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Recent talks in Islamabad between Washington and Tehran collapsed, reflecting the stark mismatch between the United States' 15‑point proposal and Iran's 10‑point counter‑offer. The brief negotiations, led by U.S. Vice‑President JD Vance, failed to bridge core disagreements on nuclear policy and regional security. Vance attributed the breakdown to Iran's outright rejection of U.S. terms, while President Donald Trump responded by imposing a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. Such a blockade is legally an act of war, raising the specter of Iranian retaliation against Gulf monarchies and a sharp spike in global oil, diesel, and LNG prices. Both sides, however, have not ruled out renewed negotiations. Pakistan and Egypt are quietly mediating, recognizing that a renewed conflict would deepen President Trump's domestic challenges—rising inflation, declining poll numbers, and the approaching midterm elections—while also exacerbating Iran's economic hardship and social unrest. The proposed diplomatic framework focuses on three pillars: Limited uranium enrichment: The U.S. would acknowledge Iran's right, under the Non‑Proliferation Treaty, to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, capping enrichment at 3.67% (the 2015 JCPOA limit). Monitoring would be conducted by the IAEA through electronic and on‑site inspections, with a potential 20‑year renewable agreement. Sanctions relief and asset release: In exchange for Iran dropping its demand for war reparations, the United States would lift primary and secondary sanctions and unfreeze all Iranian assets. Additionally, Iran would be authorized to levy a $2 million fee per oil tanker transiting Hormuz, shared with Oman, provided it guarantees innocent passage under a multinational oversight coalition that includes Russia and China. Security guarantees: Iran would issue a written pledge not to develop nuclear weapons, echoing the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s injunction. Simultaneously, the U.S. and UN Security Council would endorse a non‑aggression pact between the two nations, with parallel agreements possible for Gulf states. For the plan to succeed, three conditions must be met: Washington must make genuine concessions; President Trump must extend the 22 April cease‑fire deadline and allow sufficient time for complex negotiations; and any Israeli offensive against Iran must be avoided, as it would jeopardize the entire process. Rajan Menon, professor emeritus of international relations at CUNY’s Powell School and senior research fellow at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute, outlines this pragmatic approach as a means to avert a full‑scale war and secure a durable peace in the Middle East.

Negotiations between Washington and Tehran are expected to resume in Islamabad within days, placing President Donald Trump under intense pressure to deliver an Iran accord that can be credibly billed as superior to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) brokered by former President Barack Obama. Two tests dominate the diplomatic calculus: the deal must demonstrably exceed the Obama agreement, and it must ensure that Iran derives no lasting strategic advantage, particularly over the vital Strait of Hormuz. While direct comparisons with the 159‑page JCPOA are imperfect—given the evolution of Iran’s nuclear program and the emergence of non‑nuclear concerns—the Trump team is framing its objectives around four pivotal issues. 1. Enrichment suspension: In Geneva on 26 February, the U.S. demanded a 10‑year freeze on all domestic uranium enrichment, a figure Iran’s foreign minister deemed unrealistic beyond three years. In Islamabad, the U.S. escalated the ask to a 20‑year suspension, yet Trump publicly dismissed even that, insisting on a permanent ban. The practical timeline for Iran to restart enrichment after the damage to its facilities remains uncertain. 2. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile: The original JCPOA capped uranium enrichment at 3.65% and limited the stockpile to 300 kg. Iran now holds 440.9 kg of 60%‑enriched uranium—a material that can be rapidly converted to weapons‑grade (90%)—mostly stored as UF₆ gas in scuba‑tank‑sized canisters. Tehran offered to down‑blend this stockpile to 3.67% in an irreversible process, mirroring the 2015 deal’s provisions. The U.S., however, is pressing for the entire stockpile to be removed from Iran under American supervision, a stance that raises questions about the relative merits of in‑country down‑blending versus export. 3. Sanctions relief: The JCPOA promised the release of roughly $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets and the lifting of oil trade restrictions, while retaining sanctions on terrorism, human rights, and missile proliferation. In the Geneva framework, over 80% of sanctions would be lifted, leaving only human‑rights‑related measures. Trump’s administration, wary of political backlash, seeks to attach conditions on how Iran can spend the relief, a demand Tehran rejects, insisting on a permanent, irreversible lifting of sanctions. 4. Non‑nuclear issues: Trump has repeatedly criticized the JCPOA for isolating Iran’s nuclear program from its broader regional behavior. The current negotiations must grapple with Iran’s ballistic‑missile program, support for proxy forces, and the strategic future of the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials are divided: one camp favors leveraging the strait for immediate revenue and national pride, while another views it as a diplomatic lever to secure a lasting ceasefire and security guarantees. The confluence of these challenges creates a “marshmallow test” for both sides—whether they can forgo short‑term temptations in favor of a durable, long‑term settlement. As the Trump presidency approaches its final year, the ability to craft a deal that convincingly outperforms the Obama era while addressing the expanded nuclear and geopolitical landscape will determine the legacy of U.S. policy on Iran and its impact on regional stability.

The US-Iran peace process has encountered a significant setback as recent talks have concluded without a deal. The negotiations, which aimed to revive the stalled nuclear agreement, ended without an agreement on a new framework. The lack of a deal has raised concerns about the future of diplomatic efforts between the two nations. The US and Iran have been engaged in indirect talks for several months, with the goal of reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. The JCPOA was withdrawn from by the US in 2018, leading to a significant escalation in tensions between the two countries. Despite efforts to revive the agreement, the talks have stalled, and it remains unclear what the next steps will be. The outcome of the talks has significant implications for regional stability and the global community's efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As the situation continues to unfold, the international community remains cautious about the prospects for a renewed agreement.

The ongoing conflict between the US and Israel and Iran has significantly altered the dynamics of the nuclear programme negotiations. Former US envoys who dealt with Iran have stated that the US-Israeli attack on Iran and Tehran's subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz have given Iran new tools and resolve to resist pressure to shutter its nuclear programme.Two senior negotiators for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Obama-era agreement to limit Iran's nuclear uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief, said the Trump administration's war had handed Iran a coveted weapon by demonstrating its ability to cut off the Strait of Hormuz, an economic chokehold that one negotiator said would help Iran 'balance the asymmetry of power' with the US.Alan Eyre, a former diplomat who helped negotiate the JCPOA, noted that 'this administration, to say it more politely, cannot unsoil the bed. There's no way to get back to the status quo ante before this war started.'In 2018, Donald Trump withdrew the US from the JCPOA, which barred Tehran from enriching its uranium to weapons-grade. Trump called the deal 'one of the worst and most one-sided transactions' the US had ever entered into.However, after a strategy of high pressure – first through returning sanctions and then, after Trump's return to power in 2025, a war that was meant to destroy Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities – the current US administration has found itself in more complex negotiations than before its campaign of economic and military strikes.Robert Malley, a Yale lecturer who was former special envoy to Iran under Joe Biden and a lead negotiator on the JCPOA, said: 'The strait of Hormuz wasn't an issue before the US decided to strike. You have all the issues inherited from the past, but you just added a few, because the US has handed Iran a tool that it always had, but it never thought of using, or never felt it could.'The chances for a comprehensive agreement addressing all of the US and Iran's grievances appear slim. While the Obama administration sought to negotiate exclusively on Iran's nuclear programme in the lead-up to the 2015 agreement, the Trump administration has sought a broader deal limiting Iran's ballistic missiles programme and its support for regional proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

The United States is reportedly contemplating a daring military operation to confiscate Iran's reserves of highly enriched uranium, a move that experts warn would be fraught with significant challenges and risks.Ensuring Iran does not possess nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them using enriched uranium has been a primary objective for the US during negotiations with Iranian officials over the past year. This goal was also cited as a justification for the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities during last year's 12-day war with Israel and for initiating the ongoing conflict in February, despite ongoing talks with Iran at the time.Iran possesses approximately 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level at which it becomes considerably easier to reach the 90 percent threshold required to produce a nuclear weapon. This amount theoretically could be used to produce more than 10 nuclear warheads, according to International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi.Iran asserts that its nuclear program is exclusively for civilian energy purposes, despite enriching uranium far beyond the required threshold. Iranian officials have expressed openness to discussing a reduction in the level of enrichment during past negotiations but have refused to dismantle the country's nuclear program entirely, citing national sovereignty concerns.In 2015, the former Obama administration negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and other nations, under which Iran agreed not to enrich uranium to high levels and to undergo frequent inspections. However, Trump withdrew the US from this agreement during his first term as president.Challenges in Accessing and Transporting the UraniumAny military ground operation to extract the uranium would face substantial chemical, logistical, and tactical hurdles. Isfahan, where about half of the enriched uranium is believed to be stored, is over 480 kilometers (about 300 miles) inland, far from the nearest US naval ships. This would necessitate transporting US forces, possibly alongside Israeli troops, over a long distance through an active warzone, accompanied by heavy equipment.Securing a substantial perimeter around the site and holding that territory for the duration of the operation would be required, all while mitigating the risk of constant fire from Iran. Experts describe this as a risky and infeasible operation.Storing and Handling the UraniumIf the US were to successfully extract the uranium, it would likely be stored in the form of hexafluoride gas, which is difficult to handle and reacts with water to produce extremely toxic chemicals. The uranium hexafluoride must be stored in small, separated canisters to prevent neutrons from multiplying out of control.Any damage to these canisters could trigger the release of toxic chemicals, posing a radiological hazard. An alternative would be to destroy the cylinders on the spot using Army Nuclear Disablement Teams, but this would result in chemical contamination and environmental hazards.Previous Operations and Potential AlternativesIn 1994, US forces undertook a secret operation dubbed Project Sapphire to remove weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan. A similar operation for Iran is being considered, but it would require coordination with Iranian authorities and the IAEA, and a cessation of hostilities.A less risky approach would be for the US to negotiate a deal with Iran, resulting in the stockpile being left in place but under international oversight, being downblended, or being removed with Iranian agreement.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told Al Jazeera that Tehran has been exchanging messages with the United States, either directly or via regional partners, as the US‑Israel war on Iran continues. He emphasized that these contacts do not constitute formal negotiations. "I receive messages from US special envoy Steve Witkoff directly, as before, and this does not mean that we are in negotiations," Araghchi said. He added that all communications are routed through the Foreign Ministry or security agencies, and there is no truth to claims of active talks with any US party. Reflecting on past diplomatic experience, Araghchi recalled a previous agreement—referring to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—that the United States later abandoned. "We do not have any faith that negotiations with the US will yield results; the trust level is at zero," he asserted. President Masoud Pezeshkian echoed the skepticism, stating that the US "does not believe in diplomacy" after Iran was attacked twice during prior negotiations. In a phone call with European Council President Antonio Costa, Pezeshkian said Iran possesses the "necessary will" to end the war, but insists on guarantees to prevent further aggression. US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth countered, saying Washington aims to secure a deal that would end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz, yet remains prepared to "negotiate with bombs" if needed. Addressing the strategic waterway, Araghchi noted that the strait lies within Oman’s and Iran’s territorial waters and can be used strategically. "Only for the ships of those who are at war with us, this strait is closed. That is normal during war," he explained, adding that some nations avoid the route due to security concerns and high insurance costs, while others have negotiated access. He warned that any post‑war arrangement for the strait will be decided jointly by Oman and Iran, with the potential to transform it into a "peaceful waterway." Regarding rumors of a possible US ground operation, Araghchi said Tehran is unafraid: "We are waiting for them. I don’t think they’d dare to do such a thing. There will be a lot of strength waiting for them." He affirmed Iran’s readiness to repel any ground attack. The foreign minister clarified that Iran has neither responded to nor submitted any counter‑proposals to the US 15‑point plan aimed at ending the war. The proposal, according to earlier reports, calls for Iran to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to limit its missile stockpile in range and quantity. Araghchi concluded that Iran will only accept an end to all attacks in the region, not merely a ceasefire, underscoring the country's firm stance amid ongoing hostilities.