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The UK is leading a coalition of approximately 40 nations in virtual talks to address the ongoing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran. The waterway, crucial for global energy supply, has been blocked since the US and Israel initiated a war on Iran on February 28.The blockade has had severe economic repercussions, causing global oil prices to skyrocket above $100 per barrel, a roughly 40% increase from pre-war levels. This surge has forced countries, particularly in Asia, to implement fuel rationing and reduce industrial production. For instance, Malaysia has ordered all civil servants to work from home to conserve energy.The US has opted out of these talks, with President Donald Trump stating it's not the US's responsibility to reopen the strait, suggesting that European countries should secure their own oil. In response, UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer is chairing a video conference with over 40 countries, including France, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Canada, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates.The meeting's agenda includes assessing diplomatic and political measures to restore freedom of navigation, ensure the safety of trapped ships and seafarers, and resume the movement of vital commodities. The UK government has also outlined plans to clear the strait of landmines and protect tankers crossing the area.Experts suggest that while the coalition's efforts are crucial, the blockade's resolution is uncertain without an arrangement with Iran. Iran has demanded international recognition of its authority over the Strait of Hormuz as one of its conditions for a ceasefire. The country's parliament is also considering legislation to collect tolls from ships transiting the strait.Analysts argue that reopening the strait by force would require US and European allies to collaborate. However, under current circumstances, the coalition's success seems doubtful unless a negotiated arrangement with Iran is reached.

Following US and Israeli strikes that killed senior Iranian figures, concerns have emerged about the power dynamics within Iran's leadership. The country's response to these actions and the implications for the region are significant.This episode of 'The Take' examines the key players in Iran's system, how decisions are made, and the potential impact of losing top figures on Iran's response to the ongoing conflict with the US and Israel.Key topics include:The structure of Iran's leadership and decision-making processesThe role of senior figures and their influence on policyThe potential consequences of their loss for Iran's stance on the US-Israel conflictThe analysis features insights from Ali Hashem, a senior Al Jazeera correspondent, providing a deeper understanding of the complexities at play.

The United States is reportedly contemplating a daring military operation to confiscate Iran's reserves of highly enriched uranium, a move that experts warn would be fraught with significant challenges and risks.Ensuring Iran does not possess nuclear weapons or the capability to produce them using enriched uranium has been a primary objective for the US during negotiations with Iranian officials over the past year. This goal was also cited as a justification for the US bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities during last year's 12-day war with Israel and for initiating the ongoing conflict in February, despite ongoing talks with Iran at the time.Iran possesses approximately 440 kilograms (970 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60 percent, a level at which it becomes considerably easier to reach the 90 percent threshold required to produce a nuclear weapon. This amount theoretically could be used to produce more than 10 nuclear warheads, according to International Atomic Energy Agency chief Rafael Grossi.Iran asserts that its nuclear program is exclusively for civilian energy purposes, despite enriching uranium far beyond the required threshold. Iranian officials have expressed openness to discussing a reduction in the level of enrichment during past negotiations but have refused to dismantle the country's nuclear program entirely, citing national sovereignty concerns.In 2015, the former Obama administration negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and other nations, under which Iran agreed not to enrich uranium to high levels and to undergo frequent inspections. However, Trump withdrew the US from this agreement during his first term as president.Challenges in Accessing and Transporting the UraniumAny military ground operation to extract the uranium would face substantial chemical, logistical, and tactical hurdles. Isfahan, where about half of the enriched uranium is believed to be stored, is over 480 kilometers (about 300 miles) inland, far from the nearest US naval ships. This would necessitate transporting US forces, possibly alongside Israeli troops, over a long distance through an active warzone, accompanied by heavy equipment.Securing a substantial perimeter around the site and holding that territory for the duration of the operation would be required, all while mitigating the risk of constant fire from Iran. Experts describe this as a risky and infeasible operation.Storing and Handling the UraniumIf the US were to successfully extract the uranium, it would likely be stored in the form of hexafluoride gas, which is difficult to handle and reacts with water to produce extremely toxic chemicals. The uranium hexafluoride must be stored in small, separated canisters to prevent neutrons from multiplying out of control.Any damage to these canisters could trigger the release of toxic chemicals, posing a radiological hazard. An alternative would be to destroy the cylinders on the spot using Army Nuclear Disablement Teams, but this would result in chemical contamination and environmental hazards.Previous Operations and Potential AlternativesIn 1994, US forces undertook a secret operation dubbed Project Sapphire to remove weapons-grade uranium from Kazakhstan. A similar operation for Iran is being considered, but it would require coordination with Iranian authorities and the IAEA, and a cessation of hostilities.A less risky approach would be for the US to negotiate a deal with Iran, resulting in the stockpile being left in place but under international oversight, being downblended, or being removed with Iranian agreement.

Gabriele Gravina, the head of Italy's football federation (FIGC), has resigned following the men's national team's failure to qualify for the World Cup for a third consecutive time. This decision comes after a meeting at the FIGC's headquarters in Rome on Thursday.Gravina's resignation was announced a day after Sport Minister Andrea Abodi called for his departure. Italy's national team lost to Bosnia and Herzegovina in a penalty shootout during the playoffs on Tuesday, securing their absence from this year's World Cup in the United States, Canada, and Mexico.The FIGC has scheduled a vote for a new president on June 22. Giovanni Malago, the former head of the Italian National Olympic Committee, is reportedly among the candidates. Additionally, head coach Gennaro Gattuso and general manager Gianluigi Buffon are expected to step down.Italy's football crisis prompted Abodi to state that the sport needs to be rebuilt from the ground up, starting with changes at the top of the FIGC. Gravina had previously acknowledged that Italian football is in a profound crisis.During his tenure, which began in 2018, Gravina oversaw Italy's Euro 2020 triumph under Roberto Mancini. However, two World Cup qualification failures and a disappointing European title defense led to his resignation.Italy's football woes extend beyond the national team, with Serie A clubs not winning the Champions League since 2010. The country's hosting rights for Euro 2032, which it will cohost with Turkey, are also under scrutiny due to concerns over stadium infrastructure.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Secretary-General, Jassim al-Budaiwi, has urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take immediate action to stop Iranian attacks on Gulf countries, which he described as a 'flagrant violation' of international law and the UN Charter.Speaking at the UNSC, al-Budaiwi called on the council to 'take all necessary measures' to bring an end to Iran's attacks on Gulf countries and to protect maritime corridors and guarantee uninterrupted maritime navigation through strategic waterways in the region.The GCC chief also emphasized the need for the six GCC states – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates – to be included in any talks or deals with Iran 'to enhance regional security and prevent further escalation or repetition of such attacks in the future.'Iran has been carrying out daily missile and drone attacks across the Middle East, including in Arab Gulf nations, since the US and Israel launched a war against the country on February 28. These attacks have struck civilian sites, including critical energy facilities, and have effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, a key Gulf waterway through which about one-fifth of the world's oil and liquified natural gas supplies transit.The situation has sent global energy prices skyrocketing, and frustrations are growing across the Gulf as the US-Israeli war on Iran drags on. According to Al Jazeera's Zein Basravi, 85 percent of the projectiles fired by Iran have targeted Gulf countries, with the UAE being the hardest hit.

In Zimbabwe, a proposed constitutional amendment has sparked widespread debate and concern among citizens. The amendment, known as CAB3, aims to extend President Emmerson Mnangagwa's term from 2028 to 2030, changing presidential and legislative terms from five to seven years.Critics argue that this move will consolidate power in the hands of Mnangagwa's ruling ZANU-PF party, making it increasingly difficult for opposition leaders to assume power. Currently, the president is elected through a popular vote, but the proposed changes would allow parliament to elect the president, potentially paving the way for a dynastic succession.Public hearings on the bill have been marred by chaos and allegations of bias, with many citizens expressing concerns about the rushed and limited consultation process. Opponents of the bill, including former finance minister Tendai Biti and opposition leaders, have been arrested and intimidated.Supporters of the bill, however, argue that it will enhance political stability and allow Mnangagwa to complete his development projects. But critics counter that term limits are essential to preventing authoritarianism and ensuring peaceful transfers of power.As the bill moves forward, Zimbabweans are worried about the future of their democracy and the potential for further repression. The country's economy is in shambles, and many believe that Mnangagwa's extended term will only exacerbate the situation.

Despite a United Nations-led ceasefire in Yemen, which largely reduced hostilities four years ago, nearly 1,200 children have been killed or injured due to shelling, gunfire, landmines, and other explosive remnants of war. According to Save the Children, since the truce brokered on April 2, 2022, at least 339 children have been killed and 843 injured, with some suffering life-altering injuries.The United Kingdom-based humanitarian organization found that 511 child casualties, nearly one in two, were due to landmines and explosive remnants of war. Data from the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) suggested that children were more than three times more likely than adults to be killed or injured by explosive remnants. Save the Children attributed this to a lack of mine risk awareness and increased exposure due to child labor.“These figures are a reminder that beyond the front lines, the war on children continues in their homes, schools and areas where they play and help their families tend to land,” said Rishana Haniffa, Save the Children’s country director in Yemen. “Amid escalating wider regional tensions, there is a real risk of triggering a wider confrontation in Yemen and the Red Sea that could undermine hard-won progress to reduce armed violence in the country in the past four years, exposing children to even more harm.”The conflict in Yemen has also led to significant psychological distress in children, with blast injuries causing permanent disabilities, including injuries to the spine, amputation of limbs, and loss of sight and hearing. Children have experienced difficulty sleeping, daily fear, and anxiety, with some, like Kamal, undergoing life-changing surgery.

The United Nations‑backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF) announced on Wednesday that its first foreign troops have landed in Haiti, signalling a new phase in the international effort to tame the country’s spiralling gang warfare.An advance team of soldiers from Chad arrived in Port‑au‑Prince, accompanied by Jack Christofides, a South African UN official appointed to lead the mission’s operations on the ground.The deployment is the initial step of a force slated to expand to 5,500 personnel with a 12‑month mandate. The GSF was authorized by the UN Security Council last September as a replacement for the earlier Kenyan‑led multinational security mission, which has struggled with funding shortfalls, insufficient manpower and limited institutional backing.Unlike its predecessor, which was limited to supporting Haitian police, the new force will have the authority to make arrests and conduct direct operations against groups designated as gangs. The concept was first put forward by the United States and Panama to “neutralise, isolate and deter” criminal networks.During the Security Council vote, twelve members voted in favour of the force, while China, Russia and Pakistan abstained. Russia’s representative, Vassily Nebenzia, criticised the plan as “rushed” and warned that its broad language could enable abuses, noting that the mandate permits the use of force against anyone labelled a gang.Haiti’s recent history of foreign intervention adds a layer of sensitivity to the deployment. Past UN peacekeeping missions have been linked to a cholera outbreak that claimed roughly 10,000 lives after the 2010 earthquake, and UN personnel have faced accusations of sexual assault in earlier decades.Gang control has tightened dramatically since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse. Analysts estimate that up to 90 % of Port‑au‑Prince is now under gang influence, with around 26 criminal groups operating in the capital. The UN estimates that at least 16,000 people have been killed since 2022 and that more than 1.5 million have been displaced, many facing food insecurity. A recent human‑rights report recorded 5,519 gang‑related deaths and 2,608 injuries between March 2025 and mid‑January 2026, alongside reports of extrajudicial killings and sexual violence.The arrival of the GSF coincides with Haiti’s tentative steps toward a national election scheduled for August, where roughly 300 political parties and groups have registered. Acting Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils‑Aime has recently met with UN officials to discuss the new force’s role in stabilising the country ahead of the vote.

Europe’s attention is fixed on Hungary’s parliamentary election scheduled for April 12, a contest many analysts view as a litmus test for the bloc’s cohesion on foreign‑policy, defence, energy and migration. Since coming to power, Prime Minister Viktor Orban has consistently blocked EU initiatives: he has refused to join a common asylum framework, opposed a joint defence scheme, resisted the shift toward renewable‑energy independence while still importing Russian hydrocarbons, and vetoed both Ukraine’s accession talks and a proposed €90 billion low‑interest loan package for Kyiv. These actions have made Hungary the most disruptive member state in the Union, prompting observers to argue that the election’s outcome will reverberate far beyond Budapest’s borders. Greek conservative MP Angelos Syrigos warned that the EU is plagued by “fanatically Trump‑like and pro‑Russian” governments, naming Hungary and Slovakia as examples. He told Al Jazeera that the constant threat of an Orban veto forces other capitals to seek ad‑hoc compromises rather than genuine consensus. Opposition leader Peter Magyar of the Tisza party is campaigning on a pro‑European platform, pledging a binding referendum on Ukraine’s membership, a crackdown on corruption, the release of billions in frozen EU funds, and a reversal of Hungary’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. Current polls give Tisza roughly 50 % of the vote, a ten‑point lead over the ruling Fidesz, though the political landscape remains fluid. Even a Magyar victory would not automatically resolve the EU’s structural challenges. Other illiberal leaders—such as Slovakia’s Robert Fico and the Czech Republic’s Andrej Babiš—could step into a vacuum of obstructionism. Nevertheless, some scholars argue that Orban’s habit of breaking consensus has forced the Union to become more pragmatic. At a December 2023 summit, EU leaders temporarily excluded Orban to secure unanimous approval of Ukraine’s candidate status, later offering Hungary a €10 billion release of blocked funds as an incentive. Professor Katalin Miklossy of the University of Helsinki explained that the EU has shifted from a rigid, rule‑bound approach to a more flexible, problem‑solving mindset, saying, “We were weak when we clung to the book; now we act more practically.” Should Orban remain in power, the bloc is considering a workaround: issuing 26 bilateral loans to Ukraine from member states, bypassing any single‑country veto. Historical precedent exists. In 2010, when Greece’s debt crisis threatened the euro, EU members created the Greek Loan Facility—an ad‑hoc series of bilateral loans that compensated for the lack of a common rescue fund. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has warned that delays in funding could leave the Ukrainian army under‑resourced, underscoring the geopolitical stakes of the Hungarian vote. The EU’s inability to move from unanimity to qualified‑majority voting—an ambition thwarted by failed French and Dutch referenda in 2005—has amplified Orban’s leverage. Yet the Union continues to evolve, having launched a common bond in 2020 to revive the pandemic‑hit economy and, since Russia’s 2022 invasion, channeling resources into a nascent European defence union. Orban’s recent reversal on the €90 billion Ukraine loan—after Kyiv refused to repair the Druzhba pipeline damaged by a Russian bomb—illustrates the volatility of his stance. He initially agreed to the loan in December, on the condition that Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic would not be required to co‑sign, only to withdraw support a month later. Even if Magyar secures a parliamentary majority, the promised loan may not materialise immediately. Cambridge‑based expert Victoria Vdovychenko notes that a decision made in December 2025 to disburse funds from January 2026 has already stalled, with the next realistic window possibly in June. Academics stress that a Tisza victory would deliver a psychological boost to the EU and its trans‑Atlantic partners, injecting confidence into a system battling “stealth creep of illiberalism” and economic disenfranchisement. Professor SM Amadae of Cambridge’s Centre for the Study of Existential Risk warned that while a change in Hungary could energise citizens, the entrenched gerrymandering and patronage networks of Fidesz present formidable obstacles to lasting reform. In sum, the April 12 election is more than a domestic contest; it is a pivotal moment that could reshape the EU’s decision‑making architecture, determine the flow of critical aid to Ukraine, and signal the future trajectory of populist politics across Europe.