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Qantas announced a fare increase and a 5% reduction in domestic capacity for May and June, responding to a rapid shift in passenger demand away from airlines that transit the conflict‑ridden Middle East. In a market update released on Tuesday, the carrier said it is redeploying aircraft from its U.S. and domestic networks to capture strong interest in Europe‑bound travel, especially to Paris and Rome. The move follows service cuts by Persian Gulf carriers such as Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways, which have scaled back flights amid the escalating Iran conflict. To accommodate the new focus, Qantas and its low‑cost arm Jetstar will cut capacity across their domestic networks by about 5%, trimming frequencies on key inter‑city routes and suspending several regional services. Four temporary suspensions will take effect in mid‑May: Melbourne‑Hamilton Island, Melbourne‑Coffs Harbour, Sydney‑Busselton and Darwin‑Gold Coast. In addition, the Adelaide‑Mount Gambier route will be discontinued indefinitely due to low demand and soaring fuel costs. The airline warned that its jet‑fuel expenses are set to rise sharply, projecting a second‑half 2026 fuel bill of $3.1‑$3.3 billion, up from the previously forecast $2.2 billion. This surge is driven by higher oil prices linked to the Iran conflict. To offset the cost pressure, Qantas has already raised ticket prices and signalled that “further action” – likely additional fare hikes – may be necessary. While airlines typically use hedging contracts to lock in fuel prices, the current volatility limits the effectiveness of such safeguards. Following the market update, Qantas shares slipped more than 3% in early trading before stabilising, reflecting investor concern over the combined impact of higher fares, reduced domestic capacity, and elevated fuel costs.

The 2018 World Cup in Russia served as a high‑profile platform for Vladimir Putin, showcasing his nation and bolstering his personal legitimacy. The tournament was effectively a diplomatic bow to the Kremlin’s ambitions.Fast‑forward to the summer of 2026, and the buildup to the event has taken on a distinctly American flavour, with the competition becoming a backdrop for Donald Trump’s political narrative.The next edition, slated for 2034 in Saudi Arabia, presents a fresh set of challenges. Despite the kingdom’s controversial human‑rights record, the event offers Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman an opportunity to polish his and the nation’s image. FIFA’s current reluctance to enforce independent oversight of migrant‑worker conditions raises fears that construction could be as deadly as the 2022 Qatar experience.These developments underscore a pressing need to insulate the World Cup from the whims of powerful leaders. One proposed solution is to fragment the tournament—treating it like a monopoly that has become too dominant.Evidence that this approach is feasible already exists: the 2026 World Cup will be co‑hosted by three nations, and the 2030 edition is set to span six countries across three continents (Spain, Portugal, Morocco, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay).Building on that, the author suggests a radical redesign: allocate each group stage to a different global city—Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, Sydney, Johannesburg, London, the Basque Country, and so on. Knock‑out rounds could be broken into three‑match clusters and scattered worldwide, with the semi‑finals, final, and third‑place match awarded to the highest‑bidding venue.Carbon‑footprint concerns are addressed by noting that teams already travel long distances to a single host nation; distributing groups based on the median distance to participating teams would not significantly increase emissions.Financially, the cost of staging a traditional, single‑host World Cup has ballooned, limiting the pool of viable bidders to those seeking political or economic leverage. A decentralized format would dilute any single leader’s ability—whether Trump, Putin, or the Saudi crown prince—to manipulate the event for personal gain.Decentralisation would still align with FIFA’s stated objectives: expanding the sport’s reach, creating a truly global spectacle, and bringing football closer to fans worldwide.While FIFA claims a fiduciary duty to maximise revenue for its 211 member associations—justifying steep ticket prices and controversial sponsorships—the proposed model could actually enhance revenue by turning each small cluster of matches into premium, high‑value events.Precedent exists in the form of Euro 2020, which, despite being postponed by the pandemic, successfully unfolded across 11 European cities, delivering record‑breaking goal tallies and strong attendance figures.In sum, the most effective way to protect the World Cup’s cultural significance and prevent its exploitation by authoritarian figures may be to deconstruct and disperse it globally, turning a single‑host behemoth into a series of interconnected, locally hosted celebrations of the sport.

While the two‑week pause in the US‑Israel campaign against Iran remains uncertain, one constant is clear: Donald Trump lacks a concrete plan, but Benjamin Netanyahu does. The war’s stated aim – to cripple Iran’s state capacity – is only a stepping stone toward a larger vision of a Greater Israel. For Israel’s right‑wing, the phrase often evokes a purely territorial ambition: enlarging the land Israel claims. History shows this expansionist drive has repeatedly displaced Palestinians, a process that has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Since the war began, Israel has flattened Gaza, killing tens of thousands and reducing the civilian‑inhabitable area to roughly 12 % of its pre‑war size. In the West Bank, a wave of settlement expansion and property destruction rivals the scale of the 1967 conflict. Beyond the occupied territories, Israel has seized parts of Syria and is forging a de‑facto occupation zone in southern Lebanon, with ministers from Religious Zionism, Jewish Power and Likud openly demanding Israeli sovereignty there. Finance minister Bezalel Smotrich even called for an expansion “to Damascus,” and Netanyahu has publicly expressed a deep personal connection to this territorial vision. However, Greater Israel is as much a geopolitical and strategic construct as a land‑grab. Netanyahu’s ambition extends beyond occupying borders; he seeks a regional dominion built on new alliances and hard‑power dependencies. After the October 7 attacks and the ensuing Gaza devastation, Israel’s prospects for Arab‑state normalization stalled. Faced with a choice between a conciliatory approach and a zero‑sum rejection of a Palestinian future, Netanyahu chose the latter, aiming to eliminate Iran as a regional counterweight – a move that inevitably required massive US military involvement. Former Israeli security analysts note that, from the perspective of Sunni Gulf states, a weakened Iran would elevate Israel to the role of “dominant regional power.” Achieving this, according to the article, also means softening the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE) and making them dependent on Israel for security and energy routes. The spill‑over of Iranian drone and missile attacks on GCC infrastructure is portrayed not as an accident but as a calculated element of Israel’s strategy. When the US‑Israel coalition struck Iranian energy sites, Iran retaliated against the Gulf, disrupting global oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Netanyahu seized the moment to propose “alternative routes” – oil and gas pipelines that would bypass Hormuz and Bab‑al‑Mandab, ending at Israeli Mediterranean ports. In a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Netanyahu outlined a “hexagon of alliances” linking India, Arab nations, African states, Greece, Cyprus and other Asian partners, positioning Israel as the central hub. Recent IDF strategy papers echo this, suggesting Israel could achieve “operational control” far beyond its borders without permanent occupation, likening the Middle East to a “jungle” where Israel would become the “queen.” Netanyahu now describes Israel not merely as a “regional superpower” but, in some contexts, as a “global superpower.” He promises the hexagonal alliance will confront a “radical Shia axis” and an “emerging radical Sunni axis,” with Turkey singled out as the next strategic threat. Dismissal of the Greater Israel rhetoric as wartime hyperbole would be misleading. The article warns that a permanent war‑oriented mindset permeates Israel’s political elite, security establishment and media, posing a risk of overreach and regional blowback. Containing this expansive vision may become one of the most pressing post‑war challenges for the Middle East.

Rolls-Royce has secured a significant investment of up to £599m from the UK's national wealth fund to develop the country's first small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs). The funding will support Rolls-Royce's design of SMRs at Wylfa on the island of Anglesey, Wales. The investment is expected to create around 1,000 jobs at Rolls-Royce and contribute to the UK's goal of generating electricity without carbon dioxide emissions. The project also offers the potential for a large new export industry in SMRs. The UK government has embraced nuclear energy as a key component of its clean energy strategy, and this investment marks a significant milestone in the development of SMR technology. SMRs aim to produce nuclear power stations in factories, driving down costs and speeding up installation. The Wylfa site has a history of nuclear power generation, having operated from 1971 until 2015. Hitachi had previously attempted to build a new nuclear power station at the site but abandoned its plans in 2020 due to funding issues. The site was later acquired by the state-owned Great British Energy – Nuclear (GBE-N) in 2024. The chancellor, Rachel Reeves, highlighted the importance of the investment, stating that it will strengthen energy security, create skilled jobs, and help build a new generation of homegrown nuclear technology that will power the UK's economy for decades to come. Tufan Erginbilgiç, chief executive of Rolls-Royce, described the investment as a critical milestone for the business and for the UK, marking the beginning of a golden age of new nuclear. The company owns the majority of Rolls-Royce SMR, alongside Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, France's BNF Resources, and the Czech utility CEZ.

The United States’ senior envoy, Vice President JD Vance, said the marathon talks in Islamabad collapsed because Iran would not abandon its nuclear weapons programme, a stance Tehran’s representatives dismissed as a lack of US goodwill. Vance, who departed Islamabad on Sunday after a 21‑hour session with Iranian officials, reiterated that Washington’s red lines required an "affirmative commitment" from Tehran that it would not pursue a nuclear weapon or the means to acquire one quickly. He described the stalemate as "bad news for Iran much more than it is for the United States." Iranian parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf countered that, despite offering "constructive initiatives," the US failed to win the trust of the Iranian delegation, leaving it to Washington to decide whether it can regain that confidence. Iran’s foreign ministry downplayed expectations, stating that no one anticipated a deal in a single session and emphasizing continued regional contacts, while the semi‑official Tasnim news agency blamed "excessive" US demands for the impasse. The talks took place under a 14‑day ceasefire agreed by the US, Iran and Israel, with Pakistan’s foreign minister Ishaq Dar urging both sides to honour the pause and offering to facilitate renewed dialogue. The conflict, which began on 28 February, has already claimed over 3,000 lives in Iran, more than 2,000 in Lebanon, and dozens across the Gulf region, while inflicting extensive infrastructure damage. Israeli security cabinet minister Ze’ev Elkin warned that Iran is "playing with fire," even as he left the door open for further negotiations. These were the first direct US‑Iran talks in more than a decade and could determine the fate of the fragile ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz—a chokepoint for roughly 20 % of global energy supplies. The war has already sent international oil prices soaring. In addition to Vance, US special envoy Steve Witkoff and former President Trump’s son‑in‑law Jared Kushner met with Ghalibaf and Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi for two hours before a brief recess. The Iranian delegation arrived in black mourning attire for the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and carried shoes and bags belonging to children killed in a school bombing near a military compound—a strike the Pentagon says is under investigation, with some reports suggesting US involvement. Pakistani security forces sealed off Islamabad, a city of over two million, underscoring Pakistan’s newly prominent mediating role after a year of diplomatic isolation. The US military announced it was "setting conditions" to clear mines and allow warships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz, a claim Iran’s state media denied. Prior to the talks, a senior Iranian source told Reuters that the US had agreed to release frozen Iranian assets held in Qatar and other banks, a statement the US later denied. Tehran’s broader demands include control over the strait, payment of war reparations, a region‑wide ceasefire—including in Lebanon—and the collection of transit fees from shipping traffic. President Trump’s minimum objectives remain the free passage of global shipping through the strait and the crippling of Iran’s nuclear enrichment capability to prevent the development of an atomic bomb.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has confirmed that his country's technology played a crucial role in shooting down Iranian drones in the Middle East. This development comes after Zelenskyy announced last month that expert teams had been deployed to the region following the outbreak of the United States-Israeli war on Iran.In a recent statement, Zelenskyy revealed that Ukrainian forces participated in operations using domestically produced interceptor drones against 'Shahed' drones, which are similar to those used by Russia during its ongoing conflict with Ukraine.Key highlights of Zelenskyy's statement include:Ukrainian forces successfully destroyed Iranian 'shaheds' in several countries.The operations were not limited to training missions but involved actual support in building modern air defence systems.Ukrainian experts provided crucial advice on strengthening air defence systems in countries that collaborated with them.Zelenskyy expressed optimism about the future, stating that it is only a matter of time before mass production of interceptors capable of destroying drones with jet engines commences.Kyiv has effectively utilized cheap drone interceptors to neutralize Russian drones before they reach their targets. As part of the agreement, Ukraine is receiving weapons to protect its energy infrastructure and, in some cases, financial arrangements.During his recent visits to Gulf nations, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates, Zelenskyy signed defence agreements with the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

The Gulf Cooperation Council is reassessing its security model after the brief but intense US‑Israel campaign against Iran. With American bases on Gulf soil turning the region into a target for Tehran’s missile and drone barrage, Gulf capitals are looking to diversify their defence partners beyond the United States. Iran’s lingering missile arsenal and its demand to retain control of the Strait of Hormuz remain the central security dilemma. The strait channels the bulk of Gulf oil trade, and Tehran’s insistence on keeping a foothold there was a sticking point in the cease‑fire talks scheduled to begin in Islamabad. Gulf air defences boasted a high interception rate, claiming to have neutralised more than 90% of the 2,256 drones and 563 missiles that struck the United Arab Emirates, the hardest‑hit member of the bloc. Nevertheless, the Gulf is split on how to engage Iran moving forward. A hawkish bloc led by the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain favours a tougher stance, while Saudi Arabia, Qatar and others are open to restoring diplomatic ties. In a rare development, Saudi Arabia and Iran held their first official conversation since the conflict began, with foreign ministers discussing measures to lower tensions and restore regional stability. Security scholars such as Bader Mousa Al‑Saif of Kuwait University argue that Gulf states must broaden their security network, forging alliances with regional powers like Turkey and Pakistan rather than relying solely on the United States. He warned that the region needs a model that shields it from a perpetual state of war. Pre‑war trends are now accelerating: Saudi Arabia recently signed a defence pact with Pakistan, the UAE announced a partnership with India, and all three Gulf states – Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar – entered rapid defence agreements with Ukraine to counter Iranian drone threats. Talks of a “Muslim NATO” have largely faded, but a new alignment dubbed “Step”, involving Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan, is taking shape. The coalition’s purpose remains ambiguous, oscillating between counter‑Iran and counter‑Israel objectives, and internal rivalries complicate cohesion. The United Kingdom, which helped protect Gulf airspace during the hostilities, is also seeking deeper defence‑industrial cooperation with Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Prime Minister Keir Starmer in Jeddah. UAE political scientist Abdulkhaleq Abdulla predicts tighter security ties with the United States and a growing willingness among Gulf states to engage with Israel on military and intelligence fronts. Analysts such as Yasmine Farouk of the International Crisis Group note that Saudi Arabia’s extensive oil infrastructure, Red Sea ports and sheer geographic size give it a strategic advantage in post‑war reconstruction, though the cost of rebuilding could strain its Vision 2030 diversification agenda. Looking ahead, the Gulf is expected to layer additional security partnerships—particularly with European nations—while investing heavily in air and missile defence, hardened ports, desalination facilities, maritime surveillance and alternative export routes. As Andreas Krieg of King’s College London observes, the United States remains the only power with a full‑scale military architecture in the Gulf, but its bases are increasingly viewed as “tripwires” rather than protective shields.

Saudi Arabia has halted operational activities at several energy facilities due to recent attacks, according to the Saudi Press Agency. The attacks targeted oil, gas, and electricity sites in Riyadh, the Eastern Province, and Yanbu Industrial City.The attacks resulted in the death of one Saudi national from the industrial security personnel of the Saudi energy company, with seven others injured. The attacks have reduced the kingdom's oil production capacity by approximately 600,000 barrels per day.The Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar, have faced repeated drone and missile attacks from Iran over recent weeks. These attacks have contributed to increased volatility in the oil market, affecting the security of supply for consuming countries.Oil prices have jumped upward as the world weighs the prospects of a shaky Iran-US ceasefire and possibly the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital oil transit point that Iran has effectively blocked during the conflict.The ceasefire, announced by US President Donald Trump, has been placed in doubt due to Israel's ongoing daily attacks on Lebanon and Iran's attacks on the Gulf countries. Several leaders around the world have called for Lebanon to be included in the ceasefire.

The strategic Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, has become the focal point of the Israel‑U.S. war on Iran that began in February. In peacetime the narrow waterway handled about 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas shipments without any tolls, but the conflict has turned it into a contested zone. After a series of Israeli and U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated by targeting merchant vessels it deemed hostile, effectively shutting the passage and triggering one of the most severe energy‑distribution crises in recent memory. While a two‑week ceasefire, brokered by Pakistan, was declared on Tuesday, Tehran has issued a set of official terms that would govern the strait moving forward. According to Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghi, safe passage will be allowed in coordination with the Iranian armed forces and subject to technical limitations. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has even published a new navigation map that pushes traffic farther north, away from the traditional route near Oman’s coast, citing the risk of anti‑ship mines. Central to Tehran’s 10‑point peace proposal is the idea of charging fees for strait usage. Iranian media report that the plan could levy up to $2 million per vessel—a sum to be shared with Oman—or a charge of $1 per barrel of oil shipped. The revenue would allegedly fund reconstruction of military and civilian infrastructure damaged by the U.S.–Israeli campaign. Oman has publicly rejected any toll scheme, with Transport Minister Said Al‑Maawali reminding that the country has already signed all relevant international maritime transport agreements that prohibit such fees. International law adds another layer of complexity. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) prohibits levying charges for mere passage through international straits, allowing fees only for services like navigation assistance or port use. Neither the United States nor Iran have ratified UNCLOS, but the principle remains a benchmark for maritime norms. Analysts suggest a possible workaround: charging for de‑mining and safety services rather than for passage itself, which could be permissible under existing legal frameworks. The proposal has sparked diplomatic pushback. At the United Nations Security Council, Bahrain led a resolution urging coordinated reopening of the strait, backed by Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan. The resolution passed with 11 of 15 votes, but was vetoed by Russia and China, who argued it unfairly targeted Iran and ignored the initial strikes. Beyond the region, the United States is unlikely to accept indefinite tolls. Former President Donald Trump, who announced the ceasefire, warned that U.S. forces would remain in the area and threatened to resume attacks if negotiations faltered. American troops are reportedly “hanging around” to assist with traffic buildup, though the extent of their operational control remains unclear. Maritime analyst C. Uday Bhaskar notes that only three to five ships have traversed the strait since the ceasefire began, underscoring the lingering uncertainty for global shippers. He adds that ship owners facing multi‑million‑dollar losses each day may ultimately acquiesce to Iran’s terms, at least temporarily. Should Iran implement a toll regime, the immediate impact would fall on Gulf oil‑producing nations, but the ripple effects could destabilize global energy markets, already strained by supply shocks. Major powers such as the United Kingdom have been coordinating with a coalition of 40 countries to explore alternative mechanisms for reopening the waterway without conceding to tolls. In sum, Iran’s proposed protocol for the Strait of Hormuz introduces a contentious new variable into an already volatile geopolitical landscape, pitting national security interests against established maritime law and the broader stability of world energy supplies.