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The Australian Greens are calling on the federal government to apply direct diplomatic and economic pressure on Israel to end its intensive air strikes on Lebanon, describing the conflict as a “disastrous, illegal, immoral war.” Party defence spokesperson David Shoebridge said Australia should join the growing list of nations demanding that southern Lebanon be part of the cease‑fire framework being negotiated between the United States and Iran. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong have already signalled that Lebanon must be included in any cease‑fire agreement, but Shoebridge argued that mere statements are insufficient. He told ABC Radio that “Penny Wong saying she’s gravely concerned will not stop the illegal bombing or the plan to turn southern Lebanon into a new Gaza.” Lebanese authorities report that the war, which began in April, has already claimed the lives of more than 1,700 civilians, with over 300 deaths recorded in a single 24‑hour period following the announcement of a cease‑fire in the Iran conflict. To exert tangible pressure, Shoebridge proposed that Australia cancel more than $1 billion in Israeli arms contracts. He argued that such a move would not only address the moral outrage over the attacks but also deliver “real material pressure” on Israel to withdraw its forces. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has warned Australians to avoid travel to Lebanon and is urging residents to leave while commercial flights remain available, citing a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation, displacement crises, and the risk of sudden airspace closures. In a separate development, former Prime Minister Tony Abbott urged the government to deploy troops alongside U.S. forces, claiming Australia had “betrayed our values and long‑term national interest.” Abbott framed the conflict as part of a broader effort to curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions and protect freedom of navigation in the Hormuz Strait. His remarks were rebuffed by Health Minister Mark Butler, who emphasized that Australia’s current support is limited to defensive assistance for the United Arab Emirates and that there is no public appetite for offensive deployments in the Middle East. Energy Minister Chris Bowen reiterated that any cease‑fire must extend across the region, stating that “Lebanese people have the same rights as anyone else in the Middle East” and that Israel should honour the cease‑fire “in both letter and spirit.”

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.

Iran has declared that the Strait of Hormuz, a vital passage for global oil shipments, is open but with certain limitations. The strait, which connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, is a crucial route for oil exports from countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.The new restrictions come amid heightened tensions in the region, with Iran seeking to assert its control over the strategic waterway. Despite the limitations, shipping and trade activities are expected to continue, albeit with increased scrutiny and regulation.

The piece analyzes the ripple effects of the US‑Israel war on Iran's economy, noting that heightened geopolitical tensions have led to increased sanctions and disrupted traditional trade routes. Analysts point to a growing strain on Iran's financial sector as regional instability hampers investment and complicates access to international markets. While specific figures are not disclosed, the article underscores that the economic fallout extends beyond immediate conflict zones, affecting broader Middle‑East fiscal stability.

The escalating tensions in Iran have significant implications for global supply chains, which are still reeling from the impact of the conflict. The country's strategic location and critical infrastructure make it a crucial hub for international trade. As the situation continues to unfold, experts are closely monitoring the potential disruptions to global supply chains. Any prolonged conflict could lead to increased costs, delays, and uncertainty for businesses and consumers alike. The impact on global trade is a pressing concern, with Iran playing a vital role in the global economy. The country's significant oil reserves and key transportation routes make it an essential player in the international trade landscape. As the international community watches with bated breath, one thing is clear: the resilience of global supply chains will be put to the test. The ability of these chains to recover and adapt to the challenges posed by the conflict will be crucial in determining the future of international trade.

The piece titled The war on Iran: Nobody won, everyone paid examines the aftermath of the recent hostilities involving Iran. It argues that the conflict failed to deliver a decisive victory for any side, while inflicting widespread losses that reverberated throughout the Middle East.By highlighting the shared burdens—ranging from disrupted trade routes to strained diplomatic ties—the analysis underscores how the war deepened regional instability rather than resolving underlying tensions.In sum, the article portrays the Iran war as a costly stalemate, reminding policymakers that the true price of conflict is borne by all parties involved.

Djibouti, a one‑million‑strong nation perched on the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, is set to hold its presidential election on April 10. All signs point to incumbent Ismail Omar Guelleh securing a sixth term with little genuine opposition. The country’s strategic location—linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—makes it a linchpin for global trade and a magnet for foreign military installations. The United States, France, China, Italy and Japan all maintain bases there, earning Djibouti the reputation of hosting the highest concentration of overseas military sites. Officially, Djibouti recognizes French and Arabic, while Somali and Afar are widely spoken among the two main ethnic groups, which together comprise roughly 95% of the population. Islam is practiced by about 94% of residents, and the Djiboutian franc remains the national currency. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 243,471 citizens—about a quarter of the population—are registered to vote, up from roughly 215,000 in the 2021 poll. Historical turnout averages around 67%. IGAD’s eight‑nation bloc has dispatched 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to monitor the process, with a post‑vote statement slated for April 12. Ismail Omar Guelleh, 78, leads the ruling People’s Rally for Progress. After parliament lifted the 75‑year age ceiling in November and abolished term limits back in 2010, Guelleh is now eligible for another term. Critics label his rule as authoritarian, yet they also acknowledge the relative stability he has maintained in a volatile region. Guelleh’s administration has turned Djibouti’s lack of natural resources into a revenue engine by signing infrastructure deals with China and leasing military facilities to Western powers. In 2017, Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh estimated that the bases generate roughly $125 million annually, with the United States contributing nearly half of that sum. The U.S. installation, Camp Lemonnier, remains the only permanent American base on the continent. The sole challenger, Mohamed Farah Samatar, runs under the Unified Democratic Centre after breaking away from the ruling party. His campaign slogan—“another Djibouti is possible”—has resonated only modestly, and observers such as Horn‑of‑Africa expert Sonia le Gouriellec describe the contest as a “token competition”. Human‑rights advocates echo this sentiment, calling the election a “masquerade” and a foregone conclusion. Key issues dominate the discourse. Democratic freedoms have eroded; opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016, and Guelleh captured over 90% of the vote in 2021. The country ranks 168th out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders press‑freedom index, and allegations of corruption and nepotism persist, including speculation that Guelleh’s stepson, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, is being groomed for succession. Economically, Djibouti’s reliance on Chinese financing is creating fiscal strain. By 2026 the nation owed China roughly $1.2 billion in loans, prompting the IMF to label its debt profile “in distress and unsustainable”. Massive infrastructure projects—most notably a railway to Ethiopia—have failed to curb poverty, with 73% of the youth unemployed. The country’s lifeline is its port system, which handles virtually all of Ethiopia’s maritime trade, amounting to about $2 billion in annual revenue. Ethiopia’s recent flirtation with a Somaliland port deal threatened Djibouti’s monopoly, though a Turkey‑mediated agreement in late 2024 redirected Ethiopia toward a “reliable and sustainable” sea corridor with Somalia. In sum, the upcoming election is less about a competitive political showdown and more about reaffirming a status quo that intertwines Djibouti’s geopolitical leverage, foreign‑military income, and mounting debt challenges.

President Donald Trump has launched a scathing attack on NATO, expressing disappointment with the alliance's reluctance to support the US in its conflict with Iran. In a post on his TruthSocial platform, Trump wrote in capital letters: "NATO wasn't there when we needed them, and they won't be there if we need them again".The remarks came after a two-hour meeting with NATO's Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, at the White House. The meeting took place a day after the US and Iran agreed to a ceasefire. Trump's comments have raised concerns about the future of the transatlantic alliance, which he has repeatedly called a "paper tiger".Rutte, known as the "Trump whisperer" for his ability to maintain a productive relationship with the US president, said that Trump was "clearly disappointed with many NATO allies". However, Rutte also pushed back against some of Trump's broader criticism, highlighting the contributions of many European nations to NATO.In addition to his criticism of NATO, Trump also appeared to revive his threat to seize Greenland from Denmark, a move that had previously roiled the alliance. "Remember Greenland, that big, poorly run, piece of ice!!!" he wrote.The Wall Street Journal reported that Trump was considering punishing some NATO members he believed were unhelpful during the conflict by moving US troops out of their countries. However, Rutte declined to comment directly on the report.NATO, formed in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union, has been the cornerstone of Western security. The alliance has only activated its mutual defence clause on one occasion, following the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in the US.

US President Donald Trump has announced that countries supplying Iran with military weapons will face immediate 50% tariffs on all goods sold to the United States, with no exemptions. This move comes hours after Trump agreed to a two-week ceasefire with Tehran.In a social media post, Trump stated that 'A Country supplying Military Weapons to Iran will be immediately tariffed, on any and all goods sold to the United States of America, 50%, effective immediately. There will be no exclusions or exemptions!'However, experts have raised questions about the legal authority behind Trump's announcement, as the Supreme Court struck down his use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose broad global tariffs in February. The IEEPA has been used extensively for decades to back financial sanctions against Iran, Russia, and North Korea.Rachel Ziemba, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, told Al Jazeera that 'it's a lot more complicated to do that after IEEPA was struck down. There's no immediate policy lever and authorisation that is available for the US to do that. So they need either an act of Congress or need to adapt some other trade tool.'Trump did not specify which countries could face punitive tariffs, but China and Russia have helped Iran build military capacity to counter US and Israeli pressure. The US imports from Russia have fallen sharply since the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the wave of financial sanctions imposed on Moscow.Josh Lipsky, vice president and chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council, said that 'this is a China-related threat, the way I read it. And China will read it that way.' However, he also noted that Trump was unlikely to follow through with new tariffs in the near term because that would derail his planned trip to Beijing to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in mid-May.