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Djibouti's voters are heading to the polls to choose their next president, with incumbent leader Ismail Omar Guelleh expected to easily secure a sixth term. Guelleh, 78, has been in power since 1999 and won re-election in 2021 with 98 per cent of the vote.Guelleh's only opponent is Mohamed Farah Samatar, the leader of the Unified Democratic Centre (CDU), a party with no seats in parliament. The election comes after politicians scrapped presidential age limits last year, paving the way for Guelleh to extend his 27-year rule.Human rights groups have accused authorities of abuses and repressing freedom of political activity, while the government has denied the allegations. Two main opposition parties have boycotted elections since 2016.The election is being observed by several international organisations, including the African Union (AU), the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the League of Arab States. Guelleh has governed the small nation in the Horn of Africa since 1999, when he succeeded Hassan Gouled Aptidon, the founding president of the country with about a million people.Djibouti hosts important military bases for the United States, France, China and other powers, earning it a reputation as the country with the most foreign military bases. It is also an important port hub for landlocked neighbours such as Ethiopia.

In the closing weeks of Peru's presidential contest, the candidate who positioned himself as a staunch ally of former U.S. President Donald Trump has experienced a noticeable decline in poll numbers. Once touted as a frontrunner, his campaign now faces dwindling enthusiasm among undecided voters and a resurgence of support for rival contenders.Political analysts attribute the downturn to a combination of factors, including heightened scrutiny of the candidate's policy proposals, concerns over potential alignment with foreign interests, and a broader voter backlash against polarizing rhetoric. The shift underscores the volatility of Peru's electorate as it approaches a decisive electoral moment.Observers note that the candidate's decline could reshape the final electoral calculus, potentially benefiting centrist and left‑leaning opponents who have capitalized on the growing demand for stability and domestic-focused governance.

Millions of Indians have cast their votes in local elections in two states and a federally-governed territory, marking a crucial test of support for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The elections, held in Assam, Kerala, and the Union Territory of Puducherry, are part of five key contests scheduled this month. Voting was held on Thursday, with results due on May 4. Prime Minister Modi appealed to people to exercise their franchise in large numbers, stating, “I hope that the state’s youth and women voters participate enthusiastically and make this election a celebration of democracy and public duty.” In Assam, a BJP-led alliance has ruled the northeastern state for two successive terms and is expected to retain power. However, the BJP did not field any Muslim candidate in Assam, where the community constitutes more than 34 percent of the state’s population. In Kerala, parties opposed to the BJP are set to win, as power traditionally alternates between alliances led by the Indian National Congress and the communist parties. Modi’s party has struggled to gain ground in the state but has invested heavily to expand its presence. The elections are also crucial for opposition parties seeking to build a sustained challenge to the BJP’s dominance across the country. The outcome could show whether Modi’s party can extend its dominance by making inroads into opposition strongholds.

Peru is on the cusp of electing its 10th president in as many years, with a record-breaking field of 35 candidates competing for the top spot. The election, set to take place on April 12, comes as the country grapples with persistent political instability and growing concerns about crime and corruption.The presidential race has been marked by a fragmented electorate, with voters divided among dozens of candidates. Keiko Fujimori, daughter of former right-wing leader Alberto Fujimori, has emerged as a frontrunner, but her approval ratings remain relatively low at around 15 percent.The election also features a bicameral legislature, which was reinstated after a decades-long hiatus. Voters will select candidates to form a Senate for the first time since 1992.Crime and corruption are top-of-mind issues for voters, with 68 percent of Peruvians ranking insecurity as a top concern, followed by corruption at 67 percent. The country's political crisis has also contributed to the uncertainty surrounding the election.The leading candidates include Keiko Fujimori, Carlos Alvarez, Rafael Lopez Aliaga, and Roberto Sanchez Palomino. If no single candidate captures more than 50 percent of the vote, a second round of voting will be held on June 7.

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom’s electorate shifted from party‑centric voting to a binary choice between staying in or leaving the European Union. A decade later, about 60 % of the population still define themselves by the side they chose in that single referendum, turning a one‑off political decision into a lasting personal identity.While analysts often focus on the policy fallout—economic turbulence, party infighting, and shifting trade relations—the real impact runs deeper. The referendum ignited a civil‑war‑like split that continues to shape elections, media narratives, and everyday conversations across the country.Before the global upheavals of the George Floyd protests and the Covid‑19 vaccine rollout, Brexit was Britain’s most potent form of identity politics. It spawned new media outlets, such as GB News, and programmes like The Rest Is Politics, while also marginalising older cultural tropes like the “centrist dad” or “gammon” heckler on Question Time. Figures such as Nigel Farage and Zack Polanski now occupy the political fringe rather than the mainstream.The analysis draws on the new book Tribal Politics: How Brexit Divided Britain by political scientists Sara Hobolt and James Tilley. Their longitudinal surveys reveal a simple yet striking pattern: the referendum transformed a previously lukewarm public attitude toward the EU into a powerful, identity‑based habit.Prior to 2016, most Britons held only a mild Euroscepticism and gave the EU little thought. Even former Prime Minister David Cameron tried to silence the issue in 2006, believing it failed to engage voters. The sudden elevation of a niche concern to a national obsession forced ordinary citizens to pick a side, discuss it in pubs, and embed it into their self‑image—a process James Clear describes as building “identity‑based habits”.Data from Hobolt and Tilley show that emotional attachment to the Brexit identity was modest before the vote, rose sharply as the referendum approached, and surged dramatically after the result was announced. The post‑vote period saw a flood of EU‑themed merchandise, street rallies, and even flag‑clashes at cultural events such as the 2017 Last Night of the Proms.Crucially, the tribal divide has not faded. By 2025, only around 40 % of “Leavers” feel comfortable discussing politics with “Remainers”, and the sentiment is reciprocated. This goes beyond mere disagreement; it reflects a level of social discrimination where individuals on opposite sides would hesitate to share a home or marry into each other’s families.The authors note that the split now extends to perceptions of reality itself. Even in 2024, Remainers and Leavers disagreed on basic economic indicators, illustrating how the referendum reshaped not just policy preferences but fundamental worldviews.Class‑based voting, which dominated the 20th‑century British political landscape, has been largely supplanted by this new cultural cleavage. A previous study co‑authored by Tilley showed that the Labour Party’s turn toward the political centre in the 1990s eroded traditional working‑class loyalty. Today, leader Keir Starmer’s working‑class credentials appear largely symbolic, offering little substantive change.With class politics receded, culture wars have taken centre stage. The Brexit campaign’s vague promises about trade left the nation with a protracted, messy adjustment period. Immigration, famously dubbed the “baseball bat” issue by Dominic Cummings, remains the most polarising policy divide, followed by foreign aid and even the death penalty.Hobolt and Tilley’s most striking chart shows that while Remainers and Leavers clash over immigration, they share little disagreement on economic equality, workers’ rights, or public ownership—issues that directly affect household incomes. This suggests that the political battle is driven more by symbolic identity than by material concerns, benefitting those already financially secure.In sum, the United Kingdom’s post‑Brexit reality is one of entrenched tribalism, where a single referendum has reshaped social bonds, political discourse, and perceptions of truth itself. The nation continues to grapple with the legacy of a vote that turned a policy decision into a lasting cultural fault line.

Assam, India – Under the sweltering April sun, Akram Ali stood amid the rubble of his four‑room house, a home he had built over 45 years ago. The demolition, part of a government‑led bulldozing operation on March 14, turned his residence into a pile of debris.Bulldozers descended on Islampur, a Muslim‑majority neighbourhood on the outskirts of Guwahati, and for four hours razed homes across 177 hectares (437 acres). The sweep rendered 400 families homeless, including Ali, who now lives in a tarpaulin shanty a few kilometres from his former home.Ali, a daily‑wage worker, told Al Jazeera that despite identifying as Goriya – “son of the soil” – his house was destroyed. The Goriyas are an Assamese‑speaking Muslim community traditionally settled in the tea‑belt region. In 2022, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) officially recognised the Goriya, along with four other Muslim sub‑groups, as “Indigenous” to Assam.While this designation has afforded the Indigenous Muslims a degree of cultural safety, it has not shielded them from the state’s aggressive land‑clearance drives. Ali questioned the distinction, asking, “Weren’t our homes demolished because we are Muslims?”Muslims make up more than a third of Assam’s 31 million residents, according to the 2011 census. Of these, roughly 6.3 million are Bengali‑speaking “miyas,” often labelled “outsiders,” while about 4 million belong to Indigenous groups like the Goriya.The BJP, led nationally by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has been courting the Indigenous Muslim vote ahead of the April 2026 state elections, where it seeks a third consecutive term after governing since 2016. Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma, who has spearheaded the party’s crackdown on “miyas” since 2021, claims the government will “never target” Indigenous Muslims.Political analyst Bonojit Hussain explains that the BJP’s outreach serves two purposes: softening its communal image and capturing decisive vote blocks in constituencies where Indigenous Muslims and Hindus together decide the outcome. In seats such as Nalbari, where Indigenous Muslims account for over 25 % of the electorate, and Barkhetri, with roughly 80,000 Muslim voters, the community’s support can swing the result.Upper Assam, a region with a strong Assamese‑speaking identity, is especially critical. Journalist Firoz Khan notes that Indigenous Muslims influence the outcome in seven or eight of the 39 seats there, prompting the BJP to temper its overtly anti‑Muslim rhetoric in the area.Despite the party’s overtures, many Indigenous Muslims remain skeptical. Moinul Islam, spokesperson for the rights group Sadou Asom Goria Jatiya Parishad, warned that the BJP’s broader anti‑Muslim policies—evictions, voter‑list objections, and alleged deportations—are unlikely to win their votes.Earlier in 2025, similar demolition drives displaced hundreds of Goriya families in Lakhimpur and Golaghat districts, and a systematic campaign to challenge Muslim names on electoral rolls further strained relations.BJP spokesman Kishore Upadhyay dismissed the allegations as “malicious, biased and politically motivated,” but Indigenous groups argue the pattern signals an attempt to erase their cultural legacy.Recent actions by the state government reinforce this perception. Chief Minister Sarma renamed the only medical college in Barpeta—previously bearing the name of Goriya freedom fighter Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed—arguing that institutions should reflect their geographic location. Critics view the move as symbolic of a broader effort to marginalise Muslim contributions to Assam’s history.In December 2025, Sarma also proposed dropping the hyphen in “Sankar‑Azan,” a name that celebrated the syncretic legacy of 15th‑century polymath Srimanta Sankardev and 17th‑century Sufi saint Azan Peer. Communist Party member Isfaqur Rahman warned that such revisions reflect a “slow erasure of Assamese Muslim heritage.”For Ali, the demolition has hardened his political stance. “After being evicted, the chief minister called us illegal immigrants and broke our backs by destroying our homes,” he said. “We are the new miyas.”

Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of Taiwan’s main opposition party the Kuomintang (KMT), used a high‑profile trip to mainland China to advocate for renewed dialogue with Beijing. On Wednesday she laid a wreath at Sun Yat‑sen’s mausoleum in Nanjing, invoking the revolutionary’s legacy of “equality, inclusiveness and unity” as a moral foundation for cross‑strait reconciliation. Her visit marks the first time a KMT leader has set foot in China in ten years. Cheng said the core values of Sun’s ideal—"all under heaven are equal"—should guide efforts to promote reconciliation and regional prosperity across the Taiwan Strait. During the trip Cheng also expressed hopes to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping, framing the potential encounter as a diplomatic test that could demonstrate the effectiveness of dialogue over deterrence. The timing of the trip is notable. It comes amid heightened friction between Taipei and Beijing, with China continuing to assert sovereignty over Taiwan while refusing to engage with President William Lai Ching‑te, whom it labels a “separatist”. Amid concerns that a distracted United States may be less able to guarantee Taiwan’s security, some Taiwanese voters view a thaw in relations as attractive. Wen‑ti Sung, a non‑resident fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, told Al Jazeera that a cordial photo‑op between Cheng and Xi could bolster the KMT’s argument that dialogue is more effective than military deterrence. Domestically, Cheng’s outreach occurs as Taiwan’s opposition‑controlled parliament has stalled a proposed $40 billion increase in defence spending. She acknowledged Taiwan’s democratic evolution, referencing the legacy of the “White Terror” period, while also praising China’s recent development achievements. The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sharply criticized the trip, accusing the KMT of undermining national security. Party spokesperson Wu Cheng argued that if the opposition truly seeks stability, it should stop blocking the defence budget increase. Neither Beijing nor Taipei formally recognises the other’s government, leaving any dialogue fragile and heavily politicised. Cheng’s visit therefore represents both a symbolic gesture toward historic ties and a contested move within Taiwan’s polarized political landscape.

During Donald Trump’s January 2025 inauguration, Giorgia Meloni was the only European leader invited, underscoring a brief period of close personal and diplomatic ties between Italy’s right‑wing government and the new U.S. administration. A month earlier she had been photographed sharing a private conversation with Trump at the Élysée Palace while President Emmanuel Macron celebrated the reopening of Notre‑Dame. From the outset of Trump’s second term, the Italian premier was hailed by the U.S. president as a “real live wire” and the European ally who could help “straighten out the world.” Meloni embraced the role, describing Trump as a “brilliant man” and promising to "make the West great again" together. That camaraderie has now eroded. In the wake of the US‑Israeli military action against Iran, Meloni told reporters during a Gulf‑region visit that "when we don’t agree, we must say it", explicitly rejecting the war. Her stance was reinforced a week earlier when Italy denied U.S. bombers permission to refuel at a southern base. Political analysts note that Meloni’s shift marks a decisive break from Trump’s agenda. Roberto D’Alimonte, a political‑science professor at Luiss University, warned that her earlier attempt to act as a bridge between Trump and European allies has become a “liability” she now seeks to repair. Public opinion reflects the change. Recent polls show a solid majority of Italians oppose the Iran war, and support for Trump in Italy has plunged from 35 % to just 19 %. The backlash also manifested in a recent referendum on judicial reform, where 61 % of voters aged 18‑34 rejected Meloni’s proposal—a defeat analysts link more to dissatisfaction with her foreign‑policy alignment than to the reform itself. Beyond politics, the conflict threatens Italy’s economy. As the EU’s second‑largest natural‑gas consumer—accounting for roughly 40 % of its energy mix—Italy is feeling the impact of soaring energy prices caused by the near‑total shutdown of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The Bank of Italy now projects only a 0.5 % growth rate for 2026‑27, down from earlier forecasts, while the national statistics office reported that Italy’s fiscal deficit has breached the EU’s 3 % ceiling, limiting fiscal flexibility ahead of next year’s elections. Despite these pressures, Meloni has not completely abandoned the United States. In March she declined Trump’s request to dispatch Italian warships to the Strait of Hormuz, aligning with other European nations, yet she stopped short of condemning the US‑led operation outright. Experts argue that Meloni’s approach is deliberately cautious. “She is pragmatic and politically skilled,” D’Alimonte said. “She will continue to balance criticism of Trump’s aggressive foreign policy with the need to preserve strategic ties, moving step‑by‑step toward a stronger European alignment without burning bridges.”

President Donald Trump warned on Tuesday that a U.S. attack on Iran could cause "a whole civilization to die tonight," a statement that sparked immediate backlash from climate icon Greta Thunberg. The Swedish activist, known for her outspoken stance on climate change and the Gaza crisis, described the president’s remarks as a normalization of genocide and urged the public to reject such rhetoric. In an Instagram video posted shortly before a cease‑fire was announced, Thunberg lamented the "muted" reaction to the threat, asking, "What the f*** is anyone even doing at this point?" She emphasized that the world has become accustomed to "total annihilation of entire peoples" and the "systematic destruction of the biosphere," urging viewers to demand an end to these narratives. Poll data reveal a stark generational split on the war. A Pew Research Center survey released Tuesday showed that while 67 % of Republicans aged 65+ believe the conflict will curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, only 25 % of Republicans aged 18‑29 share that view. When asked about the war’s impact on Iranians, just 7 % of older Republican voters said they would be worse off, compared with nearly 28 % of younger voters. Among Democrats, the age gap is less pronounced but still significant: 60 % of young Democratic respondents (18‑29) think the war will harm Iranians, versus 48 % of those over 65. Similar patterns emerge in other surveys. Emerson College found that 75 % of respondents under 50 fear a new world war within four years, compared with 54 % of those over 50. A Politico poll of self‑identified “MAGA Republicans” showed that only 49 % of those under 35 believe Trump has a concrete plan for the Iran conflict, versus 70 % of older supporters. These findings echo a broader historical trend: younger Americans, many of whom grew up in the shadow of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, display a more isolationist outlook. A December 2025 Pew poll indicated that only 39 % of 18‑29‑year‑olds consider active U.S. involvement in global affairs important, compared with 73 % of seniors. The generational divide also extends to attitudes toward Israel. The same Tuesday poll reported that 84 % of young Democrats and 57 % of young Republicans hold an unfavorable view of Israel, whereas older respondents are considerably less critical. Thunberg’s criticism of Trump aligns with her longstanding activism on Middle‑East issues. Last year she joined a humanitarian flotilla bound for Gaza, only to be detained and deported by Israeli forces. Her latest condemnation underscores a growing sentiment among Gen Z that calls for accountability and an end to war‑like rhetoric. In summary, the controversy surrounding Trump’s Iran threat has amplified existing generational tensions in the United States, with younger citizens increasingly questioning the efficacy and morality of U.S. military interventions while demanding a shift away from language that normalizes mass violence.