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Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva used his Friday social‑media post to herald a new security partnership with the United States as a breakthrough in the fight against transnational crime.The agreement links the Brazilian Federal Revenue Service with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, establishing the DESARMA programme. Under DESARMA the two agencies will exchange real‑time data, apply rigorous cargo‑tracking protocols and launch joint operations to intercept illicit shipments of arms and narcotics.Finance Minister Dario Durigan called the collaboration an “important step in strengthening international cooperation”, noting that it will integrate intelligence and joint actions to curb the flow of weapons and drugs between the two nations.The pact is part of President Donald Trump’s broader “Shield of the Americas” initiative, which seeks to enlist right‑wing governments across the Western Hemisphere in a hard‑line campaign against criminal networks.Despite the cooperation, Lula’s administration has pushed back against Washington’s attempts to label Brazilian gangs such as the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) as foreign terrorist organisations. Lula and Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira have repeatedly asserted Brazil’s sovereignty and warned against external “tutelage”.In the last twelve months Brazil reported seizing 1,168 illegally imported weapons and parts, most of which originated from the U.S. state of Florida, underscoring the scale of the smuggling problem.A statement from the Revenue Service emphasized that the deal will ensure a “continuous flow of information from U.S. authorities to their Brazilian counterparts”, enhancing operational coordination.Relations remain strained: Vieira told U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Brazil opposes the terrorist‑label designation, while the Trump administration continues aggressive actions in the region, including lethal strikes on maritime vessels and a controversial raid in Venezuela.Looking ahead, Lula is expected to travel to Washington, D.C., later this year for talks with Trump, providing a diplomatic channel to manage both cooperation and disagreement.

Donald Trump's approach to the Iran war has led to a significant escalation of threats, including genocidal rhetoric and war crimes. His strategy has been marked by intimidation and vicious threats, crossing an inviolable red line of international law.Trump's war was initially expected to be over within days, with Iran's complete capitulation. However, the Iranians gained superior leverage by controlling the Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for global oil shipments. This led to a significant increase in maritime insurance premiums and a decline in traffic.Despite his initial confidence, Trump escalated his rhetoric, threatening to target civilian infrastructure, including power plants and oil fields. His doctrine of war crimes was echoed by his Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, who advocated for maximum lethality and authority for warfighters.Trump's threats culminated in a tweet on April 5, in which he stated, "Tuesday will be Power Plant Day, and Bridge Day, all wrapped up in one, in Iran. Open the Fuckin' Strait, you crazy bastards, or you'll be living in Hell – JUST WATCH. Praise be to Allah." This incitement to genocide was a war crime and a violation of numerous treaties ratified by the United States, including the Geneva Convention and the Genocide Convention.The article concludes that Trump's actions demonstrate a descent into international lawlessness and a disregard for human life. His blatant disregard for international law and human rights has significant implications for global stability and security.

Shipping through the strategic Strait of Hormuz remains effectively halted even after Washington and Tehran announced a two‑week ceasefire on Tuesday, dampening expectations of a swift end to one of the most severe energy disruptions in recent memory. According to ship‑tracking data from market‑intelligence firm Kpler, only five vessels crossed the waterway on Wednesday, down from eleven the day before, and seven managed the passage on Thursday. The figure is a stark contrast to the pre‑conflict norm of 120‑140 daily transits that the strait typically handled before the February 28 attacks by the United States and Israel. More than 600 vessels, including 325 tankers, are still stranded in the Gulf, as reported by Lloyd’s List Intelligence. Ana Subasic, Kpler’s trade‑risk analyst, warned that even if the ceasefire holds, safe‑passage capacity is likely to stay limited to 10–15 ships per day, reflecting shipowners’ caution and the absence of any toll‑free guarantee. The strait channels roughly one‑fifth of the world’s oil and LNG supplies. Its continued blockage therefore sustains pressure on global energy markets. After a brief dip, Brent crude rose to $96.39 a barrel at 02:00 GMT on Friday, having slipped below $95 the previous day. U.S. President Donald Trump accused Iran of violating the ceasefire’s “safe passage” clause, labeling Tehran’s performance “very poor” in a Truth Social post. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, countered that the United States had not honored its commitments, urging Washington to choose between a genuine ceasefire and “continued war” linked to Israel’s actions in Lebanon. Maritime veteran C Uday Bhaskar described the atmosphere in the strait as one of “uncertainty and anxiety,” noting that shipping firms remain fearful, especially after Iranian statements about newly laid mines. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, CEO of the UAE’s state‑run oil giant ADNOC, echoed the sentiment, asserting that Iran’s conditional permissions amount to “coercion, not freedom of navigation.” Asian equity markets responded positively to the tentative easing of oil price pressure. Japan’s Nikkei 225 climbed 1.8 %, South Korea’s KOSPI rose about 2 %, and Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index gained roughly 1 % in early Friday trading. While the ceasefire offers a diplomatic window, the reality on the water remains stark: the Strait of Hormuz is far from open, and the global energy system continues to feel the strain of constrained maritime traffic.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.

The United Kingdom's Defence Minister, John Healey, announced that British forces had successfully tracked and deterred three Russian submarines in a covert operation within UK waters in the High North maritime region. This area is strategically important due to its proximity to key shipping routes and crucial undersea cables.Healey revealed that the month-long operation, which involved British warships and military aircraft, did not find evidence of Russian vessels damaging undersea infrastructure. However, the decision to publicly disclose the operation was made to 'call out' Russian activity and send a clear message to Russian President Vladimir Putin.“We see you, we see your activity over our cables and pipelines. And you should know that any attempt to damage them will not be tolerated, and will have serious consequences,” Healey stated. The British Defence Ministry identified the submarines as an Akula-class Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine and two specialist submarines from Russia's Main Directorate of Deep Sea Research (GUGI), which defence experts consider one of Moscow's most secret facilities.The Russian embassy in London rejected the British government's claims that its submarines posed a threat to undersea cables. According to Healey, the Russian attack submarine was likely a decoy to distract from the two specialist vessels designed to survey underwater infrastructure during peacetime and sabotage it in conflict. The operation highlights growing concerns about threats to undersea cables, which connect about 99 percent of global internet traffic, with the UK having 60 cables near its waters.

A tragic incident unfolded early on Thursday off the northern coast of France, near Calais, as four people died while attempting to board an inflatable dinghy to cross the English Channel to the UK. The group of migrants waded into the sea to reach a small boat positioned offshore, but things went wrong, and they struggled in the water.Christian Fourcroy, the mayor of Equihen-Plage, confirmed that two women and two men lost their lives in the incident. A fifth person remains in a critical condition. Emergency services launched a rescue operation along the coastline between Equihen and Ecault, France, and 38 other people were rescued, including one with a medical emergency.The Boulogne prosecutor has opened an investigation into the deaths. This incident is part of a surge in attempted crossings and deaths in recent days. French maritime authorities reported rescuing 102 people in two separate operations on Wednesday while trying to cross the channel. Just last week, two people died in a similar incident off the coast north of Calais.Despite heightened enforcement efforts by France and the UK, 4,776 people crossed the channel between January 1 and April 4 this year, following over 41,000 crossings in 2025. The UK remains a destination for many undocumented migrants due to family ties, language, and the prospect of work. However, the journey is frequently perilous, with overcrowded boats and unpredictable conditions putting lives at risk.The issue has intensified political debate across Europe, with Paris and London seeking to deter crossings through a 'one in, one out' scheme, allowing some migrants to enter the UK legally in exchange for the return of others who arrive by boat. Rights groups argue that such measures fail to address the root causes driving people to risk the journey, emphasizing the need for safer pathways to be created.

The strategic Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has become the focal point of the Israel‑U.S. war on Iran that began in February. In peacetime the narrow waterway handled about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments without any tolls, but the conflict has turned it into a contested zone. After a series of Israeli and U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated by targeting merchant vessels it deemed hostile, effectively shutting the passage and triggering one of the most severe energy‑distribution crises in recent memory. While a two‑week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared on Tuesday, Tehran has issued a set of official terms that would govern the strait moving forward. According to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghi, safe passage will be allowed in coordination with the Iranian armed forces and subject to technical limitations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has even published a new navigation map that pushes traffic farther north, away from the traditional route near Oman’s coast, citing the risk of anti‑ship mines. Central to Tehran’s 10‑point peace proposal is the idea of charging fees for strait usage. Iranian media report that the plan could levy up to $2 million per vessel—a sum to be shared with Oman—or a charge of $1 per barrel of oil shipped. The revenue would allegedly fund reconstruction of military and civilian infrastructure damaged by the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Oman has publicly rejected any toll scheme, with Transport Minister Said Al‑Maawali reminding that the country has already signed all relevant international maritime transport agreements that prohibit such fees. International law adds another layer of complexity. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits levying charges for mere passage through international straits, allowing fees only for services like navigation assistance or port use. Neither the United States nor Iran have ratified UNCLOS, but the principle remains a benchmark for maritime norms. Analysts suggest a possible workaround: charging for de‑mining and safety services rather than for passage itself, which could be permissible under existing legal frameworks. The proposal has sparked diplomatic pushback. At the United Nations Security Council, Bahrain led a resolution urging coordinated reopening of the strait, backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. The resolution passed with 11 of 15 votes, but was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it unfairly targeted Iran and ignored the initial strikes. Beyond the region, the United States is unlikely to accept indefinite tolls. Former President Donald Trump, who announced the ceasefire, warned that U.S. forces would remain in the area and threatened to resume attacks if negotiations faltered. American troops are reportedly “hanging around” to assist with traffic buildup, though the extent of their operational control remains unclear. Maritime analyst C. Uday Bhaskar notes that only three to five ships have traversed the strait since the ceasefire began, underscoring the lingering uncertainty for global shippers. He adds that ship owners facing multi‑million‑dollar losses each day may ultimately acquiesce to Iran’s terms, at least temporarily. Should Iran implement a toll regime, the immediate impact would fall on Gulf oil‑producing nations, but the ripple effects could destabilize global energy markets, already strained by supply shocks. Major powers such as the United Kingdom have been coordinating with a coalition of 40 countries to explore alternative mechanisms for reopening the waterway without conceding to tolls. In sum, Iran’s proposed protocol for the Strait of Hormuz introduces a contentious new variable into an already volatile geopolitical landscape, pitting national security interests against established maritime law and the broader stability of world energy supplies.

Djibouti, a one‑million‑strong nation perched on the Bab al‑Mandeb Strait, is set to hold its presidential election on April 10. All signs point to incumbent Ismail Omar Guelleh securing a sixth term with little genuine opposition. The country’s strategic location—linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—makes it a linchpin for global trade and a magnet for foreign military installations. The United States, France, China, Italy and Japan all maintain bases there, earning Djibouti the reputation of hosting the highest concentration of overseas military sites. Officially, Djibouti recognizes French and Arabic, while Somali and Afar are widely spoken among the two main ethnic groups, which together comprise roughly 95% of the population. Islam is practiced by about 94% of residents, and the Djiboutian franc remains the national currency. According to the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 243,471 citizens—about a quarter of the population—are registered to vote, up from roughly 215,000 in the 2021 poll. Historical turnout averages around 67%. IGAD’s eight‑nation bloc has dispatched 17 observers from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda to monitor the process, with a post‑vote statement slated for April 12. Ismail Omar Guelleh, 78, leads the ruling People’s Rally for Progress. After parliament lifted the 75‑year age ceiling in November and abolished term limits back in 2010, Guelleh is now eligible for another term. Critics label his rule as authoritarian, yet they also acknowledge the relative stability he has maintained in a volatile region. Guelleh’s administration has turned Djibouti’s lack of natural resources into a revenue engine by signing infrastructure deals with China and leasing military facilities to Western powers. In 2017, Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh estimated that the bases generate roughly $125 million annually, with the United States contributing nearly half of that sum. The U.S. installation, Camp Lemonnier, remains the only permanent American base on the continent. The sole challenger, Mohamed Farah Samatar, runs under the Unified Democratic Centre after breaking away from the ruling party. His campaign slogan—“another Djibouti is possible”—has resonated only modestly, and observers such as Horn‑of‑Africa expert Sonia le Gouriellec describe the contest as a “token competition”. Human‑rights advocates echo this sentiment, calling the election a “masquerade” and a foregone conclusion. Key issues dominate the discourse. Democratic freedoms have eroded; opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016, and Guelleh captured over 90% of the vote in 2021. The country ranks 168th out of 180 in the 2025 Reporters Without Borders press‑freedom index, and allegations of corruption and nepotism persist, including speculation that Guelleh’s stepson, Naguib Abdallah Kamil, is being groomed for succession. Economically, Djibouti’s reliance on Chinese financing is creating fiscal strain. By 2026 the nation owed China roughly $1.2 billion in loans, prompting the IMF to label its debt profile “in distress and unsustainable”. Massive infrastructure projects—most notably a railway to Ethiopia—have failed to curb poverty, with 73% of the youth unemployed. The country’s lifeline is its port system, which handles virtually all of Ethiopia’s maritime trade, amounting to about $2 billion in annual revenue. Ethiopia’s recent flirtation with a Somaliland port deal threatened Djibouti’s monopoly, though a Turkey‑mediated agreement in late 2024 redirected Ethiopia toward a “reliable and sustainable” sea corridor with Somalia. In sum, the upcoming election is less about a competitive political showdown and more about reaffirming a status quo that intertwines Djibouti’s geopolitical leverage, foreign‑military income, and mounting debt challenges.

The Gulf region breathed a sigh of relief on Tuesday after Iran and the United States agreed to a two-week truce, halting over five weeks of escalating attacks and hostile rhetoric.However, Gulf states are expressing caution, concerned that the US, seeking a swift exit, might agree to terms granting Iran some control over the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway through which one fifth of the world's oil and natural liquefied gas passes.Iran had nearly brought traffic through the strait to a standstill in response to joint US-Israeli attacks on its soil since February 28. Under the truce, Iran has agreed to halt attacks for two weeks in exchange for resumed maritime transit in the key waterway.Despite this, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are stressing that any deal must result in a permanent, long-term arrangement to keep the strait open. They fear a weakened yet intact Iranian leadership could use the strait as leverage, leaving them under constant threat of disruption and economic blackmail.“There is a quiet but palpable concern that President Trump, eager for a quick political victory, could tolerate some Iranian leverage over the strait in exchange for a fragile truce, prioritising optics over Gulf realities,” said Hesham Alghannam, a Saudi Arabia-based scholar at the Malcolm H Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center.The GCC countries, which have faced near-daily Iranian missile and drone attacks, have welcomed the truce but emphasize that the Strait of Hormuz must reopen. They are also concerned about Iran's future influence over the strait, with a Bahrain-sponsored UN Security Council resolution calling for countries to use defensive missions to keep the maritime chokepoint open being vetoed by Russia and China.A further escalation could have devastating consequences for the GCC economies, undoing decades of work to make the region a safe hub for finance, tourism, and culture. Analysts say GCC countries have stepped up diplomacy in the lead-up to the conflict, but officials across the region have warned Iran should not mistake their inaction as a sign of weakness.“The Gulf will leave no stone unturned if Iran continues to take the path of aggression,” said Hamad Althunayyan, a political analyst and professor at Kuwait University. “The Gulf expects its interests to be represented, and included, in any deal with Iran.”