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Argentina's lawmakers have given the green light to a bill championed by President Javier Milei that permits mining in sensitive glacier and permafrost regions. The move has sparked fierce criticism from environmentalists, who argue it jeopardizes vital water sources. The bill, which was already approved by the Senate in February, passed with 137 votes in favor, 111 against, and three abstentions in the Chamber of Deputies after a marathon 12-hour debate. This development is seen as a significant victory for Milei, who has been pushing for looser regulations to attract large-scale mining projects. Environmentalists have expressed deep concerns that the reforms will undermine protections for glaciers and permafrost, which are crucial for water supplies. Thousands of people demonstrated outside parliament, with some protesters clashing with police. Banners displayed slogans such as 'Water is more precious than gold!' and 'A glacier destroyed cannot be restored!' The bill allows for mining of metals like copper, lithium, and silver in the Andes mountains. Argentina is a major producer of lithium, a critical component for the global tech and green energy sectors. The central bank forecasts that mining exports could triple by 2030. Milei, who does not believe in man-made climate change, argues that the bill is necessary for economic growth. 'Environmentalists would rather see us starve than have anything touched,' he has stated. The reform gives provinces more power to decide which areas to protect and which to exploit economically. Environmental activist Flavia Broffoni countered that 'the science is clear' and that creating a 'sustainable mine' in a periglacial environment is not possible. With nearly 17,000 glaciers and rock glaciers in Argentina, concerns over glacial reserves shrinking due to climate change add urgency to the debate.

Djibouti, a one‑million‑strong nation perched on the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, is set to hold its presidential election on April 10. All signs point to incumbent Ismail Omar Guelleh securing a sixth term with little genuine opposition. The country’s strategic location—linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—makes it a linchpin for global trade and a magnet for foreign military installations. The United States, France, China, Italy and Japan all maintain bases there, earning Djibouti the reputation of hosting the highest concentration of overseas military sites. Officially, Djibouti recognizes French and Arabic, while Somali and Afar are widely spoken among the two main ethnic groups, which together comprise roughly 95% of the population. Islam is practiced by about 94% of residents, and the Djiboutian franc remains the national currency. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 243,471 citizens—about a quarter of the population—are registered to vote, up from roughly 215,000 in the 2021 poll. Historical turnout averages around 67%. IGAD’s eight‑nation bloc has dispatched 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to monitor the process, with a post‑vote statement slated for April 12. Ismail Omar Guelleh, 78, leads the ruling People’s Rally for Progress. After parliament lifted the 75‑year age ceiling in November and abolished term limits back in 2010, Guelleh is now eligible for another term. Critics label his rule as authoritarian, yet they also acknowledge the relative stability he has maintained in a volatile region. Guelleh’s administration has turned Djibouti’s lack of natural resources into a revenue engine by signing infrastructure deals with China and leasing military facilities to Western powers. In 2017, Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh estimated that the bases generate roughly $125 million annually, with the United States contributing nearly half of that sum. The U.S. installation, Camp Lemonnier, remains the only permanent American base on the continent. The sole challenger, Mohamed Farah Samatar, runs under the Unified Democratic Centre after breaking away from the ruling party. His campaign slogan—“another Djibouti is possible”—has resonated only modestly, and observers such as Horn‑of‑Africa expert Sonia le Gouriellec describe the contest as a “token competition”. Human‑rights advocates echo this sentiment, calling the election a “masquerade” and a foregone conclusion. Key issues dominate the discourse. Democratic freedoms have eroded; opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016, and Guelleh captured over 90% of the vote in 2021. The country ranks 168th out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders press‑freedom index, and allegations of corruption and nepotism persist, including speculation that Guelleh’s stepson, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, is being groomed for succession. Economically, Djibouti’s reliance on Chinese financing is creating fiscal strain. By 2026 the nation owed China roughly $1.2 billion in loans, prompting the IMF to label its debt profile “in distress and unsustainable”. Massive infrastructure projects—most notably a railway to Ethiopia—have failed to curb poverty, with 73% of the youth unemployed. The country’s lifeline is its port system, which handles virtually all of Ethiopia’s maritime trade, amounting to about $2 billion in annual revenue. Ethiopia’s recent flirtation with a Somaliland port deal threatened Djibouti’s monopoly, though a Turkey‑mediated agreement in late 2024 redirected Ethiopia toward a “reliable and sustainable” sea corridor with Somalia. In sum, the upcoming election is less about a competitive political showdown and more about reaffirming a status quo that intertwines Djibouti’s geopolitical leverage, foreign‑military income, and mounting debt challenges.

President Donald Trump declared on Truth Social that U.S. troops, aircraft and naval vessels will stay positioned around Iran until what he termed the "REAL AGREEMENT" is fully honored, warning that any failure by Tehran will trigger "bigger, better, and stronger" military action.Trump’s message, posted late Wednesday, underscores Washington’s demand that Iran abandon any nuclear weapons ambitions and guarantee safe passage through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. He added that U.S. forces are "loading up and resting, looking forward to its next conquest," a rhetoric that heightens concerns of a rapid escalation.The announcement follows a two‑week ceasefire brokered by Pakistan that paused six weeks of combat and briefly steadied global markets worried about disruptions to oil shipments through Hormuz. However, the truce remains precarious.Iranian semi‑official outlets ISNA and Tasnim released a chart suggesting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had laid sea mines in the strait, marking a "danger zone" that forced some vessels to navigate farther north near Larak Island. The chart, dated Feb. 28 to Apr. 9, leaves it unclear whether the mines have been cleared.On the ground in Tehran, public sentiment is deeply skeptical. One woman told Al Jazeera that any day without bloodshed would be "very good," while another dismissed the ceasefire as meaningless while Israel continues its bombardment of Lebanon. A third resident called the truce "a theatrical show" orchestrated by Trump.Negotiations are further complicated by Tehran’s rejection of a sweeping U.S. proposal. Iran insists on an end to Israeli attacks on Lebanon and the lifting of sanctions—conditions Washington has yet to accept.Despite the uncertainty, Iranian officials hinted at a diplomatic push: Ambassador Reza Amiri Moghadam announced on X that a delegation would arrive in Islamabad for talks based on ten Iranian‑proposed points, though he later deleted the post. Pakistan’s capital simultaneously announced two days of unannounced holidays, adding to the opacity.Israel has intensified its campaign in Lebanon, killing at least 182 people in a single day, which Tehran warns could render further negotiations "unreasonable" under the current circumstances.In Washington, opposition to the conflict is mounting. Senator Cory Booker announced that Democrats intend to invoke the War Powers Resolution to force a congressional vote, condemning Trump’s actions as "unauthorised" and "reckless war‑mongering" that the American public does not support.The convergence of U.S. military posturing, Iranian skepticism, Israeli escalation, and domestic political pressure creates a volatile environment where the fragile ceasefire could unravel, threatening regional security and global energy markets.

US Vice President JD Vance labeled Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's comments about Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban as “completely scandalous” during a stop in Budapest. Vance’s remarks came as Hungary prepares for a critical parliamentary election on April 12, the toughest test of Orban’s 16‑year rule. Vance, speaking at a Hungarian university, said that a foreign head of government should never threaten the leader of an allied nation. He added that the media shows a double standard when it highlights alleged foreign interference in the 2016 U.S. election but downplays similar concerns in the Hungarian vote. Budapest has long accused Kyiv of attempting to influence the election by disrupting the flow of Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline. Kyiv counters that the pipeline was damaged by a Russian drone attack in late January and is being repaired as quickly as possible. In retaliation, Hungary blocked a €90 billion (≈$105 billion) EU loan intended for Ukraine. Zelenskyy responded by warning that he could provide the identity of those responsible to the Ukrainian army, saying they could “speak with him in their own language.” Vance also criticized the European Union, arguing that withholding billions of euros from Hungary for “border protection” and Ukraine’s pipeline shutdown are not acts of foreign influence but rather political pressure. The European Commission said it would convey its concerns to Washington through diplomatic channels, highlighting the growing friction between the EU, the United States, and Hungary over the upcoming election. These developments illustrate how the Hungarian vote has become a flashpoint for broader geopolitical rivalries, linking domestic politics with U.S.‑EU coordination, Ukraine’s war‑time financing, and the future of EU‑Hungary relations.

Argentina's congress has approved a bill promoted by President Javier Milei that authorizes mining in ecologically sensitive areas of glaciers and permafrost, sparking widespread environmental protests. The bill, which was already approved by the senate in February, will make it easier to mine for metals such as copper, lithium, and silver in frozen parts of the Andes mountains.The chamber of deputies approved the amendment with 137 votes in favor, 111 against, and three abstentions after nearly 12 hours of debate. Environmentalists argue that the legislative changes will weaken protections for crucial water sources, with thousands protesting outside parliament, holding banners with slogans such as “Water is more precious than gold!” and “A glacier destroyed cannot be restored!”Seven Greenpeace activists were arrested earlier in the day after scaling a statue outside parliament and unfurling a banner urging lawmakers “not to betray the Argentine people”. The passage of the amendment is a new coup for Milei, who pushed through looser labor laws in February despite repeated street protests.Environmental activists, such as Flavia Broffoni, argue that there is no possibility of creating a 'sustainable mine' in a periglacial environment. Argentina has nearly 17,000 glaciers or rock glaciers, with glacial reserves in the north-west shrinking by 17% in the last decade due to climate change.Milei, a free-market radical who does not believe in human-made climate change, says the bill is necessary to attract large-scale mining projects. The Central Bank of Argentina estimates that the country could triple its mining exports by 2030. Supporters argue that the bill will provide legal certainty and clear definitions, while critics, such as Enrique Viale, warn that it threatens the water supply for 70% of Argentinians.

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom’s electorate shifted from party‑centric voting to a binary choice between staying in or leaving the European Union. A decade later, about 60 % of the population still define themselves by the side they chose in that single referendum, turning a one‑off political decision into a lasting personal identity.While analysts often focus on the policy fallout—economic turbulence, party infighting, and shifting trade relations—the real impact runs deeper. The referendum ignited a civil‑war‑like split that continues to shape elections, media narratives, and everyday conversations across the country.Before the global upheavals of the George Floyd protests and the Covid‑19 vaccine rollout, Brexit was Britain’s most potent form of identity politics. It spawned new media outlets, such as GB News, and programmes like The Rest Is Politics, while also marginalising older cultural tropes like the “centrist dad” or “gammon” heckler on Question Time. Figures such as Nigel Farage and Zack Polanski now occupy the political fringe rather than the mainstream.The analysis draws on the new book Tribal Politics: How Brexit Divided Britain by political scientists Sara Hobolt and James Tilley. Their longitudinal surveys reveal a simple yet striking pattern: the referendum transformed a previously lukewarm public attitude toward the EU into a powerful, identity‑based habit.Prior to 2016, most Britons held only a mild Euroscepticism and gave the EU little thought. Even former Prime Minister David Cameron tried to silence the issue in 2006, believing it failed to engage voters. The sudden elevation of a niche concern to a national obsession forced ordinary citizens to pick a side, discuss it in pubs, and embed it into their self‑image—a process James Clear describes as building “identity‑based habits”.Data from Hobolt and Tilley show that emotional attachment to the Brexit identity was modest before the vote, rose sharply as the referendum approached, and surged dramatically after the result was announced. The post‑vote period saw a flood of EU‑themed merchandise, street rallies, and even flag‑clashes at cultural events such as the 2017 Last Night of the Proms.Crucially, the tribal divide has not faded. By 2025, only around 40 % of “Leavers” feel comfortable discussing politics with “Remainers”, and the sentiment is reciprocated. This goes beyond mere disagreement; it reflects a level of social discrimination where individuals on opposite sides would hesitate to share a home or marry into each other’s families.The authors note that the split now extends to perceptions of reality itself. Even in 2024, Remainers and Leavers disagreed on basic economic indicators, illustrating how the referendum reshaped not just policy preferences but fundamental worldviews.Class‑based voting, which dominated the 20th‑century British political landscape, has been largely supplanted by this new cultural cleavage. A previous study co‑authored by Tilley showed that the Labour Party’s turn toward the political centre in the 1990s eroded traditional working‑class loyalty. Today, leader Keir Starmer’s working‑class credentials appear largely symbolic, offering little substantive change.With class politics receded, culture wars have taken centre stage. The Brexit campaign’s vague promises about trade left the nation with a protracted, messy adjustment period. Immigration, famously dubbed the “baseball bat” issue by Dominic Cummings, remains the most polarising policy divide, followed by foreign aid and even the death penalty.Hobolt and Tilley’s most striking chart shows that while Remainers and Leavers clash over immigration, they share little disagreement on economic equality, workers’ rights, or public ownership—issues that directly affect household incomes. This suggests that the political battle is driven more by symbolic identity than by material concerns, benefitting those already financially secure.In sum, the United Kingdom’s post‑Brexit reality is one of entrenched tribalism, where a single referendum has reshaped social bonds, political discourse, and perceptions of truth itself. The nation continues to grapple with the legacy of a vote that turned a policy decision into a lasting cultural fault line.

Assam, India – Under the sweltering April sun, Akram Ali stood amid the rubble of his four‑room house, a home he had built over 45 years ago. The demolition, part of a government‑led bulldozing operation on March 14, turned his residence into a pile of debris.Bulldozers descended on Islampur, a Muslim‑majority neighbourhood on the outskirts of Guwahati, and for four hours razed homes across 177 hectares (437 acres). The sweep rendered 400 families homeless, including Ali, who now lives in a tarpaulin shanty a few kilometres from his former home.Ali, a daily‑wage worker, told Al Jazeera that despite identifying as Goriya – “son of the soil” – his house was destroyed. The Goriyas are an Assamese‑speaking Muslim community traditionally settled in the tea‑belt region. In 2022, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) officially recognised the Goriya, along with four other Muslim sub‑groups, as “Indigenous” to Assam.While this designation has afforded the Indigenous Muslims a degree of cultural safety, it has not shielded them from the state’s aggressive land‑clearance drives. Ali questioned the distinction, asking, “Weren’t our homes demolished because we are Muslims?”Muslims make up more than a third of Assam’s 31 million residents, according to the 2011 census. Of these, roughly 6.3 million are Bengali‑speaking “miyas,” often labelled “outsiders,” while about 4 million belong to Indigenous groups like the Goriya.The BJP, led nationally by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been courting the Indigenous Muslim vote ahead of the April 2026 state elections, where it seeks a third consecutive term after governing since 2016. Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, who has spearheaded the party’s crackdown on “miyas” since 2021, claims the government will “never target” Indigenous Muslims.Political analyst Bonojit Hussain explains that the BJP’s outreach serves two purposes: softening its communal image and capturing decisive vote blocks in constituencies where Indigenous Muslims and Hindus together decide the outcome. In seats such as Nalbari, where Indigenous Muslims account for over 25 % of the electorate, and Barkhetri, with roughly 80,000 Muslim voters, the community’s support can swing the result.Upper Assam, a region with a strong Assamese‑speaking identity, is especially critical. Journalist Firoz Khan notes that Indigenous Muslims influence the outcome in seven or eight of the 39 seats there, prompting the BJP to temper its overtly anti‑Muslim rhetoric in the area.Despite the party’s overtures, many Indigenous Muslims remain skeptical. Moinul Islam, spokesperson for the rights group Sadou Asom Goria Jatiya Parishad, warned that the BJP’s broader anti‑Muslim policies—evictions, voter‑list objections, and alleged deportations—are unlikely to win their votes.Earlier in 2025, similar demolition drives displaced hundreds of Goriya families in Lakhimpur and Golaghat districts, and a systematic campaign to challenge Muslim names on electoral rolls further strained relations.BJP spokesman Kishore Upadhyay dismissed the allegations as “malicious, biased and politically motivated,” but Indigenous groups argue the pattern signals an attempt to erase their cultural legacy.Recent actions by the state government reinforce this perception. Chief Minister Sarma renamed the only medical college in Barpeta—previously bearing the name of Goriya freedom fighter Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed—arguing that institutions should reflect their geographic location. Critics view the move as symbolic of a broader effort to marginalise Muslim contributions to Assam’s history.In December 2025, Sarma also proposed dropping the hyphen in “Sankar‑Azan,” a name that celebrated the syncretic legacy of 15th‑century polymath Srimanta Sankardev and 17th‑century Sufi saint Azan Peer. Communist Party member Isfaqur Rahman warned that such revisions reflect a “slow erasure of Assamese Muslim heritage.”For Ali, the demolition has hardened his political stance. “After being evicted, the chief minister called us illegal immigrants and broke our backs by destroying our homes,” he said. “We are the new miyas.”

Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of Taiwan’s main opposition party the Kuomintang (KMT), used a high‑profile trip to mainland China to advocate for renewed dialogue with Beijing. On Wednesday she laid a wreath at Sun Yat‑sen’s mausoleum in Nanjing, invoking the revolutionary’s legacy of “equality, inclusiveness and unity” as a moral foundation for cross‑strait reconciliation. Her visit marks the first time a KMT leader has set foot in China in ten years. Cheng said the core values of Sun’s ideal—"all under heaven are equal"—should guide efforts to promote reconciliation and regional prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. During the trip Cheng also expressed hopes to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, framing the potential encounter as a diplomatic test that could demonstrate the effectiveness of dialogue over deterrence. The timing of the trip is notable. It comes amid heightened friction between Taipei and Beijing, with China continuing to assert sovereignty over Taiwan while refusing to engage with President William Lai Ching‑te, whom it labels a “separatist”. Amid concerns that a distracted United States may be less able to guarantee Taiwan’s security, some Taiwanese voters view a thaw in relations as attractive. Wen‑ti Sung, a non‑resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, told Al Jazeera that a cordial photo‑op between Cheng and Xi could bolster the KMT’s argument that dialogue is more effective than military deterrence. Domestically, Cheng’s outreach occurs as Taiwan’s opposition‑controlled parliament has stalled a proposed $40 billion increase in defence spending. She acknowledged Taiwan’s democratic evolution, referencing the legacy of the “White Terror” period, while also praising China’s recent development achievements. The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sharply criticized the trip, accusing the KMT of undermining national security. Party spokesperson Wu Cheng argued that if the opposition truly seeks stability, it should stop blocking the defence budget increase. Neither Beijing nor Taipei formally recognises the other’s government, leaving any dialogue fragile and heavily politicised. Cheng’s visit therefore represents both a symbolic gesture toward historic ties and a contested move within Taiwan’s polarized political landscape.

During Donald Trump’s January 2025 inauguration, Giorgia Meloni was the only European leader invited, underscoring a brief period of close personal and diplomatic ties between Italy’s right‑wing government and the new U.S. administration. A month earlier she had been photographed sharing a private conversation with Trump at the Élysée Palace while President Emmanuel Macron celebrated the reopening of Notre‑Dame. From the outset of Trump’s second term, the Italian premier was hailed by the U.S. president as a “real live wire” and the European ally who could help “straighten out the world.” Meloni embraced the role, describing Trump as a “brilliant man” and promising to "make the West great again" together. That camaraderie has now eroded. In the wake of the US‑Israeli military action against Iran, Meloni told reporters during a Gulf‑region visit that "when we don’t agree, we must say it", explicitly rejecting the war. Her stance was reinforced a week earlier when Italy denied U.S. bombers permission to refuel at a southern base. Political analysts note that Meloni’s shift marks a decisive break from Trump’s agenda. Roberto D’Alimonte, a political‑science professor at Luiss University, warned that her earlier attempt to act as a bridge between Trump and European allies has become a “liability” she now seeks to repair. Public opinion reflects the change. Recent polls show a solid majority of Italians oppose the Iran war, and support for Trump in Italy has plunged from 35 % to just 19 %. The backlash also manifested in a recent referendum on judicial reform, where 61 % of voters aged 18‑34 rejected Meloni’s proposal—a defeat analysts link more to dissatisfaction with her foreign‑policy alignment than to the reform itself. Beyond politics, the conflict threatens Italy’s economy. As the EU’s second‑largest natural‑gas consumer—accounting for roughly 40 % of its energy mix—Italy is feeling the impact of soaring energy prices caused by the near‑total shutdown of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The Bank of Italy now projects only a 0.5 % growth rate for 2026‑27, down from earlier forecasts, while the national statistics office reported that Italy’s fiscal deficit has breached the EU’s 3 % ceiling, limiting fiscal flexibility ahead of next year’s elections. Despite these pressures, Meloni has not completely abandoned the United States. In March she declined Trump’s request to dispatch Italian warships to the Strait of Hormuz, aligning with other European nations, yet she stopped short of condemning the US‑led operation outright. Experts argue that Meloni’s approach is deliberately cautious. “She is pragmatic and politically skilled,” D’Alimonte said. “She will continue to balance criticism of Trump’s aggressive foreign policy with the need to preserve strategic ties, moving step‑by‑step toward a stronger European alignment without burning bridges.”