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HSBC’s chief executive, Georges Elhedery, told Bloomberg Television at a conference in Hong Kong that the ongoing Iran war is undermining global economic confidence. He warned that the conflict’s duration could amplify price pressures on commodities such as oil, refined products, fertilisers and metals, extending the impact far beyond the Middle East. Brent crude, which had briefly risen above $100 per barrel, slipped 0.9% to $98.5 per barrel after a U.S. blockade of Iranian ports took effect. Negotiations between the United States and Iran are set to resume in Islamabad, but no agreement was reached in the previous talks. In London, the FTSE 100 edged up 22 points (0.21%) to 10,605, even as Imperial Brands led the losers, citing a “more uncertain geopolitical and macro environment.” The UK recruitment firm PageGroup warned that the Middle East conflict is creating an “increasingly uncertain outlook” for the rest of the year, with salaries lagging behind 2022‑2023 levels across the UK, Europe, the Middle East and Asia. HSBC holds a 31% stake in Saudi Awwal Bank, making it one of the European banks most exposed to the region, which contributes roughly 4% of its pre‑tax profit according to JP Morgan analysts. Nevertheless, Elhedery noted that capital outflows from the Middle East have been “very benign” so far. Since the U.S. and Israel began striking Iran on 28 February, some affluent Middle‑Eastern investors have started exploring relocation to financial hubs such as Singapore and Hong Kong. HSBC chair Brendan Nelson stressed that a peace settlement is essential to restore global energy flows, warning that prolonged disruption would lift inflation and suppress growth. “The longer the disruption continues, the more the indirect effects from higher energy costs will lift inflation and depress growth,” he said at the HSBC Global Investment Summit. Manufacturers reliant on petroleum‑derived synthetic fabrics, such as sportswear maker Castore, reported cost increases of 10‑15% and warned that continued conflict could push those costs onto consumers. Co‑founder Tom Beahon described price volatility as “very difficult to plan,” with daily swings of up to 40%. Logistics are also strained: airlines have reduced flights and vessels remain stranded in the Strait of Hormuz, complicating product shipments. Castore hopes that a resolution in the coming weeks will limit the impact on customers. Virgin Atlantic chief executive Corneel Koster told the Financial Times that jet‑fuel prices have more than doubled since the war began, adding that “some of this disruption to global energy prices will be here to stay.” UK Chancellor Rachel Reeves, speaking at the IMF and World Bank spring meetings, called for coordinated economic action, stating that the Iran conflict must become “a line in the sand” for how the world handles crises and instability.

Bahrain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has strongly condemned the 'continued malicious drone attacks' launched from Iraq towards Bahrain and several Gulf Cooperation Council countries. The summoning of the Iraqi envoy follows similar action by Saudi Arabia, signalling growing regional concern over pro-Iranian groups based in Iraq. The diplomatic move complicates Baghdad's efforts to rebuild ties with its Arab neighbours. Bahrain's Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered an official protest note to the Iraqi charge d'affaires, Ahmed Ismail al-Karawi, calling on Baghdad to address 'these threats and attacks urgently and responsibly'. Iraq has become a staging ground for a secondary conflict during the US-Israel war on Iran, with drones and missiles launched by Iran-aligned armed groups repeatedly targeting Gulf states and Jordan. US interests in Iraq, particularly the embassy in Baghdad, have also been targeted. Despite a two-week Iran-US ceasefire, several Gulf nations reported missile and drone attacks on their territories just hours after the ceasefire was announced. Iran-aligned groups in Iraq had announced their commitment to the ceasefire and suspended their actions towards Gulf countries. The attacks are severely testing Iraq's painstakingly rebuilt ties with its Arab neighbours. Baghdad has categorically rejected the use of its territory to target Gulf states or Jordan, adding that it is taking necessary measures 'in accordance with the constitution and the law'.

The 2018 World Cup in Russia served as a high‑profile platform for Vladimir Putin, showcasing his nation and bolstering his personal legitimacy. The tournament was effectively a diplomatic bow to the Kremlin’s ambitions.Fast‑forward to the summer of 2026, and the buildup to the event has taken on a distinctly American flavour, with the competition becoming a backdrop for Donald Trump’s political narrative.The next edition, slated for 2034 in Saudi Arabia, presents a fresh set of challenges. Despite the kingdom’s controversial human‑rights record, the event offers Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman an opportunity to polish his and the nation’s image. FIFA’s current reluctance to enforce independent oversight of migrant‑worker conditions raises fears that construction could be as deadly as the 2022 Qatar experience.These developments underscore a pressing need to insulate the World Cup from the whims of powerful leaders. One proposed solution is to fragment the tournament—treating it like a monopoly that has become too dominant.Evidence that this approach is feasible already exists: the 2026 World Cup will be co‑hosted by three nations, and the 2030 edition is set to span six countries across three continents (Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay).Building on that, the author suggests a radical redesign: allocate each group stage to a different global city—Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, Sydney, Johannesburg, London, the Basque Country, and so on. Knock‑out rounds could be broken into three‑match clusters and scattered worldwide, with the semi‑finals, final, and third‑place match awarded to the highest‑bidding venue.Carbon‑footprint concerns are addressed by noting that teams already travel long distances to a single host nation; distributing groups based on the median distance to participating teams would not significantly increase emissions.Financially, the cost of staging a traditional, single‑host World Cup has ballooned, limiting the pool of viable bidders to those seeking political or economic leverage. A decentralized format would dilute any single leader’s ability—whether Trump, Putin, or the Saudi crown prince—to manipulate the event for personal gain.Decentralisation would still align with FIFA’s stated objectives: expanding the sport’s reach, creating a truly global spectacle, and bringing football closer to fans worldwide.While FIFA claims a fiduciary duty to maximise revenue for its 211 member associations—justifying steep ticket prices and controversial sponsorships—the proposed model could actually enhance revenue by turning each small cluster of matches into premium, high‑value events.Precedent exists in the form of Euro 2020, which, despite being postponed by the pandemic, successfully unfolded across 11 European cities, delivering record‑breaking goal tallies and strong attendance figures.In sum, the most effective way to protect the World Cup’s cultural significance and prevent its exploitation by authoritarian figures may be to deconstruct and disperse it globally, turning a single‑host behemoth into a series of interconnected, locally hosted celebrations of the sport.

While the two‑week pause in the US‑Israel campaign against Iran remains uncertain, one constant is clear: Donald Trump lacks a concrete plan, but Benjamin Netanyahu does. The war’s stated aim – to cripple Iran’s state capacity – is only a stepping stone toward a larger vision of a Greater Israel. For Israel’s right‑wing, the phrase often evokes a purely territorial ambition: enlarging the land Israel claims. History shows this expansionist drive has repeatedly displaced Palestinians, a process that has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Since the war began, Israel has flattened Gaza, killing tens of thousands and reducing the civilian‑inhabitable area to roughly 12 % of its pre‑war size. In the West Bank, a wave of settlement expansion and property destruction rivals the scale of the 1967 conflict. Beyond the occupied territories, Israel has seized parts of Syria and is forging a de‑facto occupation zone in southern Lebanon, with ministers from Religious Zionism, Jewish Power and Likud openly demanding Israeli sovereignty there. Finance minister Bezalel Smotrich even called for an expansion “to Damascus,” and Netanyahu has publicly expressed a deep personal connection to this territorial vision. However, Greater Israel is as much a geopolitical and strategic construct as a land‑grab. Netanyahu’s ambition extends beyond occupying borders; he seeks a regional dominion built on new alliances and hard‑power dependencies. After the October 7 attacks and the ensuing Gaza devastation, Israel’s prospects for Arab‑state normalization stalled. Faced with a choice between a conciliatory approach and a zero‑sum rejection of a Palestinian future, Netanyahu chose the latter, aiming to eliminate Iran as a regional counterweight – a move that inevitably required massive US military involvement. Former Israeli security analysts note that, from the perspective of Sunni Gulf states, a weakened Iran would elevate Israel to the role of “dominant regional power.” Achieving this, according to the article, also means softening the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and making them dependent on Israel for security and energy routes. The spill‑over of Iranian drone and missile attacks on GCC infrastructure is portrayed not as an accident but as a calculated element of Israel’s strategy. When the US‑Israel coalition struck Iranian energy sites, Iran retaliated against the Gulf, disrupting global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Netanyahu seized the moment to propose “alternative routes” – oil and gas pipelines that would bypass Hormuz and Bab‑al‑Mandab, ending at Israeli Mediterranean ports. In a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Netanyahu outlined a “hexagon of alliances” linking India, Arab nations, African states, Greece, Cyprus and other Asian partners, positioning Israel as the central hub. Recent IDF strategy papers echo this, suggesting Israel could achieve “operational control” far beyond its borders without permanent occupation, likening the Middle East to a “jungle” where Israel would become the “queen.” Netanyahu now describes Israel not merely as a “regional superpower” but, in some contexts, as a “global superpower.” He promises the hexagonal alliance will confront a “radical Shia axis” and an “emerging radical Sunni axis,” with Turkey singled out as the next strategic threat. Dismissal of the Greater Israel rhetoric as wartime hyperbole would be misleading. The article warns that a permanent war‑oriented mindset permeates Israel’s political elite, security establishment and media, posing a risk of overreach and regional blowback. Containing this expansive vision may become one of the most pressing post‑war challenges for the Middle East.

Intense rainfall has caused severe flooding in multiple provinces of Saudi Arabia, leading officials to temporarily close schools to ensure student safety. Video footage circulating online captures inundated streets, submerged vehicles, and classrooms rendered unusable by rising waters.Education authorities cited the need to protect children from hazardous conditions, noting that the closures affect thousands of students and may disrupt the academic calendar. The Ministry of Education is coordinating with local municipalities to assess damage and plan for a swift reopening once floodwaters recede.While the immediate priority remains public safety, the event underscores the growing vulnerability of infrastructure to extreme weather events in the region, prompting calls for improved flood‑risk management and resilient school facilities.

Saudi Arabia has returned its East‑West oil pipeline to full operational capacity, enabling the transport of approximately 7 million barrels of crude per day after a series of attacks disrupted flow earlier this week. In a statement released on Sunday, the Ministry of Energy praised the swift repair work, noting that the turnaround demonstrates the high operational resilience and crisis‑management efficiency of Saudi Aramco and the broader national energy system. The ministry also confirmed that production at the Manifa oilfield—situated off Saudi Arabia’s eastern coast—has been restored to its full capacity of about 300,000 barrels per day (bpd). Efforts continue at the inland Khurais oilfield, which is still recovering from a loss of roughly 300,000 bpd. Earlier reports from the Saudi Press Agency indicated that attacks on a pumping station along the East‑West pipeline had cut daily output by 700,000 bpd. Simultaneous assaults on the Manifa and Khurais fields were said to have reduced combined capacity by 600,000 bpd. No party was identified as responsible for the attacks. The East‑West pipeline, linking the prolific Abqaiq field in the east to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, has become a vital conduit for international oil supplies, especially as Iran’s effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has choked off about 20% of global oil shipments, driving up energy prices worldwide. Despite a fragile cease‑fire announced on Tuesday between the United States and Iran, maritime traffic through the strait remains severely limited. Data from S&P; Global show that only 22 vessels with active AIS transponders passed through the strait between Wednesday and Friday, a stark drop from the pre‑conflict average of 135 daily transits. Restoring the pipeline’s full capacity is expected to reinforce supply continuity for both domestic and international markets, providing a modest but meaningful cushion to the global economy as geopolitical tensions persist.

Three Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) successfully navigated the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday, marking a rare movement of oil cargoes amid the fragile truce between the United States and Iran.The vessels – the Liberia‑flagged Serifos, and the China‑flagged Cospearl Lake and He Rong Hai – each can transport about 2 million barrels of crude, collectively representing a significant volume for a waterway that channels roughly 20% of the world’s oil and LNG shipments.According to data from the London Stock Exchange Group (LSEG) and analytics firm Kpler, the Serifos is chartered by Thailand’s state‑owned energy firm PTT. Loaded with Saudi and UAE crude in early March, it is slated to dock at Malaysia’s Malacca Port on April 21.The other two carriers, Cospearl Lake and He Rong Hai, are chartered by Unipec, the trading arm of Chinese energy giant Sinopec. Cospearl Lake, carrying Iraqi oil, is expected to reach China’s Zhoushan port on May 1, while the destination for He Rong Hai remains undisclosed.Earlier, a tanker named Ocean Thunder, chartered by a Petronas subsidiary, also transited the strait, underscoring a gradual, albeit limited, resumption of traffic.Despite these movements, hundreds of tankers remain stranded in the Gulf, awaiting clearance during the two‑week ceasefire. Their prolonged idling continues to pressure global energy prices, which have surged since Iran’s blockade began in late February.In addition to the loaded vessels, three empty tankers – Mombasa B, Agios Fanourios I, and Shalamar – were observed heading into the strait on Sunday to load fresh cargoes. Notably, Agios Fanourios I signaled a route to Iraq’s Basrah fields to pick up crude destined for Vietnam.Management firms such as Eastern Mediterranean Maritime, Cmb.Tech NV, and Pakistan National Shipping have not provided comments on the recent transits.While the passage of these three supertankers offers a modest relief to the global oil supply chain, the overall situation remains precarious. The continuation of the ceasefire and the resolution of Iran’s blockade will be critical determinants of oil market stability in the weeks ahead.

Two planes of Iranian negotiators, many from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, arrived in Pakistan to confront a 21‑hour deadline for talks that span two decades of nuclear tension and new strategic concerns such as control of the Strait of Hormuz and U.S. compensation for past attacks.The United States responded with a delegation that included Vice‑President JD Vance and roughly 300 officials, signaling a recognition that Iran’s seasoned team—featuring figures like Ali Bagheri Kani and former chief negotiator Abbas Araghchi—was well‑prepared.During the marathon, Vance held multiple conversations with former President Donald Trump and, notably, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Iranian officials claimed the Netanyahu call hardened the U.S. stance, underscoring the delicate diplomatic balance.Veteran negotiators Robert Malley and Aaron David Miller warned that the time frame was either too long for a mere reiteration of rejected demands or far too short for genuine negotiation, highlighting a strategic misreading of Tehran’s position.Vance concluded the session by presenting what he described as a “best and final offer,” leaving the door open for further dialogue pending Iranian acceptance.Meanwhile, President Donald Trump signaled an intention to impose a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz—a move that could inflate global oil prices and further destabilize the region.Iran’s objectives included drafting a memorandum of understanding to extend a tentative ceasefire and address three core issues: an end to Israel’s offensive in Lebanon, a governance framework for Hormuz shipping, and the disposition of its highly enriched uranium stockpile, whether through UN‑supervised down‑blending or export to a third party.Vance emphasized the need for an affirmative Iranian commitment not to pursue a nuclear weapon or the rapid pathways to one, a demand that intersects with ongoing debates about Iran’s sovereign right to enrich uranium—a capability currently null after recent U.S. strikes.In practice, Iran is already exercising selective control over Hormuz traffic, allowing 2 million barrels of Iraqi oil and 4 million barrels of Saudi oil to pass, a tactic described by an Iranian parliamentarian as a “continuous atomic bomb” that provides strategic depth.Beyond the diplomatic impasse, Iran confronts severe domestic challenges: hyperinflation approaching triple‑digit levels, an internet blackout threatening economic activity, and a political climate marked by assassination threats. These pressures compound the difficulty of achieving a sustainable peace settlement.

Sergio García, the 2017 Masters winner, made the cut at Augusta National but saw his weekend marred by a heated outburst on the second hole. After a mis‑hit tee shot, he struck his club into the ground, snapped off its head, and tossed it into a nearby cooler.Masters officials responded swiftly, issuing García a code‑of‑conduct warning. Under tournament rules, a second breach would add a two‑stroke penalty, while a third could lead to disqualification.In the aftermath of the incident, García stepped in to assist his playing partner Jon Rahm, picking up and carrying Rahm’s clubs while Rahm’s caddie was occupied raking a bunker.The Masters has seen several disciplinary actions this year. Scotland’s Robert MacIntyre received a reprimand for flashing an obscene gesture toward spectators after a wayward shot landed in water.García entered the round 16 shots behind leaders Rory McIlroy and Cameron Young. Although he managed a par on the second hole, he recorded three bogeys in the first four holes, slipping further down the leaderboard.Known for a volatile temperament, García’s latest flare adds to a history of on‑course confrontations: at the 2023 Open Championship he broke his driver after a similar outburst, was disqualified from the 2019 Saudi International for damaging greens, and clashed with officials at the 2022 Wells Fargo Championship before departing the PGA Tour for LIV Golf.