iran and Tehran's subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz have given Iran new tools and resolve to resist pressure to shutter its nuclear programme.Two senior negotiators for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Obama-era agreement to limit Iran's nuclear uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief, said the Trump administration's war had handed Iran a coveted weapon by demonstrating its ability to cut off the Strait of Hormuz, an economic chokehold that one negotiator said would help Iran 'balance the asymmetry of power' with the US.Alan Eyre, a former diplomat who helped negotiate the JCPOA, noted that 'this administration, to say it more politely, cannot unsoil the bed. There's no way to get back to the status quo ante before this war started.'In 2018, Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, which barred Tehran from enriching its uranium to weapons-grade. Trump called the deal 'one of the worst and most one-sided transactions' the US had ever entered into.However, after a strategy of high pressure – first through returning sanctions and then, after Trump's return to power in 2025, a war that was meant to destroy Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities – the current US administration has found itself in more complex negotiations than before its campaign of economic and military strikes.Robert Malley, a Yale lecturer who was former special envoy to Iran under Joe Biden and a lead negotiator on the JCPOA, said: 'The strait of Hormuz wasn't an issue before the US decided to strike. You have all the issues inherited from the past, but you just added a few, because the US has handed Iran a tool that it always had, but it never thought of using, or never felt it could.'The chances for a comprehensive agreement addressing all of the US and Iran's grievances appear slim. While the Obama administration sought to negotiate exclusively on Iran's nuclear programme in the lead-up to the 2015 agreement, the Trump administration has sought a broader deal limiting Iran's ballistic missiles programme and its support for regional proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

The situation surrounding Pakistan's involvement in mediating the Iran conflict remains unclear due to a lack of provided content. However, Pakistan's emergence as a mediator suggests a significant development in international relations, particularly in the Middle East region.The Guardian's report, authored by Hannah Ellis-Petersen, Laure Boulinier, Sofia Couceiro, and Boglarka Kosztolanyi, likely delves into the specifics of Pakistan's mediation efforts and the implications for global diplomacy.

Amid escalating tensions in the Middle East, the Asian Football Confederation (AFC) has postponed the draw for the 2027 men’s Asian Cup, originally scheduled for Riyadh, and is exploring contingency plans. Australia has been urged to submit an emergency hosting bid to ensure the tournament proceeds as planned.The competition, set to kick off on 7 January 2027 and run for four weeks, will feature 24 national teams, including the Socceroos, across venues in Riyadh, Jeddah and Khobar. With the draw delayed and the Saudi venue’s security under question, AFC officials are weighing alternative locations.Former Australian international Craig Foster argues that the nation is uniquely positioned to step in on short notice. He highlights the success of the 2015 men’s Asian Cup and the recent Women’s Asian Cup hosted in Australia, noting that the country demonstrated both logistical capability and fan engagement.“Hosting the tournament would be a vital diplomatic gesture at a time when Australia’s reputation in the Middle East has suffered,” Foster said, adding that the event could deliver a significant economic uplift for the hospitality industry as teams and supporters flock to Australian cities.Data from the 2015 edition show that 15,000 overseas visitors generated more than half of the tournament’s $81 million direct spend. By contrast, the federal and state contributions to the women’s Asian Cup exceeded $20 million, underscoring the financial stakes involved.The Australian government has indicated willingness to collaborate with Football Australia, stating that any investment in international sport would be considered through regular budget processes. Foster has called on sport minister Anika Wells to endorse an emergency hosting proposal.Football Australia emphasizes that AFC tournaments have become “some of the most significant events in the global football calendar,” delivering “substantial economic, diplomatic, social, and health value for Australia.” Continued support from all government levels, they argue, is essential to maintain the country’s status as a premier host nation.Saudi Arabia, which secured hosting rights in 2023 and will later stage the 2034 FIFA World Cup, now faces uncertainty as its venues sit within striking distance of ongoing regional hostilities, including recent Iranian counter‑attacks near the under‑construction Aramco Stadium in Khobar.

The Australian Greens are calling on the federal government to apply direct diplomatic and economic pressure on Israel to end its intensive air strikes on Lebanon, describing the conflict as a “disastrous, illegal, immoral war.” Party defence spokesperson David Shoebridge said Australia should join the growing list of nations demanding that southern Lebanon be part of the cease‑fire framework being negotiated between the United States and Iran. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have already signalled that Lebanon must be included in any cease‑fire agreement, but Shoebridge argued that mere statements are insufficient. He told ABC Radio that “Penny Wong saying she’s gravely concerned will not stop the illegal bombing or the plan to turn southern Lebanon into a new Gaza.” Lebanese authorities report that the war, which began in April, has already claimed the lives of more than 1,700 civilians, with over 300 deaths recorded in a single 24‑hour period following the announcement of a cease‑fire in the Iran conflict. To exert tangible pressure, Shoebridge proposed that Australia cancel more than $1 billion in Israeli arms contracts. He argued that such a move would not only address the moral outrage over the attacks but also deliver “real material pressure” on Israel to withdraw its forces. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has warned Australians to avoid travel to Lebanon and is urging residents to leave while commercial flights remain available, citing a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation, displacement crises, and the risk of sudden airspace closures. In a separate development, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott urged the government to deploy troops alongside U.S. forces, claiming Australia had “betrayed our values and long‑term national interest.” Abbott framed the conflict as part of a broader effort to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions and protect freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait. His remarks were rebuffed by Health Minister Mark Butler, who emphasized that Australia’s current support is limited to defensive assistance for the United Arab Emirates and that there is no public appetite for offensive deployments in the Middle East. Energy Minister Chris Bowen reiterated that any cease‑fire must extend across the region, stating that “Lebanese people have the same rights as anyone else in the Middle East” and that Israel should honour the cease‑fire “in both letter and spirit.”

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.

Japan's Prime Minister, Sanae Takaichi, announced on Friday that the country will release additional oil reserves early next month, equivalent to roughly 20 days' worth of oil, to ensure a stable supply of crude oil. This move comes as concern grows over energy shortages caused by the crisis in the Middle East.This will be the second time Japan has dipped into its strategic reserves since the US-Israel war on Iran started in February. Last month, Takaichi approved the release of 50 days' worth of oil, the government's biggest ever release, in an attempt to head off a spike in prices.Japan has enough oil in reserve to last 230 days, but it also imports 95% of its crude oil from the Middle East, most of which is transported through the Strait of Hormuz. The country is trying to secure oil from locations that do not ship via the Strait of Hormuz, amid uncertainty over whether the waterway will fully reopen after a two-week conditional ceasefire announced by Donald Trump this week.By May, Japan should be able to secure more than half of its oil imports via other routes, Takaichi said, although she did not provide details. The industry ministry has said that potential new sources for imports could include Yanbu on Saudi Arabia's Red Sea coast and the Port of Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates.The decision to tap into oil reserves for a second time came as pressure grew on Japan's government to resist US pressure to become militarily involved in the conflict. More than 100 demonstrations were held across the country on Wednesday, with protesters urging Takaichi to abide by the postwar constitution, which forbids Japan from using the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.