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Death of Yemen's Exiled Leader Marks End of an EraYemen's former president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who fled house arrest by Houthi rebels and spent his final years in exile in Saudi Arabia, has died at age 80. Yemen's presidency confirmed the death, with state-run Yemeni TV reporting that Hadi died at his residence in Riyadh on Thursday.Former President's Life in ExileHadi was the internationally recognized president of Yemen who led a fractured government mostly from exile for eight years as the country descended into civil war and famine before stepping down in 2022. He fled to Saudi Arabia in 2015 as war erupted between the Iran-backed Houthis, who had forced the government from the capital Sanaa, and a Saudi-led coalition.The government announced three days of mourning, during which flags will be flown at half-staff. Hadi is survived by his wife, Hala, and six children.Human Cost of Yemen's ConflictAlthough a UN-brokered ceasefire is largely holding, the war has killed hundreds of thousands of people through direct and indirect causes. Last year, 19.5 million people needed aid, the United Nations reported. Yemen remains divided between the Houthi-controlled north and the government-run south, which includes a patchwork of factions.Political Vacuum in Divided YemenRashad al-Alimi, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council – the leadership body of Yemen's internationally recognized government – said Hadi believed in the Yemeni people's "right to a just state, freedom and human dignity." "He led the battle to defend the republican system," al-Alimi said on social media.Hadi took office in 2012 after a long stint as vice president to Ali Abdullah Saleh, who reluctantly ended his 33 years in power during Arab Spring protests. He handed over his powers – reportedly under Saudi pressure – to the newly formed Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022.Uncertain Path for Peace in YemenHadi, a career military officer, was waved through as the sole candidate in an election in which he won 99.8 percent of the vote. His presidency was thwarted with spells of unrest, with his opponents accusing him of favoring the country's eastern oil-rich provinces at the expense of the mountainous heartlands dominated by Houthis. After the Houthis overran the capital in 2014, they placed Hadi under house arrest in early 2015 before he escaped in February of that year.

The past few days have seen a roller‑coaster of optimism and doubt around the six‑week‑old US‑Iran ceasefire, with President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio signaling progress, while Iranian officials cast the announcements as propaganda and highlight unresolved issues. Competing Narratives Over the US‑Iran Ceasefire On Friday the ceasefire appeared to be collapsing as Trump skipped his son’s wedding to stay in the White House and was reported to be weighing new military strikes. By Saturday he announced an agreement would be concluded “shortly,” and on Sunday Rubio promised “good news” would follow. Iranian media dismissed Trump’s social‑media claim as propaganda and pointed to several remaining points of dispute, underscoring the widening gap between Washington and Tehran. Financial Stakes and Military Costs Highlighted in the Talks $29bn has been spent by mid‑May on a war that has strained the global economy. The United States demands the removal of Iran’s entire stockpile of enriched uranium, not just the roughly 450kg enriched to 60%. Trump has stated more than 70 times that Iran must not acquire a nuclear weapon. Iran proposes a 60‑day extension of the ceasefire in phase one, with the Strait of Hormuz reopened without tolls. Regional Power Dynamics: Israel, Lebanon, and the Strait of Hormuz Israel, alarmed by any deal, seeks to preserve freedom of action in Lebanon and worries that a free and open strait conflicts with Iran’s May 18 unveiling of a Persian Gulf Strait Authority that would levy tolls. The United States and Israel also insist Iran curb its ballistic‑missile programme and cease support for regional proxies such as Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. What the Next Phase Could Mean for Tehran and Washington If phase one succeeds—opening the strait, lifting sanctions and unfreezing assets—the talks would move to phase two, focusing on Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran has not detailed its red lines, leaving uncertainty over whether it will accept the U.S. demand to transport the entire uranium stockpile out of the country. A failure at this stage could unravel the ceasefire, potentially prompting renewed U.S. strikes or Israeli action, and would further damage the global economy ahead of the U.S. mid‑term elections.

The Prisoner Exchange Agreement Yemen's internationally recognised government and the Houthi group have signed a United Nations-backed agreement in Jordan to exchange more than 1,600 detainees, marking the largest prisoner exchange since the country's civil war began in September 2014. Details of the Agreement Under the accord, the Houthis will release 580 prisoners, including seven Saudis and 20 Sudanese, while the government will release 1,100 Houthi prisoners, Houthi official Abdulqader al-Mortada said in a post on social media on Thursday. The Houthis will release 580 prisoners. The government will release 1,100 Houthi prisoners. The Data Analysis Nearly 1,728 detainees from both sides will be released as part of what Yahya Kazman, the deputy head of the government negotiating team, called the “largest” agreement of its kind. The Impact Analysis The deal follows more than three months of negotiations held in the Jordanian capital Amman in line with an agreement reached by both parties in December after UN-facilitated consultations in the Omani capital Muscat. The two sides agreed to hold further talks on additional releases and allow mutual visits to detention facilities. They also agreed on an implementation plan with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to move forward with the release operation. The Prediction “The agreement includes the release of a number of coalition forces personnel, members of the armed forces and security services, fighters from various military formations and the popular resistance, as well as politicians and journalists who spent years in Houthi detention,” Kazman said on social media. The ICRC also said it “welcomed” the agreement between the two parties, saying in a statement that it “represents a crucial step forward”.

The Resurgence of Somali PiracyAt least three vessels have been targeted in hijackings this week off the coast of Somalia in what analysts fear is a replay of past piracy around the Horn of Africa. The area was the world's most notorious hot spot for piracy in the mid to early 2000s, with an international naval coalition eventually subduing the threat it posed to global shipping.Recent Hijackings and Security ResponseBetween three and four merchant ships are believed to have been captured around the coast of Somalia since April 20. The European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) reported the hijacking of fishing vessel Alkhary 2 on April 20, followed by the seizure of Honour 25 the next day. On April 26, EUNAVFOR confirmed it was monitoring the hijacking of another merchant vessel, the Sward.United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO), which provides security information about trade routes to shipping firms, raised the threat levels around the Somalia coast to "substantial" this week and warned vessels to "transit with caution".Economic Impact of PiracyAccording to the World Bank, the annual impact of piracy off Somalia on the global economy was as high as $18bn during the height of the crisis. In the period between 2005 and 2012, ransoms totalled between $339m and $413m. In 2011 alone, about 212 attacks were recorded – one of the highest numbers in a single year.The surge in petrol prices amid the US-Israel war on Iran has also likely made fuel tankers — like the Honour 25 — more valuable to pirates, experts say. Brent crude prices — the global oil benchmark — have risen by more than 50 percent since the start of the war, and are at over $110 per barrel.Geopolitical Shifts and Security ChallengesAnalysts speculate that the diversion of anti-piracy patrols since 2023 to the Red Sea to counter attacks by the Yemen-based Houthis in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait has created an opportunity for pirates. More recently, naval patrols of major nations that previously helped contain the threat of piracy have been distracted or diverted towards shepherding ships trying to access the Strait of Hormuz — which Iran and the US have both blocked.It's yet unclear which groups are behind the attacks. In the past, local fishermen and various armed groups – including those affiliated with ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda – have been involved in hijackings.Future Outlook for Maritime SecurityThe international community may need to reassess its naval priorities in the region as the threat of piracy resurfaces. With multiple global security challenges, including the Iran war and conflicts in the Red Sea, maritime security experts predict a potential increase in hijackings unless coordinated international efforts are renewed. The historical precedent suggests that a combination of naval patrols, economic development in Somalia, and international cooperation will be necessary to contain this renewed threat.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the next nuclear accord with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) he abandoned in 2018, adding new demands on enrichment, ballistic missiles and proxy groups as a two‑week cease‑fire in the US‑Israel‑Iran conflict nears its end.Key DevelopmentsTrump asserts the forthcoming deal will surpass the JCPOA, which limited Iran’s uranium enrichment to 3.67% and reduced centrifuges to 6,104.New US‑Israel demands include: zero uranium enrichment, removal of the estimated 440 kg of 60%‑enriched uranium, strict caps on ballistic‑missile development, and a halt to support for Hezbollah, the Houthis and other proxy forces.Negotiations are expected to shift to Islamabad, Pakistan after the current cease‑fire expires.Analyst Andreas Kreig (King’s College London) predicts any new pact will likely resemble the JCPOA with limited tweaks, not the sweeping concessions Trump touts.Data & Market ImpactU.S. sanctions imposed after the 2018 withdrawal cut Iran’s oil exports by roughly 60 %, slashing revenue by an estimated $30 billion per year.Frozen Iranian sovereign assets total about $150 billion; their release would inject significant liquidity into Iran’s banking sector.IAEA reports indicate Iran now holds 440 kg of 60%‑enriched uranium, enough to reach weapons‑grade (90%) in weeks if centrifuge capacity is fully utilized.Why This MattersThe outcome will shape three critical arenas:Regional security: A stricter deal could curb Iran’s missile reach, reducing the threat to Israel’s “Iron Dome” and to Gulf‑state oil infrastructure.Global non‑proliferation: Allowing zero enrichment would set a precedent that could pressure other volatile states to accept similar terms, but it also risks driving Tehran underground if perceived as punitive.Economic stability: Lifting sanctions would revive Iran’s oil exports, potentially adding $20‑30 billion to global supply and influencing crude prices.Expert InsightAndreas Kreig warns that Tehran’s political climate has hardened; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now dominates strategic decision‑making, making concessions on sovereignty unlikely. While the United Nations resolution attached to the JCPOA prohibited missile work linked to nuclear delivery, the new U.S. demand for outright missile bans exceeds that framework and could stall talks.Economic incentives—rapid asset release and sanction relief—are the primary leverage for Washington. However, without a credible verification regime comparable to the JCPOA’s intrusive IAEA inspections, any “better” deal may lack enforceability, increasing the risk of clandestine enrichment.What Happens NextNegotiators are expected to convene in Islamabad within the next two weeks; the agenda will likely focus on enrichment thresholds and verification mechanisms.If talks stall, both sides may resort to further kinetic actions, as seen in recent strikes on Natanz, Isfahan and Bushehr facilities.International actors—EU, China, Russia—are poised to mediate, pushing for a compromise that balances sanctions relief with robust monitoring.Long‑term, the region’s stability hinges on whether the U.S. can deliver tangible economic benefits to Iran while securing verifiable limits on its nuclear and missile programs.

The Escalating US-Iran Standoff United States President Donald Trump has claimed a second round of negotiations with Iran will take place in Pakistan on Tuesday as mediators try to revive negotiations before the end of an ongoing yet fragile two-week ceasefire. The announcement on Sunday came alongside a sharp escalation in rhetoric. Trump warned that Iran must agree to a deal "one way or another – the nice way or the hard way" and threatened to target key infrastructure if negotiations fail. He also renewed his threat of striking "bridges and power plants", which experts said could amount to war crimes under international law. Iran, however, has so far denied it will participate in the talks, accusing the US of "armed piracy" after US forces struck and seized an Iran-linked tanker on Sunday, further heightening tensions between the longtime adversaries. US Position and Demands On Sunday, Trump announced that US negotiators would travel to the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, on Monday for talks aimed at ending the US-Israel war on Iran. In a social media post, the president did not say which officials would be sent to the talks. Last weekend's first round of talks, at which Vice President JD Vance led the US delegation, ended without a deal. Trump accused Iran of violating their two-week ceasefire, which is due to expire on Wednesday, by opening fire on Saturday in the Strait of Hormuz. The US president threatened to destroy civilian infrastructure in Iran if it doesn't accept the terms of the deal being offered by the US. "We're offering a very fair and reasonable deal, and I hope they take it because, if they don't, the United States is going to knock out every single power plant, and every single bridge, in Iran," Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. In a further escalation, Trump said an Iranian-flagged ship called the Touska was "stopped" by US forces in the Gulf of Oman "by blowing a hole in the engine room". He said it was trying to get past the US naval blockade of Iranian ports. US forces boarded the ship and took physical control of the vessel. Iran's Response and Position Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya military headquarters confirmed the US attack on the Iranian-flagged tanker and said it would "respond soon". Then, Iran's Tasnim News Agency reported that Iranian forces had sent drones in the direction of US military ships. Ebrahim Azizi, the head of the Iranian parliament's National Security Committee, told Al Jazeera that Iran's actions during talks with the US are strictly guided by national interests and security. When asked if Tehran intends to participate in the talks in Islamabad, he said, "Iran acts based on national interests." "We see the current negotiations as a continuation of the battlefield, and we see nothing other than the battlefield in this," he said. "If it yields achievements that sustain those of the battlefield, then the negotiation arena is also an opportunity for us … but not if the Americans intend to turn this into a field of excessive demands based on their bullying approach." Key Points of Friction Since the start of the war on February 28, a number of new sticking points have emerged – alongside old challenges: Strait of Hormuz Dispute A central dispute is over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global shipping route linking the Gulf to the Arabian Sea. One-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies were shipped through the strait before the war began. Iran insists on sovereignty over the waterway, which lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman and does not fall into international waters, and stated that only "nonhostile" ships could pass. It has also floated the idea of levying tolls while Washington demands full freedom of navigation. After the war began, Iran in effect closed the strait by forbidding transits, attacking ships and reportedly laying sea mines. Shipping traffic has since dropped by 95 percent. A week ago, the US implemented a blockade of its own. Its Navy has been blocking Iranian ports to pressure Tehran to reopen the vital waterway, adding another obstacle to the talks. According to Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer in international security at King's College London, Trump's stance on the strait has shifted during the conflict and remains unclear. "We've had Trump say that he would be open to jointly controlling the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, where both sides collect a toll for shipping," Geist Pinfold noted, calling this "completely different to the demands of the US on paper but also the demands of the US's regional allies like the Gulf states and Israel, … who would regard any deal that entrenches Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz … as a stab in the back". "This isn't just between the US and Iran. It's about the US having to keep its regional allies on side," Geist Pinfold told Al Jazeera. Nuclear Enrichment Standoff Another core issue is Iran's nuclear programme, particularly its stock of enriched uranium. The US and Israel are pushing for zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building a nuclear weapon while providing no evidence for their claims. Iran has insisted its enrichment effort is for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In 2015, the US was a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under then-US President Barack Obama. In that agreement, Iran pledged to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent, which is substantially below weapons grade, and to comply with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to insure it wasn't developing nuclear weapons. In return, international sanctions on Iran were lifted. However, in 2018, during his first term, Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the agreement up to that point. In March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the US director of national intelligence, testified to Congress that the US "continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon". A month later, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440kg (970lb) of 60-percent enriched uranium. While that is also below weapons grade, it is a short jump to achieve the 90-percent purity needed for atomic weapons production. On Sunday, in strongly worded comments, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Trump had no justification to ⁠⁠"deprive" Iran of its nuclear ⁠⁠rights. Maryam Jamshidi, a law professor at the University of Colorado in Boulder, said Iran's position on enrichment is based on Article IV of the NPT, "which recognises that all state parties [to the treaty] have the inalienable right to research, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes". "In demanding that Iran have no enrichment, the United States is denying Iran its rights under this treaty," she told Al Jazeera. "In insisting that its right to enrichment be preserved, Iran is expressing a reasonable desire to be treated the same as any other state under international law." Lebanon Conflict Complicates Talks Two days after the first US-Israeli strikes on Tehran on February 28, in which Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei was killed, the Iran-backed Hezbollah group in Lebanon began firing rockets and drones into northern Israel, and Israel struck back, launching an invasion into southern Lebanon. Iran is adamant that its ceasefire with the US extends to Lebanon and is demanding Israel end its offensive against its ally Hezbollah and its invasion of Lebanon. After initially denying the two-week ceasefire included Lebanon, Israel accepted a 10-day truce starting on Thursday night after direct Israel-Lebanon talks. However, that ceasefire is also teetering on collapse amid renewed hostilities. On Monday, the Israeli military claimed that it struck a loaded launch system in the Kfarkela area of southern Lebanon overnight while Hezbollah claimed responsibility for multiple explosions that it said hit a convoy of eight Israeli armoured vehicles, also in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is Tehran's most powerful ally in the region and a central part of its "axis of resistance", a network of armed groups across the Middle East aligned with Iran against Israel. The network also includes Yemen's Houthis and a collection of armed groups in Iraq. Evolving US Demands Before the US-Israeli war on Iran, Tehran had always insisted negotiations be exclusively focused on Iran's nuclear programme. US demands, however, have extended beyond the nuclear file. Before the war, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile programme. Iran has said its ability to maintain its missile capabilities is non-negotiable. On February 25, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that Iran's refusal to discuss its missile programme was a "big problem". Yet, since the two-week ceasefire was announced on April 8 and the Pakistan-brokered negotiations began, the US has not made any mention of Iran's ballistic missiles, which have been a major feature in Iran's retaliation against US and Israeli forces. Regime Change and Proxy Support The US and Israel have also made no secret of their desire for a change in Iran's government. Asked two weeks before the war began if he wished for a toppling of the government in Tehran, Trump said: "Seems like that would be the best thing that could happen." After the killing of Khamenei and multiple other senior Iranian leaders, Trump claimed the US-Israel war had in effect brought about "regime change", claiming key leadership layers were "decimated". Experts, however, disputed Trump's assertions, saying the government was very much intact, if not stronger. Salar Mohandesi, a professor at Bowdoin College in Maine, argued that despite US claims, what is happening in Iran does not meet any serious definition of "regime change". "The fundamental structures of the Islamic Republic are intact, and the new leaders are regime loyalists who are arguably more hardline than their assassinated predecessors," he told Al Jazeera. Mohandesi said the war has arguably strengthened the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), something that is an "acceleration of an existing" trend and does not necessarily amount to regime change, "certainly not in the way Trump means it". "Trump's declaration that he has succeeded in 'regime change' is just a rhetorical move to try to claim victory where none exists," he added. Proxy Group Support Three days before the war began during his State of the Union address to the US Congress, Trump accused Iran and "its murderous proxies" of spreading "nothing but terrorism and death and hate". The US and Israel have long demanded Iran stop supporting its nonstate allies – primarily Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and a number of groups in Iraq. Tehran to date has refused to enter into any dialogue about limiting its support for these armed groups. But on Friday, Trump claimed Iran had agreed to almost all of the US demands, including support for its proxies. A statement by Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected that any such agreement was in place, saying: "The Americans talk excessively and create noise around the situation. Do not be misled!" Prospects for a Breakthrough On Sunday, Iran's top negotiator and speaker of its parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, acknowledged that while "conclusions" had been reached on some issues, "we are far from a final agreement." Analyst Geist Pinfold told Al Jazeera that deep divisions between the US and Iran make a comprehensive deal unlikely in the near term despite some openings created by Trump's shifting positions. "The primary complication that would mean a deal is less likely but also one of the potential curveballs that would make a deal more likely is the Trump administration's equivocations regarding what its red lines actually are," he said. "At the moment, the gaps look insurmountable," Geist Pinfold added, noting that "the best-case scenario would be the extension of the ceasefire rather than the actual deal." The US-Iran talks face major structural obstacles despite growing speculation about a negotiated end to the current crisis, according to Bowdoin College's Mohandesi. "Donald Trump feels that he needs to somehow convert this disastrous defeat into some sort of win," he noted, adding: "It's unclear what that would look like at the negotiating table." On the Iranian side, Mohandesi sees little room for compromise on the core strategic issues. "Iran will absolutely not abandon its missile programme. It will not stop supporting its allies in the region, and it will almost certainly not agree to zero enrichment," he said. The academic questioned whether even a restoration of maritime traffic would constitute meaningful success for Washington. Even if Trump "were to somehow convince Iran to return the Strait of Hormuz to the pre-war status quo, it's unclear how that would be a major win since the strait was open before he started the war", Mohandesi said.

In Yemen, the government's efforts to curb the devaluation of the Yemeni riyal have led to a stabilisation of the currency, but have also created a severe liquidity crunch. The Central Bank of Yemen, based in the southern city of Aden, has implemented measures to control currency speculation and provide traders with hard currency.Despite these efforts, cash shortages have worsened, with people in government-controlled cities such as Aden, Taiz, and Mukalla struggling to access Yemeni riyals. Many are unable to convert foreign currency, such as US dollars or Saudi riyals, into local cash, leading to a thriving black market for currency exchange.The cash shortage has paralysed businesses and left many Yemenis unable to access their savings or use their hard currency. Mohammed Omer, a small grocery shop owner in Mukalla, said he has spent hours trying to convert Saudi riyals into Yemeni riyals, but has been unable to do so due to the cash shortage.The Yemeni government has acknowledged the cash shortage and approved short-term measures to address the problem. However, the crisis has highlighted the country's ongoing economic struggles, which have been exacerbated by the war between the Saudi-backed government and the Iran-aligned Houthis.

Sanaa, Yemen – At 7 a.m., 14‑year‑old Qasim wakes, grabs a one‑metre‑by‑half‑metre white sack and heads out to collect plastic bottles, hoping to fill it by 11:30 a.m. A full sack can bring in up to 1,500 Yemeni riyal (≈ $3), which the family uses for daily meals. When Qasim returns home, he can briefly be a child again, playing football with neighbours. By evening, his 12‑year‑old brother Asem takes over the bottle‑collecting, selling the haul at night to cover dinner costs. For the siblings, school is a luxury they cannot afford. "I was in fourth grade in 2024, but I stopped because I needed to help my family," Qasim told Al Jazeera, wiping his cheeks. "Sitting in a classroom would not feed me," he added. The conflict that began in 2014 between Iran‑backed Houthis and the Saudi‑backed government has devastated Yemen’s education system. UNICEF estimates that 3.2 million school‑aged children are out of school, with another 1.5 million displaced children at risk of permanent dropout. Even though a cease‑fire was declared in April 2022, the war’s economic fallout persists. During the fourth Riyadh International Humanitarian Forum, Yemen’s Minister of Planning Waed Badhib said the war has cost the national economy **over $250 billion** and pushed unemployment to **35 %**. Parents like Qasim’s father, 48‑year‑old daily‑wage worker Abdu, no longer see education as a viable path. "Seeing a hungry child hurts more than seeing a child drop out," he said, noting that many university graduates now work as construction guards or porters. Experts warn that this short‑term coping strategy harms long‑term prospects. Mahmoud al‑Bukari, a Taiz academic, explained that forcing children into work “creates further social and economic problems for both individuals and society.” Sociology professor Afrah al‑Humaiqani stressed that denying education violates children’s rights and breeds anxiety, undermining future economic development. Infrastructure damage compounds the crisis: more than 2,400 schools are destroyed, partially damaged, or repurposed (Save the Children). Remaining classrooms are overcrowded, and teachers—many unpaid for years—are demotivated, leading to a decline in teaching quality. Fatima Saleh, a teacher in Sanaa, described educators as the "engine" of learning. "When that engine falters, students lose interest and drop out," she said, noting that unpaid salaries force many teachers to quit or seek other work. Journalist Mohammed Abdu al‑Samei argues that the cease‑fire alone cannot revive education without addressing the underlying economic collapse. International aid has also dwindled, leaving a critical funding gap for programs that once kept children in school. For Qasim, returning to a classroom is no longer realistic. He now aims to acquire a trade—painting, carpentry, or welding—to earn a living, saying, "I will not return to the classroom, but I will learn a skill that helps my family."

Israel has appointed Michael Lotem as its first ambassador to Somaliland, marking the latest milestone after the country officially recognized the self‑declared state in December 2025. Lotem, who previously served as Israel’s ambassador to Kenya, was announced by Israel’s public broadcaster on Wednesday. Somaliland’s president, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, hailed the appointment in a joint parliamentary session, declaring Israel a “reliable partner” and prompting applause from lawmakers. In stark contrast, Somalia’s foreign ministry condemned the decision, labeling it a “direct breach” of Somali sovereignty and unity. The condemnation echoed broader disapproval from the UN Security Council, the African Union, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and the European Union, all of which have criticized Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. Since the December announcement, diplomatic activity has accelerated. Israeli foreign minister Gideon Saar visited Hargeisa in January, and Somaliland’s water ministry sent a delegation to Israel for training in water‑management techniques. President Abdullahi told Reuters in February that a trade agreement with Israel is expected soon. Israel has also granted diplomatic approval to Mohamed Hagi, a presidential adviser instrumental in securing recognition, designating him as Somaliland’s first ambassador to Israel. Somali officials warn that the deepening ties could destabilise the region. President of Somalia earlier this year called Israel’s outreach the “gravest attack” on Somali sovereignty and suggested Israel might seek to establish a military base to launch operations against Yemen. Geographically, Somaliland sits across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen, where the Iran‑backed Houthi movement controls the northwest and remains hostile to Israel. The Houthis have publicly stated that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be a legitimate target. In March, Somaliland’s minister of the presidency, Khadar Hussein Abdi, told Bloomberg that the country aims for a “strategic relationship” with Israel that includes security cooperation. He did not rule out the possibility of an Israeli military base, noting that such a decision “will be analysed at some point.” Somalia’s state minister for foreign affairs, Ali Omar, reiterated to Al Jazeera that Somalia does not want its territory drawn into external confrontations that could further destabilise an already sensitive region. The appointment of an Israeli ambassador therefore not only solidifies bilateral ties but also introduces new strategic calculations for regional actors, potentially reshaping security dynamics in the Horn of Africa and the broader Red Sea corridor.