Breaking AI & Tech News Analyzed

U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the next nuclear accord with Iran will be “far better” than the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) he abandoned in 2018, adding new demands on enrichment, ballistic missiles and proxy groups as a two‑week cease‑fire in the US‑Israel‑Iran conflict nears its end.Key DevelopmentsTrump asserts the forthcoming deal will surpass the JCPOA, which limited Iran’s uranium enrichment to 3.67% and reduced centrifuges to 6,104.New US‑Israel demands include: zero uranium enrichment, removal of the estimated 440 kg of 60%‑enriched uranium, strict caps on ballistic‑missile development, and a halt to support for Hezbollah, the Houthis and other proxy forces.Negotiations are expected to shift to Islamabad, Pakistan after the current cease‑fire expires.Analyst Andreas Kreig (King’s College London) predicts any new pact will likely resemble the JCPOA with limited tweaks, not the sweeping concessions Trump touts.Data & Market ImpactU.S. sanctions imposed after the 2018 withdrawal cut Iran’s oil exports by roughly 60 %, slashing revenue by an estimated $30 billion per year.Frozen Iranian sovereign assets total about $150 billion; their release would inject significant liquidity into Iran’s banking sector.IAEA reports indicate Iran now holds 440 kg of 60%‑enriched uranium, enough to reach weapons‑grade (90%) in weeks if centrifuge capacity is fully utilized.Why This MattersThe outcome will shape three critical arenas:Regional security: A stricter deal could curb Iran’s missile reach, reducing the threat to Israel’s “Iron Dome” and to Gulf‑state oil infrastructure.Global non‑proliferation: Allowing zero enrichment would set a precedent that could pressure other volatile states to accept similar terms, but it also risks driving Tehran underground if perceived as punitive.Economic stability: Lifting sanctions would revive Iran’s oil exports, potentially adding $20‑30 billion to global supply and influencing crude prices.Expert InsightAndreas Kreig warns that Tehran’s political climate has hardened; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now dominates strategic decision‑making, making concessions on sovereignty unlikely. While the United Nations resolution attached to the JCPOA prohibited missile work linked to nuclear delivery, the new U.S. demand for outright missile bans exceeds that framework and could stall talks.Economic incentives—rapid asset release and sanction relief—are the primary leverage for Washington. However, without a credible verification regime comparable to the JCPOA’s intrusive IAEA inspections, any “better” deal may lack enforceability, increasing the risk of clandestine enrichment.What Happens NextNegotiators are expected to convene in Islamabad within the next two weeks; the agenda will likely focus on enrichment thresholds and verification mechanisms.If talks stall, both sides may resort to further kinetic actions, as seen in recent strikes on Natanz, Isfahan and Bushehr facilities.International actors—EU, China, Russia—are poised to mediate, pushing for a compromise that balances sanctions relief with robust monitoring.Long‑term, the region’s stability hinges on whether the U.S. can deliver tangible economic benefits to Iran while securing verifiable limits on its nuclear and missile programs.

The Stalled Islamabad Negotiations and Impending Ceasefire DeadlineVice President JD Vance is slated to lead a U.S. delegation to Islamabad on Tuesday, but Tehran has yet to confirm participation. Meanwhile, a fragile two‑week ceasefire, announced on April 7, is set to expire at 8 pm Washington time on Tuesday, leaving the region on edge.Key Moves: Naval Blockade, Vessel Seizure, and Threats from Both SidesThe United States has imposed a naval blockade on all Iran‑linked ships in the Strait of Hormuz and, on Monday, shot at and seized an Iranian vessel attempting passage. Iran denounced the seizure as “piracy” and warned of retaliation, while Trump reiterated that the U.S. would destroy Iranian power plants and bridges if Tehran refuses a deal.Quantifying the Stakes: Ceasefire Timeline, Naval Traffic, and Economic PressureCeasefire length: 14 days, set to end at 8 pm DC (midnight GMT) on Tuesday.Strait of Hormuz traffic: dozens of commercial vessels daily; recent incidents have reduced throughput by an estimated 15‑20%.Economic leverage: U.S. sanctions target Iran’s frozen assets worth roughly $30 billion, while the blockade threatens an additional $5 billion in daily oil‑related revenue.Regional and Global Implications of a Renewed Iran‑US ClashA collapse of the ceasefire would likely trigger a surge in maritime attacks, jeopardizing global oil supplies and inflating prices. Neighboring states, especially Pakistan and Gulf nations, could face spill‑over security challenges, while the broader U.S.–China strategic balance may shift as Beijing watches U.S. military commitments in the region.Four Scenarios and Their Likely Trajectories Over the Next WeekScenario 1 – Interim Deal: Talks in Islamabad produce a memorandum of understanding that extends the ceasefire and outlines a framework for nuclear steps in exchange for limited sanctions relief.Scenario 2 – Ceasefire Extension Without Deal: Both sides agree to a short‑term pause, buying time for diplomacy but leaving core disputes unresolved.Scenario 3 – Ceasefire Holds Without Talks: The U.S. unilaterally prolongs the pause, creating a fragile lull while maritime tensions remain high.Scenario 4 – Ceasefire Collapses: No Iranian delegation appears, the ceasefire expires, and the U.S. resumes targeted strikes on Iranian infrastructure, risking a broader regional escalation.Analysts warn that even a limited extension (Scenarios 1‑3) remains precarious without credible diplomatic concessions. If Scenario 4 unfolds, the conflict could quickly “get very ugly,” with potential attacks on critical infrastructure across the Middle East.

The European Union has long voiced strong criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the West Bank, but recent political developments suggest it may finally translate that rhetoric into tangible economic pressure.Key DevelopmentsEU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen labeled Gaza aid restrictions a “man‑made famine” (Sept 2025).EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas condemned Israeli strikes in Lebanon as unjustified (Apr 2026).Spain’s government called for suspending the EU‑Israel association agreement over human‑rights concerns (Apr 2026).Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced a pause on the defence‑cooperation pact with Israel (Apr 2026).Hungary’s shift after Viktor Orbán’s electoral loss may reopen EU sanctions on West‑Bank settlers (Feb 2026).Data & Market ImpactApproximately 33% of Israel’s trade is conducted with the EU, giving Brussels significant economic leverage.Israeli participation in the Horizon research programme brings billions of euros in joint scientific funding.A partial suspension of the EU‑Israel association agreement would affect only the trade component, requiring a weighted majority rather than unanimity.Why This MattersEconomic pressure could compel Israel to reconsider settlement expansion and military actions that breach international law.Reduced EU‑Israel trade would impact sectors ranging from technology and agriculture to academic collaborations, affecting businesses and researchers on both sides.EU credibility on human‑rights enforcement would be tested, influencing its global standing and relations with other partners.Expert InsightThe EU’s hesitancy has stemmed from internal disunity and a reliance on diplomatic persuasion. However, the loss of a reliable far‑right ally in Hungary and growing public outrage in Italy and Spain are reshaping the calculus. By leveraging its status as Israel’s largest trading partner, the EU can move from moral condemnation to actionable leverage. Yet the move is fraught with risk: a fragmented response could weaken the bloc’s negotiating power, while a hardline stance may push Israel closer to non‑EU allies such as the United States under a Trump‑aligned administration.What Happens NextEU ministers are likely to revisit the proposal to partially suspend the association agreement, aiming for a weighted‑majority vote.Hungary’s new government may support sanctions on West‑Bank settlers, reviving the stalled measure.Italy and Spain could spearhead a coordinated diplomatic push for broader economic restrictions if settlement activity continues.Israel’s response will hinge on the economic cost versus political support from the United States; a significant EU clamp‑down could force policy recalibrations in Jerusalem.

The Lead A strike by London Underground drivers will severely disrupt transport in the capital over the next four days, with the RMT union confirming action will proceed despite no last-minute talks planned. Strike Impact on London Transport Network Just under half of London's tube drivers are in the RMT union and expected to join the strike, with a slight majority – members of Aslef – still working as normal. The RMT has called the action in two 24-hour tranches from midday on Tuesday and Thursday for maximum impact over four days. On Tuesday and Thursday afternoons, services will be significantly reduced and may not run later than 8pm on most lines. On Wednesday and Friday morning the first trains are not expected to begin running until 7.30am, and services are likely to be worse than usual in the afternoon. Some lines, where the RMT is heavily represented, will probably not run at all during the strike periods: the Piccadilly, Waterloo & City and Circle lines are expected to have no service. Parts of the Metropolitan line, between Baker Street and Aldgate, and the Central line, between White City and Liverpool Street, will also have no trains. Alternative Transportation Options The London Overground, national rail services, the Elizabeth line, the DLR and trams will be running as usual but are likely to be extremely busy. London buses should be running as normal but are likely to be very crowded, and are liable to be disrupted and delayed by the added numbers of passengers boarding and by congested roads if people turn to private cars. TfL advises that people may find it easier to walk or cycle on some journeys. During the last tube strike, which took place in September 2025, the number of cycle and e-bike hires rose significantly. At least the weather promises to be fine. The Dispute Over Working Hours This dispute centers around working hours. The RMT went on strike last year to press for a 32-hour working week, which TfL said was unaffordable. Now drivers are being offered a four-day week, which the Aslef drivers' union supports but the RMT opposes. TfL says its proposals would bring London Underground in line with the working patterns of other train operating companies, improving reliability and flexibility at no additional cost. It said the changes would be voluntary, there would be no reduction in contractual hours and those who wish to continue a five-day working week pattern would be able to do so. The RMT general secretary, Eddie Dempsey, said TfL was making no concessions, adding: "The approach of TfL is not one which leads to industrial peace and will infuriate our members who want to see a negotiated settlement to this avoidable dispute." Aslef says it is surprised that the RMT is taking action. It views the voluntary four-day week as a winner: giving tube drivers who wish to do it an extra 35 days off every year, in return for minor changes to working conditions and using electronic, rather than paper-based, systems. Future Strike Possibilities The first set of planned strikes in this particular dispute, in March, was called off by the RMT to allow talks to go ahead. But that pause was announced six days before action was due, and there are no signs of further negotiation now, with the RMT at the weekend accusing TfL of "reneging on promises" and making strikes inevitable. If there is no resolution, further strikes over the same four-day pattern are scheduled by the RMT in May and June.

The Prediction Platform's Meteoric Rise Polymarket, the online prediction platform that hosts bets on events such as the Iran war, is in talks to raise $400m (£296m) at a valuation of up to $15bn. This latest fundraising round would represent a significant two-thirds increase on the company's previous valuation, underscoring the rapid growth and increasing influence of prediction markets in the financial landscape. Geopolitical Betting Drives Platform Growth The company has gained notoriety in recent months over wagers placed on the Middle East conflict, including on the timing of US-Israel strikes against Iran, and on a US-Iran ceasefire, some of which appeared to bear signs of insider trading. During this period, Polymarket has experienced a massive increase in volume, with more than $1bn a week now traded on its platform. The platform operates on a commission-based fee structure, though geopolitical and world events markets are "fee-free." Financial Trajectory and Strategic Investments Polymarket's valuation has been increasing rapidly, having achieved a $1bn price tag in June last year after Peter Thiel's Founders Fund led a $200m round. This was followed months later by the owner of the New York stock exchange, Intercontinental Exchange, pledging $1bn at a valuation of $9bn. The NYSE's owner has since invested a further $600m in Polymarket, with plans to become a "global distributor" of the platform's data, using bets to provide "sentiment analysis" to investors. Datafeeds Reshaping Financial Markets Datafeeds from Polymarket and other online prediction markets have increasingly been shaping trades, including in oil markets. The platform's forecasts are being used by more traditional financial institutions to inform their strategies, creating a new intersection between prediction markets and conventional finance. This integration has raised questions about the potential for prediction markets to influence larger financial systems and whether they might create distortions in market behavior. Controversies and Regulatory Challenges Despite its growth, Polymarket has faced significant scrutiny. Numerous bets placed by anonymous accounts have given rise to speculation that people are taking advantage of insider information. The Israeli authorities earlier this year arrested several people and charged two on suspicion of using classified information to make Polymarket bets. A Guardian investigation found that thousands of people in online communities are strategizing on how to profit from conflict through betting, with some attempting to pressure institutions to change their reporting to align with their wagers. The Future of Prediction Markets As prediction markets continue to gain mainstream acceptance, Polymarket's latest funding round signals growing confidence in the sector's potential. However, the platform faces ongoing challenges regarding regulatory oversight, market manipulation, and the ethical implications of monetizing predictions on sensitive geopolitical events. The increasing integration of Polymarket data into financial decision-making processes suggests that prediction markets are evolving from niche gambling platforms to influential data sources that could shape market behavior in increasingly significant ways.

Israel Deploys ‘Yellow Line’ Buffer Zone in Southern Lebanon On 20 April 2026, the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) declared the establishment of a clearly marked "yellow line" along the southern Lebanese border. The line is intended to serve as a visual and operational barrier to prevent stray fire and infiltration by militant groups operating near the frontier. Scope and Resources Behind the New Demarcation Length: approximately 12 kilometres of marked boundary stretching from the town of Marjayoun to the outskirts of Tyre. Personnel: 300 Israeli soldiers assigned to monitor and enforce the line, supported by 2 UAV units for aerial surveillance. Equipment: portable radar stations, night‑vision cameras, and rapid‑response teams positioned at five key checkpoints. Timeline: construction began on 15 April 2026 and was completed within five days. Strategic Calculus: Why the ‘Yellow Line’ Matters The move follows a spike in cross‑border incidents during the past month, including three rocket launches from Lebanese territory that landed in northern Israel. By creating a visible, enforceable boundary, Israel aims to: Reduce civilian casualties on both sides. Provide a legal and tactical justification for rapid interdiction. Signal to the Lebanese government and Hezbollah that Israel will take proactive defensive steps. Regional Repercussions and Domestic Fallout Lebanese officials have condemned the unilateral action, calling it a violation of sovereignty. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has expressed concern over potential escalation. Analysts predict: Increased diplomatic friction between Israel and Lebanon, possibly prompting emergency talks at the UN. Heightened security alerts in southern Lebanese towns, with local militias likely to test the line’s robustness. Potential ripple effects on Israel’s broader border strategy with Syria and the Gaza Strip. Looking Ahead: Scenarios for the ‘Yellow Line’ Experts outline three plausible trajectories: Stabilisation: The line deters incursions, leading to a de‑escalation and possible joint monitoring with UNIFIL. Escalation: Militants attempt to breach the line, prompting Israeli retaliatory strikes and a cycle of violence. Diplomatic Resolution: The visible barrier becomes a bargaining chip in broader Israel‑Lebanon negotiations, potentially resulting in a formal demilitarised zone. For now, the "yellow line" stands as a tangible reminder of the fragile security balance in the Middle East, and its evolution will be a key barometer of regional stability in the months ahead.

Washington Hosts the Next Chapter in Lebanon-Israel RelationsThe United States State Department is set to host a second round of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel on Thursday, marking a pivotal moment in the region's fragile post-conflict landscape. This meeting follows the first direct talks in decades, held on April 14, which were attended by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and led by Lebanese Ambassador Nada Hamadeh and her Israeli counterpart Yechiel Leiter.The talks are taking place against the backdrop of a fragile ceasefire announced by Donald Trump on April 16. The US Department of State has emphasized its commitment to facilitating "good-faith discussions," though the path forward remains fraught with tension.The Strategic Stakes of Direct DiplomacyThe core of the current diplomatic effort is the divergent vision of security held by the two nations. While the Lebanese government, led by President Joseph Aoun, seeks a full Israeli withdrawal, Israel is actively pursuing a "forward defence" line.Lebanon's Position: Aoun has vowed to negotiate without sacrificing any part of the country's territory, framing the talks not as a weakness but as a decision rooted in the strength to protect the nation.Israel's Position: Israeli officials have openly stated their intent to replicate the destruction of entire towns in Gaza in southern Lebanon, creating an "annihilated area" as a security buffer.The Human Cost: The negotiations follow a massive Israeli wave of air strikes across Lebanon in early April that killed more than 300 people, including medics, women, and children.Hezbollah's Resistance vs. Aoun's Diplomatic PushA significant fracture exists between the Lebanese government and the powerful militant group Hezbollah. While Aoun argues that the negotiations are necessary to protect the country, Hezbollah has described them as "losing concessions" and futile.Naim Qassem, Hezbollah's chief, has rejected the talks, insisting that no one has the right to steer Lebanon toward Israel without internal consensus. This internal division is further complicated by Iran, which has stressed that Lebanon must be included in broader truce discussions, creating a complex web of regional alliances that the US must navigate.Navigating the Gap Between Ceasefire and RealityThe most immediate threat to the success of Thursday's talks is the continued military activity on the ground. Despite the ceasefire announcement, Israel has continued to blow up neighbourhoods in border villages and struck targets in Bint Jbeil and Deir Siriane on Monday.While President Trump has publicly "prohibited" Israel from attacking Lebanon, the discrepancy between diplomatic proclamations and military actions suggests a deep mistrust. The upcoming talks face the challenge of addressing the ongoing ground offensive, which undermines the credibility of the ceasefire and complicates any potential diplomatic resolution.

The Frontline ParadoxMichael Watkins, a 50-year-old recovery advocate in Dallas, represents the human cost of the evolving opioid crisis. His work involves 'uninvited interventions'—door-knocking strangers within 72 hours of an overdose to offer Narcan and resources. Despite these grassroots efforts, the broader national strategy faces a critical juncture. While Dallas County saw fentanyl deaths drop from 280 in 2023 to 203 last year, a nationwide trend of decline has been complicated by a sudden shift in federal policy and the global supply chain of the drug.The Migration of Fentanyl PrecursorsA critical technical breakthrough in the supply chain has shifted the epicenter of fentanyl production. For years, the focus was on China, where companies like Yuancheng supplied precursor chemicals. However, a new paper in the journal Science suggests that China's crackdown on these companies led to a drop in overdose deaths. Now, the supply chain has migrated to India.The New Route: Precursor chemicals are now largely sourced from India's large, less-regulated pharmaceutical industry.The Destination: These chemicals are exported to Mexico, where they are used to manufacture the lethal drug before it crosses the US-Mexico border.The Blind Spot: Experts like Ben Westhoff argue that the US is 'behind the eight ball' because India is not currently on the radar of policymakers, despite the strong diplomatic relationship between the two nations.Funding Cuts and Data DisruptionThe progress made in reducing overdose deaths is now at risk due to severe federal budget cuts. The Trump administration has declared fentanyl a 'weapon of mass destruction,' yet simultaneously slashed hundreds of millions of dollars in addiction services.Massive Reductions: At least $1.7bn in block grants for state health departments and $350m in addiction prevention funding were cut.Staffing Crisis: The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has reduced its staff by half.DOGE Impact: Elon Musk's DOGE team fired a team that rigorously tracked Americans' drug use for decades, creating a data vacuum that hampers response efforts.The Cost of Political RhetoricThe administration's militaristic approach, including military strikes on Venezuela (which does not produce fentanyl) and labeling cartels as 'terrorist organisations,' has drawn criticism from public health experts. Jonathan Caulkins of Carnegie Mellon University argues that labeling fentanyl a 'weapon of mass destruction' is a political move that hijacks a specific term and ignores the reality that cigarettes kill more Americans annually.Experts warn that this rhetoric further stigmatizes addiction, discouraging users from seeking help. While military tactics are necessary for interdiction, the consensus is that healthcare and local support services are equally critical for saving lives.Future Outlook: The India Blind SpotThe future of the fentanyl crisis in the US depends on addressing the new supply chain reality. As the precursor trade moves to India, the US must pivot its focus from China to the Indian subcontinent. Without increased funding for community organizations like the Recovery Resource Council and a strategic focus on Indian chemical regulation, the recent decline in overdose deaths could be short-lived. The 'uninvited interventions' of advocates like Michael Watkins will be vital, but they cannot replace the systemic support that federal funding provides.

The Escalating US-Iran Standoff United States President Donald Trump has claimed a second round of negotiations with Iran will take place in Pakistan on Tuesday as mediators try to revive negotiations before the end of an ongoing yet fragile two-week ceasefire. The announcement on Sunday came alongside a sharp escalation in rhetoric. Trump warned that Iran must agree to a deal "one way or another – the nice way or the hard way" and threatened to target key infrastructure if negotiations fail. He also renewed his threat of striking "bridges and power plants", which experts said could amount to war crimes under international law. Iran, however, has so far denied it will participate in the talks, accusing the US of "armed piracy" after US forces struck and seized an Iran-linked tanker on Sunday, further heightening tensions between the longtime adversaries. US Position and Demands On Sunday, Trump announced that US negotiators would travel to the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, on Monday for talks aimed at ending the US-Israel war on Iran. In a social media post, the president did not say which officials would be sent to the talks. Last weekend's first round of talks, at which Vice President JD Vance led the US delegation, ended without a deal. Trump accused Iran of violating their two-week ceasefire, which is due to expire on Wednesday, by opening fire on Saturday in the Strait of Hormuz. The US president threatened to destroy civilian infrastructure in Iran if it doesn't accept the terms of the deal being offered by the US. "We're offering a very fair and reasonable deal, and I hope they take it because, if they don't, the United States is going to knock out every single power plant, and every single bridge, in Iran," Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform. In a further escalation, Trump said an Iranian-flagged ship called the Touska was "stopped" by US forces in the Gulf of Oman "by blowing a hole in the engine room". He said it was trying to get past the US naval blockade of Iranian ports. US forces boarded the ship and took physical control of the vessel. Iran's Response and Position Iran's Khatam al-Anbiya military headquarters confirmed the US attack on the Iranian-flagged tanker and said it would "respond soon". Then, Iran's Tasnim News Agency reported that Iranian forces had sent drones in the direction of US military ships. Ebrahim Azizi, the head of the Iranian parliament's National Security Committee, told Al Jazeera that Iran's actions during talks with the US are strictly guided by national interests and security. When asked if Tehran intends to participate in the talks in Islamabad, he said, "Iran acts based on national interests." "We see the current negotiations as a continuation of the battlefield, and we see nothing other than the battlefield in this," he said. "If it yields achievements that sustain those of the battlefield, then the negotiation arena is also an opportunity for us … but not if the Americans intend to turn this into a field of excessive demands based on their bullying approach." Key Points of Friction Since the start of the war on February 28, a number of new sticking points have emerged – alongside old challenges: Strait of Hormuz Dispute A central dispute is over the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global shipping route linking the Gulf to the Arabian Sea. One-fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies were shipped through the strait before the war began. Iran insists on sovereignty over the waterway, which lies within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman and does not fall into international waters, and stated that only "nonhostile" ships could pass. It has also floated the idea of levying tolls while Washington demands full freedom of navigation. After the war began, Iran in effect closed the strait by forbidding transits, attacking ships and reportedly laying sea mines. Shipping traffic has since dropped by 95 percent. A week ago, the US implemented a blockade of its own. Its Navy has been blocking Iranian ports to pressure Tehran to reopen the vital waterway, adding another obstacle to the talks. According to Rob Geist Pinfold, a lecturer in international security at King's College London, Trump's stance on the strait has shifted during the conflict and remains unclear. "We've had Trump say that he would be open to jointly controlling the Strait of Hormuz with Iran, where both sides collect a toll for shipping," Geist Pinfold noted, calling this "completely different to the demands of the US on paper but also the demands of the US's regional allies like the Gulf states and Israel, … who would regard any deal that entrenches Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz … as a stab in the back". "This isn't just between the US and Iran. It's about the US having to keep its regional allies on side," Geist Pinfold told Al Jazeera. Nuclear Enrichment Standoff Another core issue is Iran's nuclear programme, particularly its stock of enriched uranium. The US and Israel are pushing for zero uranium enrichment and have accused Iran of working towards building a nuclear weapon while providing no evidence for their claims. Iran has insisted its enrichment effort is for civilian purposes only. It is a signatory to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In 2015, the US was a signatory to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) under then-US President Barack Obama. In that agreement, Iran pledged to limit its uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent, which is substantially below weapons grade, and to comply with inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to insure it wasn't developing nuclear weapons. In return, international sanctions on Iran were lifted. However, in 2018, during his first term, Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA despite the IAEA saying Iran had complied with the agreement up to that point. In March 2025, Tulsi Gabbard, the US director of national intelligence, testified to Congress that the US "continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon". A month later, the IAEA estimated that Iran had 440kg (970lb) of 60-percent enriched uranium. While that is also below weapons grade, it is a short jump to achieve the 90-percent purity needed for atomic weapons production. On Sunday, in strongly worded comments, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said Trump had no justification to ⁠⁠"deprive" Iran of its nuclear ⁠⁠rights. Maryam Jamshidi, a law professor at the University of Colorado in Boulder, said Iran's position on enrichment is based on Article IV of the NPT, "which recognises that all state parties [to the treaty] have the inalienable right to research, develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes". "In demanding that Iran have no enrichment, the United States is denying Iran its rights under this treaty," she told Al Jazeera. "In insisting that its right to enrichment be preserved, Iran is expressing a reasonable desire to be treated the same as any other state under international law." Lebanon Conflict Complicates Talks Two days after the first US-Israeli strikes on Tehran on February 28, in which Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei was killed, the Iran-backed Hezbollah group in Lebanon began firing rockets and drones into northern Israel, and Israel struck back, launching an invasion into southern Lebanon. Iran is adamant that its ceasefire with the US extends to Lebanon and is demanding Israel end its offensive against its ally Hezbollah and its invasion of Lebanon. After initially denying the two-week ceasefire included Lebanon, Israel accepted a 10-day truce starting on Thursday night after direct Israel-Lebanon talks. However, that ceasefire is also teetering on collapse amid renewed hostilities. On Monday, the Israeli military claimed that it struck a loaded launch system in the Kfarkela area of southern Lebanon overnight while Hezbollah claimed responsibility for multiple explosions that it said hit a convoy of eight Israeli armoured vehicles, also in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is Tehran's most powerful ally in the region and a central part of its "axis of resistance", a network of armed groups across the Middle East aligned with Iran against Israel. The network also includes Yemen's Houthis and a collection of armed groups in Iraq. Evolving US Demands Before the US-Israeli war on Iran, Tehran had always insisted negotiations be exclusively focused on Iran's nuclear programme. US demands, however, have extended beyond the nuclear file. Before the war, Washington and Israel demanded severe restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile programme. Iran has said its ability to maintain its missile capabilities is non-negotiable. On February 25, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned that Iran's refusal to discuss its missile programme was a "big problem". Yet, since the two-week ceasefire was announced on April 8 and the Pakistan-brokered negotiations began, the US has not made any mention of Iran's ballistic missiles, which have been a major feature in Iran's retaliation against US and Israeli forces. Regime Change and Proxy Support The US and Israel have also made no secret of their desire for a change in Iran's government. Asked two weeks before the war began if he wished for a toppling of the government in Tehran, Trump said: "Seems like that would be the best thing that could happen." After the killing of Khamenei and multiple other senior Iranian leaders, Trump claimed the US-Israel war had in effect brought about "regime change", claiming key leadership layers were "decimated". Experts, however, disputed Trump's assertions, saying the government was very much intact, if not stronger. Salar Mohandesi, a professor at Bowdoin College in Maine, argued that despite US claims, what is happening in Iran does not meet any serious definition of "regime change". "The fundamental structures of the Islamic Republic are intact, and the new leaders are regime loyalists who are arguably more hardline than their assassinated predecessors," he told Al Jazeera. Mohandesi said the war has arguably strengthened the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), something that is an "acceleration of an existing" trend and does not necessarily amount to regime change, "certainly not in the way Trump means it". "Trump's declaration that he has succeeded in 'regime change' is just a rhetorical move to try to claim victory where none exists," he added. Proxy Group Support Three days before the war began during his State of the Union address to the US Congress, Trump accused Iran and "its murderous proxies" of spreading "nothing but terrorism and death and hate". The US and Israel have long demanded Iran stop supporting its nonstate allies – primarily Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and a number of groups in Iraq. Tehran to date has refused to enter into any dialogue about limiting its support for these armed groups. But on Friday, Trump claimed Iran had agreed to almost all of the US demands, including support for its proxies. A statement by Iran's Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejected that any such agreement was in place, saying: "The Americans talk excessively and create noise around the situation. Do not be misled!" Prospects for a Breakthrough On Sunday, Iran's top negotiator and speaker of its parliament, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, acknowledged that while "conclusions" had been reached on some issues, "we are far from a final agreement." Analyst Geist Pinfold told Al Jazeera that deep divisions between the US and Iran make a comprehensive deal unlikely in the near term despite some openings created by Trump's shifting positions. "The primary complication that would mean a deal is less likely but also one of the potential curveballs that would make a deal more likely is the Trump administration's equivocations regarding what its red lines actually are," he said. "At the moment, the gaps look insurmountable," Geist Pinfold added, noting that "the best-case scenario would be the extension of the ceasefire rather than the actual deal." The US-Iran talks face major structural obstacles despite growing speculation about a negotiated end to the current crisis, according to Bowdoin College's Mohandesi. "Donald Trump feels that he needs to somehow convert this disastrous defeat into some sort of win," he noted, adding: "It's unclear what that would look like at the negotiating table." On the Iranian side, Mohandesi sees little room for compromise on the core strategic issues. "Iran will absolutely not abandon its missile programme. It will not stop supporting its allies in the region, and it will almost certainly not agree to zero enrichment," he said. The academic questioned whether even a restoration of maritime traffic would constitute meaningful success for Washington. Even if Trump "were to somehow convince Iran to return the Strait of Hormuz to the pre-war status quo, it's unclear how that would be a major win since the strait was open before he started the war", Mohandesi said.