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Oppdal, a mountain village in central Norway, hosted its first interspecies council on a snowy morning at the Bjerkeløkkja conference centre. Thirty‑eight local participants each represented a different species – from a northern bat to a birch tree – and voiced the needs of the natural world in a structured decision‑making process.The council draws on the legacy of the Council of All Beings, a practice created in the 1980s by environmentalists John Seed and Joanna Macy. Phoebe Tickell, a scientist and “moral imagination” activist mentored by Macy, adapted the ritual into a governance methodology that expands representation beyond humans.Facilitators first identified the multispecies stakeholders in the region, then briefed human representatives – chosen either randomly or for expertise – on the perspectives they would embody. The session concluded with a manifesto of principles for human governance and an impact‑evaluation plan to track participants’ connection to nature six months later.Oppdal’s mayor, Elisabeth Hals, noted that the village’s population swells from 5,000 to over 30,000 in winter as tourists flock to private cabins (hytter). The municipality plans to add 1,000 new apartments by 2035 to promote year‑round tourism, a move that has sparked debate over land use, farming, and conservation.During the council, a birch “worried there’s too much of me,” while a rockfoil flower urged humans to “slow down and listen to where nature can tolerate more activity.” The River Driva lamented being treated as a mere resource, and a fox enthusiastically pointed at a wader, highlighting the emotional range the exercise seeks to capture.Proponents argue that such empathy‑building exercises are crucial as wildlife populations have fallen by roughly 70 % over the past 50 years. Tickell contends that “imperfect representation beats exclusion” and envisions interspecies councils becoming as routine as environmental impact assessments.Across the UK, 13 councils have recognised river rights since 2023, and a coalition of artists, ecologists, lawyers and policymakers is exploring similar biodiversity governance around the North Sea. In London, multispecies assemblies have already informed stewardship of the River Roding and land‑use consultations.Oppdal’s experiment aims to create “institutional trace” – genuine decision‑making power backed by robust methodology and longitudinal research – rather than a tokenistic green‑washing exercise. If successful, the model could be replicated internationally, giving non‑human nature a formal seat at the policy table.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.

The strategic Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has become the focal point of the Israel‑U.S. war on Iran that began in February. In peacetime the narrow waterway handled about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments without any tolls, but the conflict has turned it into a contested zone. After a series of Israeli and U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated by targeting merchant vessels it deemed hostile, effectively shutting the passage and triggering one of the most severe energy‑distribution crises in recent memory. While a two‑week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared on Tuesday, Tehran has issued a set of official terms that would govern the strait moving forward. According to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghi, safe passage will be allowed in coordination with the Iranian armed forces and subject to technical limitations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has even published a new navigation map that pushes traffic farther north, away from the traditional route near Oman’s coast, citing the risk of anti‑ship mines. Central to Tehran’s 10‑point peace proposal is the idea of charging fees for strait usage. Iranian media report that the plan could levy up to $2 million per vessel—a sum to be shared with Oman—or a charge of $1 per barrel of oil shipped. The revenue would allegedly fund reconstruction of military and civilian infrastructure damaged by the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Oman has publicly rejected any toll scheme, with Transport Minister Said Al‑Maawali reminding that the country has already signed all relevant international maritime transport agreements that prohibit such fees. International law adds another layer of complexity. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits levying charges for mere passage through international straits, allowing fees only for services like navigation assistance or port use. Neither the United States nor Iran have ratified UNCLOS, but the principle remains a benchmark for maritime norms. Analysts suggest a possible workaround: charging for de‑mining and safety services rather than for passage itself, which could be permissible under existing legal frameworks. The proposal has sparked diplomatic pushback. At the United Nations Security Council, Bahrain led a resolution urging coordinated reopening of the strait, backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. The resolution passed with 11 of 15 votes, but was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it unfairly targeted Iran and ignored the initial strikes. Beyond the region, the United States is unlikely to accept indefinite tolls. Former President Donald Trump, who announced the ceasefire, warned that U.S. forces would remain in the area and threatened to resume attacks if negotiations faltered. American troops are reportedly “hanging around” to assist with traffic buildup, though the extent of their operational control remains unclear. Maritime analyst C. Uday Bhaskar notes that only three to five ships have traversed the strait since the ceasefire began, underscoring the lingering uncertainty for global shippers. He adds that ship owners facing multi‑million‑dollar losses each day may ultimately acquiesce to Iran’s terms, at least temporarily. Should Iran implement a toll regime, the immediate impact would fall on Gulf oil‑producing nations, but the ripple effects could destabilize global energy markets, already strained by supply shocks. Major powers such as the United Kingdom have been coordinating with a coalition of 40 countries to explore alternative mechanisms for reopening the waterway without conceding to tolls. In sum, Iran’s proposed protocol for the Strait of Hormuz introduces a contentious new variable into an already volatile geopolitical landscape, pitting national security interests against established maritime law and the broader stability of world energy supplies.

In a stark assessment of the ongoing regional confrontation, Iranian officials acknowledge that the country has endured significant casualties, yet they assert that Tehran is gaining a strategic advantage over the combined forces of the United States and Israel. The narrative, presented by Al Jazeera on April 9, 2026, emphasizes that despite being "bloodied," Iran perceives its actions as a victory against the US‑Israel axis. This framing signals Tehran’s intent to portray resilience and influence, even as the human and material costs rise. Analysts note that such rhetoric serves multiple purposes: it bolsters domestic morale, signals to regional allies that Iran remains a formidable player, and attempts to undermine the cohesion of the US‑Israel partnership. By positioning itself as a winner in a conflict where the costs are visible, Iran aims to reshape the discourse around its regional role. While the article does not provide specific casualty figures or detailed military outcomes, the emphasis on a perceived strategic win suggests a broader shift in Tehran’s diplomatic messaging. The statement may also foreshadow Iran’s next steps in leveraging its position to negotiate from a place of perceived strength. Observers will watch closely how this narrative influences both Tehran’s internal politics and its external engagements with neighboring states, as well as how the United States and Israel respond to a claim of Iranian ascendancy despite evident hardships.

Europe is undergoing a significant transformation in its relationship with the US, marked by a growing desire for independence and a shift away from Trump's aggressive policies. The recent crisis in the Middle East, where Trump's threat to annihilate Iranian civilisation was temporarily called off, has been a turning point in this journey. Initially, many European leaders had tacitly supported the US and Israeli attack on Iran, driven by a desire for a transatlantic detente and antipathy towards the Iranian regime. However, as the war escalated, Europe's stance began to shift, with countries like Italy, Poland, and France taking steps to distance themselves from Trump's policies. The cooling of European support for the war has taken various forms, including Italy denying US warplanes permission to use an airbase in Sicily, Poland refusing to send Patriot air defence systems to the Middle East, and France rejecting overflight rights and opposing a US-sponsored resolution at the UN security council. This shift in European policy is driven by a number of factors, including the realisation that the war has been a windfall for Russia, through higher oil prices and a depletion of air defence interceptors available to Ukraine. European leaders have also been reminded that the erosion of international law is bad news for the world, Europe included. As Europe finds its footing in distancing itself from Trump, it may also find its voice. Europe's diplomatic role in the Iranian nuclear file in the early 2000s grew out of its opposition to the Iraq war. Today, the same dynamic could unfold, with Europe promoting a permanent end of hostilities and a multilateral initiative in the region. The proposal by a group of European, Gulf, and Asian countries to contribute to ensuring safe passage through the strait of Hormuz was originally aimed at placating Trump. Europeans then backed a UN-led fertiliser corridor to prevent a food crisis in the global south. The UK is also leading a coalition of more than 40 countries seeking to reopen the strait once the US and Israel definitively end their offensive. If a sustainable reopening of Hormuz succeeds, it could eventually extend to a new nuclear agreement, a non-aggression pact between the US and Iran, and a similar one between Israel and Iran – including Lebanon. It could involve the release of Iranian funds frozen abroad to rebuild infrastructure destroyed by US and Israeli attacks, and the selective lifting of EU and US sanctions.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced on Wednesday that the United States had achieved a "decisive" military victory over Iran, claiming the Iranian missile programme has been "functionally destroyed." Speaking alongside General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hegseth described the operation—codenamed Operation Epic Fury—as a "historic and overwhelming" triumph that met every objective, including the dismantling of Iran’s navy, air‑defence systems and missile‑production capability. The declaration came a day after President Donald Trump stepped back from a threatened full‑scale assault on Iran, just two hours before a self‑imposed deadline for Tehran to reopen the blockaded Strait of Hormuz. The resulting cease‑fire agreement stipulates that Iran will not possess a nuclear weapon and that the United States will monitor the country’s enriched uranium stockpiles. While Hegseth emphasized that "they can still shoot here and there, but that would be very unwise," he also warned that US forces will remain in the region to ensure compliance with the two‑week cease‑fire and to oversee the safe transit of vessels through the strategic waterway. Iran’s response was equally emphatic. The Supreme National Security Council, cited by IRNA, congratulated the Iranian people on a "victory" and urged perseverance until the details of that victory are finalized. The council highlighted Iran’s alliances with the so‑called "axis of resistance" in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and occupied Palestine, claiming the coalition has delivered blows to the enemy over the past 40 days. At the same briefing, General Caine confirmed that US military objectives in Iran have been met, but framed the cease‑fire as a "pause" rather than a permanent end to hostilities, noting that forces remain ready to resume combat if necessary. In parallel diplomatic developments, a senior Iranian official told Reuters that Tehran could reopen the Strait of Hormuz on Thursday or Friday, contingent on a cease‑fire framework being reached ahead of a scheduled US‑Iran meeting in Pakistan. The closure of the strait has previously disrupted global oil and gas markets, making its reopening a critical economic signal. Trita Parsi, vice‑president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told Al Jazeera that President Trump needed an exit from a war he described as "an absolute disaster" and that the next two weeks are "crucial" for any genuine diplomatic opening, though he cautioned that the situation is not yet resolved. Analysts note that the cease‑fire’s success will hinge on Iran’s willingness to allow unfettered navigation through the Strait of Hormuz and on US verification of Iran’s uranium holdings. The coming fortnight will test whether the declared victory translates into lasting stability in a volatile region.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer told reporters that the United Kingdom has a "job" to assist in reopening the Strait of Hormuz after reports that the vital oil corridor was blocked again just hours after a tentative cease‑fire was announced. The leader arrived at the King Fahd airbase in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where he met with British and local staff before embarking on a broader diplomatic tour of Gulf allies. The visit mirrors his recent push to shape a cease‑fire framework for Ukraine. While officials describe the trip as complementary to the Pakistan‑mediated talks between Washington and Tehran, many Gulf observers see Starmer as a more predictable partner than a United‑States administration that has been criticised for its unpredictable stance. The cease‑fire, brokered barely an hour before a deadline set by the U.S. president, included a clause to reopen Hormuz. Starmer’s itinerary follows a UK‑led gathering of military planners that explored practical steps for achieving that goal. Iran’s state news agency, Fars, claimed that Israeli actions in Lebanon breached the cease‑fire, prompting a fresh blockage of oil tankers in the strait. Later on Wednesday, Starmer is scheduled to meet Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Their agenda is expected to cover the removal of Iranian mines and the insurance of tankers that rely on the Hormuz route for global oil shipments. "There are many practicalities and moving parts involved; this cannot be switched on instantly," a UK official explained, underscoring the complexity of the task. Addressing the media at the airbase, Starmer acknowledged the temporary relief provided by the cease‑fire but warned that the situation remains in its early stages. He emphasized that the UK’s priority is a permanent solution that restores full maritime traffic. "The impact on our energy prices is evident – we have seen daily fluctuations over the past 39 days. It is our responsibility to ensure the strait remains open so that the world’s energy needs are met and UK fuel prices stabilise," he said. Starmer has previously drawn criticism from former President Donald Trump for refusing to back the initial U.S.–Israeli strike on Iran and for limiting U.S. use of British bases to defensive missions, such as targeting Iranian missile sites. When asked about the risk of the UK becoming entangled in the conflict, Starmer reiterated that Britain acts only in collective self‑defence and that his mandate is to protect British lives and national interests, which includes keeping Hormuz open. The remainder of his Gulf itinerary has not been disclosed, and it remains unclear which other regional capitals he will visit after Saudi Arabia. One government source summed up the mission: "The cease‑fire is welcome, but the decisive factor for the British public will be a fully operational Hormuz Strait, which will have the greatest impact on domestic energy costs." The source likened Starmer’s role to his earlier effort in assembling the "coalition of the willing" that pledged to back any peace settlement in Ukraine, noting that this is his first opportunity to demonstrate solidarity with Middle‑East allies.

The conflict in Iran has underscored how fragile a world built on fossil fuels truly is, with disruptions to oil, gas and fertilizer shipments adding millions of tonnes of greenhouse‑gas emissions to an already critical climate system.While Saudi Arabia and other petrostates blocked any mention of a fossil‑fuel phase‑out at the UN COP30 summit last November, a new diplomatic effort is gathering momentum outside the UN framework.On 28‑29 April, Colombia will host the First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels. Unlike UN negotiations, the summit will be decided by majority vote, preventing a handful of countries from derailing progress.The event is co‑sponsored by Colombia – the world’s fifth‑largest coal exporter – and the Netherlands, home to Royal Dutch Shell. Organisers have invited nations that supported the COP30 roadmap, as well as sub‑national leaders such as California Governor Gavin Newsom, a potential 2028 U.S. presidential contender.Delegates, described as a “coalition of the willing”, will share concrete plans to shift their economies away from fossil fuels while safeguarding workers and communities. Climate activists, Indigenous representatives and trade‑union leaders will also contribute ideas for turning the abstract goal of decarbonisation into actionable policy.One focal point will be the reduction of the $7 trillion per year in global fossil‑fuel subsidies, a figure that the International Energy Agency warns could be trimmed without harming the livelihoods that depend on these funds. UN Secretary‑General António Guterres has urged the International Energy Agency to create a platform that aligns the decline of fossil‑fuel investment with rapid clean‑energy expansion.The real leverage of this coalition lies in its economic weight. The 85 countries that backed the COP30 roadmap together account for a gross national product of $33.3 trillion—surpassing the United States’ $30.6 trillion and far exceeding China’s $19.4 trillion.If the Just Transition conference produces a credible, market‑oriented plan, it could send a clear signal to investors and policymakers that the era of oil, gas and coal is ending, prompting a reallocation of capital away from stranded‑asset risks.Adding California’s $4.1 trillion GDP to the coalition’s total would create an economic bloc of roughly $37.4 trillion, approaching the combined $50 trillion output of the United States and China.Newsom has repeatedly positioned California as a climate leader, noting that two‑thirds of the state’s electricity now comes from non‑carbon sources and that its economy has risen from the world’s sixth to fourth largest. He pledged that California will fill the void left by the United States’ retreat from the Paris Agreement by competing in global green‑technology markets.Public opinion supports such a shift: between 80 % and 89 % of the world’s population wants stronger climate action. The upcoming conference therefore represents a pivotal chance to translate widespread demand into a coordinated, economically powerful push for a fossil‑fuel‑free future.

On April 6, 2026, a sizable crowd of protesters converged on the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv, chanting slogans and holding signs that called for an immediate end to all wars in which the United States is engaged.The demonstration, organized by a coalition of local activist groups, reflected growing frustration among segments of the Israeli public over the perceived role of the United States in perpetuating overseas conflicts. Participants demanded that Washington reassess its military commitments and adopt a more neutral stance in international disputes.While the protest remained peaceful, the sheer number of participants underscored a broader shift in public sentiment, suggesting that foreign‑policy decisions are increasingly subject to direct civic scrutiny. Observers note that such actions could influence diplomatic dialogues between the United States and its allies, as well as shape future policy debates within the U.S. administration.